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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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IS THE STATE A DIVINE INSTITUTION?

A celebrated critic in a celebrated criticism has taken a poor poet severely to task for having, in one of his poems, observed that the deity was present at some of the events related in it—a proposition, says the critic, which might be safely predicated of any event that ever happened or ever will happen. In a similar strain some friends have commented upon the title of this present lecture, *Is the State a Divine Institution?* Why they have said, in a sense it is a divine institution; for is not God the author of everything? In the language of philosophy, all being is derived from the Infinite, all secondary causes depend for their existence from the First Cause; or, to state the same truth in the more homely, but not less precise, words of the Gospel, by Him are made all things that are made, and without Him was made nothing that has been made. Of course, in this sense, the State is of divine origin; and so is everything else from the solar system to the suffragette movement. But you surely do not propose to inflict upon an innocent audience a disquisition of an hour's length on a platitude.

Those who made these remarks—and they were very intelligent persons, quite familiar with Washington political life—did not seem to entertain for a moment the supposition that the State could have any other claim to a divine origin than the one above referred to. Yet the purpose of this paper is

certainly not the idle one of raising the barren ontological question which cannot be answered in the negative without denying the infinity of God. The question means, is the political State a contrivance of the human mind and will, just like, for example, a railroad company, but on a larger scale; or is its existence ordained in a special manner by God, so that it stands, in the moral world, on quite a different plane from any association or organization created by human ingenuity and co-operation? In other words, is the State to be considered as purely a product of human reason and volition established by men to promote their welfare, which they are perfectly free to institute or not to institute just as it pleases them; or is it, on the contrary, provided for and ordained in the Providential scheme of things to be—we are speaking of men in general—a necessary means for man to rightly develop his nature and realize his destiny? This is the query which this paper proposes to answer by stating the authoritative Catholic doctrine bearing on the subject.

As an initial step it may be well to define in what sense the word State is here accepted. We have a very large number of definitions of the term; for students and masters in political science, when they take account of all the details involved in the idea, and all the actual varieties of the thing which the idea represents, find, as is usual in a problem of this kind, a great deal of difficulty in formulating a definition which shall conform to the rules of logic by being applicable to all the individual things of the class defined and to none outside of that class.

In our present case, however, we need not insist on absolute scientific precision with regard to the meaning of the term. We shall use it to signify an organized civil society, politically independent of any other such organization, and exercising supreme authority in temporal affairs over the members of the society. We speak of civil society as distinct from the State, but this distinction is rather mental than actual. In the concrete they are not distinct; they both embrace the same aggregate of persons or groups of persons, but when we speak

of the aggregate as the society, we think of it apart from the power or authority which serves to organize it into a sovereign political unity. When, on the other hand, we think of the same aggregate, the people, as permeated, organized and controlled by that supreme authority which binds the otherwise loosely associated groups into one compact whole, we call it the State. If a collection of families were living together, united by mutual relationships, common pursuits and interests, but under the authority of no individual or body of individuals, that collection would be the inchoate or partially developed society; when there should arise in such a collection of families some controlling authority, exercising a compulsory directive power over the individuals and groups of the society, and itself subject to no other power of a similar kind, then the society would have developed into a State.

Now on surveying mankind today from China to Peru, we observe that everywhere men are grouped into states; and history, with its sister sciences, tells us that the same has been the case as far as we can pursue the traces of man into the dark backward and abysm of time. Among some tribes of degraded savages, indeed, the characteristics of social and political life present themselves only in an extremely imperfect and rudimentary form; but the germ at least is there in a condition of development corresponding to the general mental and moral development that prevails in the tribe. Now we face the question, whence are we to trace the origin of this universally spread institution of human life, what has given rise to the State?

The question thus stated must be disintegrated into two, one of which addresses itself to the historian, the other to the moralist or jurist. To trace historically the origin of the State the student's work would be to collect the data that history, archæology and ethnology provide relative to the manner in which states actually came to exist; to supplement this data by judicious inference based upon them and upon the known tendencies, needs and activities of human nature, and the external conditions in which man's lot is cast. History can

inform us accurately concerning the origin of many states, our own Republic, for example; but apart from the revelation contained in the Bible, it can tell us but little regarding how or when the State, in its rudimentary form first sprung up as an institution of human life. Nevertheless the research and reflection of a host of earnest workers, who do not always agree in detail among themselves, permit us to hold with sufficient certitude that the actual origin of the State has been, roughly speaking, as follows:—A number of families living in proximity, in some cases associated with each other by ties of blood were brought into mutual relationship by their respective wants, and powers to supply the wants of one another. They entered into relations of exchange or barter; they introduced a division of labor. They began the work of organization by acknowledging as authoritative some principles of justice and other moral rules, they devised some system of defense against outside enemies; and against members of their own community who disregarded the rights of others and the feelings or prejudices of the society. In the course of time a body of customs was evolved and accepted as being obligatory guides of conduct. To prevent the dissension and violence that would constantly occur if every quarrel were to be fought out and settled by the parties concerned some individuals were acknowledged arbiters or judges whose decisions were enforced by the consensus of the community or by physical compulsion. Some persons too, were chosen either by suffrage or the force of circumstances to be the leaders in military defense. And, usually, some method was fixed upon to determine who, on the death of the holders of these offices, should succeed to the power. When these developments had been taken the society found itself to be a State.

Our present enquiry, however, is only indirectly interested in historical origins. Its purport is of a different character. The problem which it pursues lies not in the order of facts, but in the order of rights. It is philosophic, rational, or, if you prefer the term, jural. It is a problem dealing primarily not with *is* but with *ought*. What we want to know is whence

is derived the right in virtue of which those individuals, or collections of individuals who exercise authority on the part of the State, can justly lay obligations on the independent wills of the members of the community. In all that belongs to the essentials of our nature, in all the rights intrinsically inherent to personality all men are equal, and no individuals or group of individuals possess as originating in and belonging to themselves the moral power of imposing any limitation or constriction on the will of any other person. How then are we to account for the legitimacy and moral validity of political authority in virtue of which these individuals in whom it is justly vested have the undoubted right to make laws to bind their associates in the community, and by various means involving physical constraint enforce compliance with the laws and punish infractions of them?

Various theories have been proposed to account for the legitimacy of this power. Students of the subject usually begin with a study of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. The limitations of our time save you from having any review, however short, of the Republic or of the Politics inflicted upon you. Nor shall we examine any modern theories any further than an inspection of their character will enable us more thoroughly to grasp the import of our own doctrine.

These theories, besides, are too numerous to permit us to review them individually. But the principal ones closely related in virtue of common descent, and from which they have inherited a common feature. The distinctive character of them is that they rest the authority of the State upon a purely human basis. They might take as their motto the expression which Laplace is said to have used when Napoleon observed that the astronomer in his great work on the heavens had made no reference to the Creator: we have no need of that hypothesis. The origin of political powers, according to this school of thought is some kind of a contract or compact which the original members of a community entered into for the purpose of establishing a civic society or State. Their theories taken together as a class are conveniently called the contract theories.

The leading advocates of them were the Englishman Thomas Hobbes and the Frenchman Jean Jacques Rousseau. These philosophers are the parents, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of subsequent writers who while disregarding the views of Hobbes or Rousseau as a whole, nevertheless assume as axiomatic the leading principle of these doctrines which is that the political authority arises solely from the consent of the people; and that the original liberty of the individual cannot become subject to civic authority except through his own act.

The English philosopher starts from the assumption that the original and truly natural condition of man was one in which every individual was absolutely independent, and unrestrained by any social or moral relations with his fellows. It was a condition of warfare in which every man's hand was against every other man. Force and brutality reigned uncontrolled by any moral or jural restriction. Obviously, this plan of life, however strenuous it might be, was not the one best adapted to permit the individual to obtain the maximum of enjoyment of the desirable things which lay in his path. So, for their common benefit the individuals agreed to surrender their liberty and power to a certain extent at least, in order that some common authority might emerge strong enough to coerce all and establish a condition of peace and order under which each one should reap a larger measure of well-being than was possible for him in the original condition of warfare. The jural foundation of the State, then, according to Hobbes, is "a covenant of every man with every man in such manner as if every man should say to every man 'I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.' This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth." This, he continues, is the generation of Leviathan, his symbolic name for the State.¹ "In him," Hobbes proceeds, "consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which, to define it, is one person of whose acts a great

¹ *Leviathan*, Morley ed., p. 84.

multitude, by mutual authority one with another have made themselves every one the author, to this end (that) he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense."

Like Hobbes, Rousseau assumes that man's natural state was one of solitary independence and absolute liberty; but, in contrast with Hobbes' primeval ruffian, Rousseau's man was an idyllic creature, endowed with every charm and every goodness. Society, Rousseau held, is an artificial state introduced subsequent to the original natural state of solitary existence. Whereas Hobbes declares that when the people individually surrender their liberty, the alienation is complete and irrevocable, Rousseau's teaching is that they never can possibly abjure their liberty and independence. They enter into a contract to constitute a State authority. But the object of this contract is "to form an association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, uniting with all, shall obey, however only himself, and remain as free as before." In this manner is created what Rousseau calls the *general will*. "Thus is produced a moral collective body, which derives from this act its unity, its common personality, its life, its will. To conceive the existence of an entity corresponding to "the general will" is a difficult feat for the intellect, or even for the imagination. It is not at all what we ordinarily mean by the general will, which is a general consensus of the wills of all the persons who make up the people, or of a majority of them. There is, Rousseau tells us, quite a difference between the will of all and the general will, for the will of all is the sum of particular wills. In accepting the general will he declares the individual continues to enjoy full liberty. Because when a proposed law is submitted to the people they are not asked "whether they approve of the proposition or reject it, but whether it is conformed to the general will which is theirs. When therefore the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves nothing but that I have made a mistake, and that what I thought to be the general will was not such. If my

opinion had prevailed I should have done something other than I had wished to do; it is then I should not have been free." The general will of Rousseau, at once the will of each individual and yet not his will, a will not identical with the consensus of wills, a will belonging to no person, but existing, if one may say so, *in vacuo*, is, as Woolsey has caustically characterized it, a fine illustration of the absurd in impractical abstractions.

Against the contractual theories criticism has launched many unanswerable arguments; one being that no such universal compact or contract as they postulate ever did or ever could have been entered into among men. Another is that the social condition is not unnatural to man; on the contrary, that it shows itself as a normal development of his nature without which he cannot attain to his destined perfection. Furthermore the conception that the rights of the State are composed of the personal rights which the individuals relinquish is obviously false. The individual does not surrender his personal rights in becoming a member of an organized society. It is true that his liberty is subjected to more restrictions that would exist for him if he were living after the fashion of Robinson Crusoe, but he does not surrender any class of rights. The first duty of the State is to protect him in the peaceable enjoyment of his rights. Besides, the State has rights which never belonged to the individual at all; as, for instance, the right to inflict capital punishment.

Another unanswerable charge against these theories is that they fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem which they have been invented to solve: why and how can we be lawfully bound by the will of another?

Assuming that a contract such as Hobbes or Rousseau has described was ever entered into, it would have bound those and those only who were parties to it, it would have no force whatever to bind succeeding generations. One of the supporters of the contract idea, Thomas Jefferson, by logically deducing the absurd consequences contained in it, unintentionally revealed its weakness. He said that, as a political contract of

this kind could bind only the individuals who were originally parties to it, and as the life of a generation is about thirty years, every constitution and law expires at the end of thirty years. Subsequently he reduced the period by one-half, thereby as one of his critics has observed reducing the life of almost every political constitution to a span shorter than that of a horse.

Though the contract theories have been as a whole abandoned they have left as a legacy to our contemporay political constructive thinkers the idea of the general will.

Perceiving clearly that the State's authority, if it can justly lay obligations on the wills of the citizens, must derive from some other will that is on a higher plane and superior to the individual will, political theorists of today, nevertheless, refuse to raise their eyes to the only authority which exists with a native right to bind our free personalities. So they labor over the hopeless task of constructing some transcendental will residing in the body-politic distinct from, and superior to, the wills of the citizens and to the sum of those wills meeting in a general consent, or in the consent of the majority. They might just as well contend that, distinct from the sum of the digestive apparatus possessed by each citizen, the people as a body have also a transcendental stomach which belongs to no one in particular and yet is the property of each.

The foregoing considerations have placed in evidence two principles, one of which is common to our own doctrine and the antagonistic theories that we have glanced at. This one is that to vindicate the claim made by political authority, and acknowledged by all but anarchists, to have a just power to lay binding obligations on those ruled by it, it must derive its power from a source jurally superior to those wills which it assumes to control. The second principle which is set in relief by the failure of the contractual theories to solve the problem is that to discover the true origin of the State we must revert to God, the only source of all authority over the free creature whom He has endowed with liberty.

The Catholic doctrine has been succinctly stated in the

plainest of language, many years ago by Paul of Tarsus writing to some citizens of the greatest State that the world has ever seen. "Let every soul," he wrote to his disciples in Rome, "be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." Continuing to speak of the political ruler he calls him God's minister to whom all are to be subject, not only through fear but also for conscience sake; and that, he adds, is the reason why men are to pay lawful taxes to the proper officials; "because they are the ministers of God serving to that end."

Those familiar with the ambitious motives and methods that prevail extensively in political life may be inclined to believe that to ascribe any sacred character to State authority is highly incongruous. Many good people no doubt who would not think of challenging any apostolic teaching would treat it as an irreverent joke if a tax collector or the custom-house inspector at the New York docks were to claim that in discharging his duties he was acting with authority derived from on high. The policeman is a figure which, however dignified, is, even in the religious mind, but remotely associated with the Kingdom of Heaven. The belief that the ruler rules by the authority of God and right divine may in the opinion of a great number be left at this stage of the world's history to the moth-eaten theologian and the Emperor of Germany.

When properly understood, however, the doctrine that the authority of the State is derived in a special manner from the supreme source of all right, justice and authority cannot but appear eminently reasonable to any one who believes in God at all; that is to say, not merely in an impersonal First Cause, or absolute groundwork of all existence, but in God as the author of the moral law, the fount of righteousness, the ultimate ground of justice as of truth, who, in creating man destined this creature to an end and traced out for him a law by which his activities should be governed in order to achieve his perfection and attain that end.

As a preliminary step towards reaching the true significance of the doctrine that we must look upon supreme political authority as derived or descended from the Almighty, let us first glance briefly at some conceptions which are not to be confounded with it. In the first place it is not identical with the theory known as the divine right of kings. This theory is that the sovereign receives his authority to rule directly from God by some mysterious method of communication. Having thus received it from on high, the sovereign as distinct from the community, is the sole possessor of the power, or, if you like, he can truly affirm, as Louis XIV said of himself, *L'état c'est moi*. The people and their ruler are two entirely distinct parts of the social body. Responsible only to God from whom he received it, the sovereign cannot forfeit his rights by misgovernment nor diminish them by any concessions to the people. If under stress of adversity he is obliged to make any contract of this kind he is not bound by it and may repudiate it when he has been delivered from his difficulties. This theory was advocated widely during the Seventeenth Century by Protestant theologians subservient to princes who were ambitious to exercise paramount authority over religious affairs in their dominions, and by Catholics supporting their kings who endeavored to restrict and supervise the existence of papal authority in their kingdoms. The civil power has never been communicated in this manner to any political ruler outside the case of the Jewish theory recorded in the Scripture. Again, in the supernatural order we have the example of another form of divine communication made directly to the recipient, but not without the previous intervention of human agency. This is the case of the Pope who receives immediately from God the powers of Peter, but not until the cardinalitial conclave determines by a majority of votes who is to be the successor of Peter. Political power is imparted in no supernatural or preternatural manner. Nor is it conveyed through the operation of physical causes and laws and facts, as is the case with parental authority which by the very fact of birth arises independent

of the human will. Political power is not communicated to any person or body of persons until the explicit or implicit consent of the people or some combination of circumstances equivalent to such a rational consent designates those to whom the power shall be entrusted. In what sense then is the State, and especially the authority which organizes the otherwise loosely associated elements of the society into a harmonious and stable unity, and, having organized it, direct it to realize its end, of divine origin.

Let us go down to the root of the matter. We sometimes say that a certain law is unjust though it has been enacted in a perfectly legal manner. Now to say so is to imply that above and independent of civil or human law there exists for us some standard of justice by which we may try these laws and approve or condemn them accordingly; that superior to the laws of the State there is some law which the State is bound to observe under penalty of acting unrighteously and thereby vitiating its claim to our obedience. Our legal system itself acknowledges by the existence of our courts of equity that there is a law of natural justice authoritative enough to over-ride any statutory enactment when the latter works out to unfair conclusions in some particular case. There is then some transcendent law superior to and independent of State authority and human legislation. You may say perhaps, "Certainly,, but this law is nothing else but the judgment of our reason. If we say that some human law is unjust and if we are asked why we say so we immediately proceed to point out considerations that warrant us in calling it unreasonable." True, the supreme law is the law of our reason rightly exercised. But it is that and at the same time something immeasurably higher and more venerable. Human reason is not its original fount nor the source of its validity. Reason—our reason—recognizes it, acknowledges its authority and interprets it—not always truthfully—in order to apply it to the direction of our lives. The great thinkers of the Pagan world, no less explicitly than the Christian philosopher, have borne witness to the existence and the transcendent

majesty of the higher law. It is proclaimed in one of the noblest passages of Greek poetry. When Antigone, in violation of King Creon's express decree, pays the honors of sepulture to the corpse of her disgraced brother, Creon upbraids her with having defied his edict. She replies:

" Nowise from Zeus, methought, this edict came,
Nor justice that abides among the gods
In Hades who ordained these laws for men.
Nor did I deem thine edicts of such force
That they, a mortal's bidding, should o'er ride
Unwritten laws, eternal in the heavens.
Not of to-day or yesterday are these ;
They live from everlasting, and from whence
They sprang none knoweth." (Sophocles, *Antigone*.)

The consensus of classic philosophers on the existence of the supreme law has been gathered by Cicero, who says: " This then, as it appears to me has been the decision of the wisest philosophers—that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by and decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Therefore they call that aboriginal and supreme law, the mind of God, enjoining or forbidding each separate thing in accordance with reason." This witness of the ancient world is repeated and confirmed by the world of today wherever prejudice or false philosophy has not made thought subservient to the Positivism which refuses to acknowledge a God who is the moral ruler of the universe. The greatest master of political wisdom who has used the English language says: " We are all born in subjection, all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in subjection to one great imitable pre-existent law, prior to all our devices and all our contrivances, paramount to all our ideas and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of the universe out of which we cannot stir. This great law does not arise from our conventions and compacts; on the contrary, it gives to our compacts all the force they have."

Let us now turn from these somewhat vague descriptions to the precise thought of Catholic philosophy. When God by an act of His will gave existence to the universe He had conceived everything in order and harmony. He destined all things to an end, and that they might attain their ends He prescribed a course which each according to its kind should follow in its rise, development and progress towards its perfection or final goal. This course or law He fixed for things when He constituted their respective natures, just as the clock-maker determines by the character of the mechanism which he puts into a clock which he constructs, whether it shall strike the quarters and half-hours or only the hours, or not strike at all. The universe, however, contains two widely different classes of beings; it is divided into the moral world and the non-moral world, the world of free will and the world of creatures which do not possess the power of controlling their actions. The first of these two worlds comprises man. The second, everything else in the visible universe except man. The characteristic which marks man as a being of a different and incomparably higher order than those of the sub-human and merely material realms is that his possession of intelligence and free will renders him the master of his actions, the arbiter of his conduct. In accordance with this radical difference between the human and the non-human is a difference in the manner in which the mandates of the eternal are issued to these two kinds of creatures. In the merely physical world the course of all beings is traced for them in terms of "you must;" to man the form of the divine mandate is "you ought." The physical universe is bound in the iron chain of cause and effect; man is bound to shape his conduct in harmony with the divine plan and the eternal law by the bond of duty or moral obligation. The everlasting law of Sophocles, of Cicero and of Burke has been defined by St. Augustine as the Eternal Reason and Will of God, ordaining that the order which He has established be respected and forbidding its violation. This Eternal Law is no separate distinct being such as the Stoics imagined it to be; on the other hand, it is

no mere abstraction; for it is one aspect of God Himself, the ground and exemplar of all truth, order and justice.

But, one may say, if this transcendent law is the divine nature, how can we reach a knowledge of its tenor or contents? *Who by searching can find out God?* The means are provided; a copy of the Law, so far as it bears upon our lives exists in the very constitution of our own nature and of the things which form the world in which we live, move, and have our being.

The interpreter of this text is our own reason with which God has endowed us to be the guide of our own life. So that what we call the law of reason, the natural law or the moral law is a temporal copy of the law which is from everlasting. Live according to your natural nature, observe the order prescribed by God, obey your conscience, are various formulæ of one import epitomizing the commands of that law which the Creator has imposed on the human will. From that law every just human law draws its vigor, and every just human authority must derive its warrant from that same source. God alone possesses at first hand the right to impose obligation on the free wills of men. No human beings or aggregation of human beings can of their own authority impose their dictates on any other person; because every other person is their equal and is jurally independent of them by the constitution of our common nature.

In order, then, to learn what is the course of life prescribed in the Eternal Law two concurrent methods are to be followed. One is directly to inspect our own nature in its entirety under all its various aspects, according to its essential constitution; in all its manifold relations, with its higher and lower elements, spiritual and material; with its distinction of sex, and its need for society as an indispensable means to its normal development. The knowledge gained from this method will be controlled, and false inferences may be corrected by studying how some of the race in the past have interpreted or misinterpreted the demands of our moral nature, and frequently, through prejudice, ignorance, erroneous re-

ligious notions, and the influence of passion have reached false conceptions of what the moral law prescribes, and formed false codes of morality in consequence. Thus by introspection, observation and reflection on experience, reason is able to interpret that living volume in which the Divine Language has written His *Thou Shalt* and *Thou Shalt Not* for the human race in accordance with that Eternal Law of order which is the expression of His own nature.

One of the clearly expressed ordinances of this law is that, in order suitably to develop his powers and capacities to their normal perfection, man shall enter into social relations with his fellow-men; not merely into those social relations which constitute the family and arise in consequence of physical laws, but also into that broader though less intimate form of association known as civil society. That in the teeth of the evidence to the contrary offered by psychology, history, and ethnology any philosophers should be found to assert that a man is not by nature a social being is but another example of the extravagances to which one may be driven by the exigencies of a favorite theory. Given the conditions necessary—sufficient numbers and physical proximity—civil society will arise by the force of nature in the manner we have already sketched when touching upon the historical origin of states. Now let us listen to Leo XIII, completing the last link in the chain of our argument: “Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties; hence it is divinely ordained that he should lead his life, be it family, social, or civil, with his fellow-men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But as no society can hold together unless there be a head over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority no less than society itself has its source in nature, and has consequently God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone

is the true and supreme Lord of the world. Everything without exception must be subject to Him and must serve Him, so that whoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source, namely, God the Sovereign Ruler of all. *There is no power but from God.*" The authority of the State, then, is no mere human contrivance; it is not begotten by the consent of the governed; it is the offspring of "the one great immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices and all our contrivances, . . . antecedent to our very existence by which we are knit and connected in the frame of the universe out of which we cannot stir.

"But," some may say, "must we believe that the Almighty as author of nature has directly constituted every State that exists or ever has existed? Has He instituted the various forms of government, here a republic, there an absolute, elsewhere a constitutional monarchy, an oligarchy or a military despotism?" Or, the objection may be raised as it is to be found in an able work on political science that emanates from a neighboring university: "Grant all that the Divine theory maintains that ultimately all power is from God; that by Him is implanted in the nature of man the need and demand for the State, we get no nearer to knowing why, in any particular case, there should exist in a community a definite set of individuals arrogating to themselves the right of exercise of the divine prerogative of ruling." Granted; this is perfectly true and entirely irrelevant as an objection to the divine theory, as the writer calls our doctrine. It was formulated and answered long before the dawn of political science by St. John Chrysostom. In one of his sermons, on the Pauline text, we read the following passage: "What is that you say, Paul? 'Every ruler is ordained of God.' 'No; I say not such a thing,' replies Paul. 'I am not speaking of particular individual rulers, but of the thing itself. That there should exist a principle of authority, and that some should rule while others obey, so that everything may not be at the merey of chance and rashness, driving the people hither and thither—this, I say, is provided for by divine wisdom.'" "Hence,"

concludes Chrysostom, "the apostle does not say there is no ruler except from God, but he speaks of the authority itself, saying, there is no power except from God."

In the objection above quoted two distinct matters are confused, one is that of the ultimate origin of the power of ruling, the other is how some person or persons are designated to be the custodians and wielders of that authority. Our theory that all power is from God, will no more, of itself, prove that President Taft, the Legislature and judiciary are the just and lawful possessors of the supreme power today in the United States than the doctrine of apostolic succession would alone, without an appeal to a vast congeries of facts, enable a historian to determine who was the rightful pope in those days when rival claimants contended for the chair of Peter. It simply declares that if President Taft and these bodies who share political power with him have lawfully and constitutionally attained the offices which they fill, then the power which they exercise is from God. Before this hypothetical statement can be turned into a categorical one—the President and the bodies associated with him in the Government of the United States, are the custodians of a divinely given power—we must revert to the Constitution of the United States and the elections of 1908, or subsequent ones, without, of course going behind the returns.

While the State is an institution ordained by God, He does not establish directly any particular State, nor specify what form it shall assume nor who are to be vested with authority to rule. These matters are settled by human convention or the force of circumstances or, as is usually the case, by a conjunction of both of these causes. Pact or convention, on the part of the whole people, or their chosen representatives, may be the means to determine the form of government, and the manner in which the ruler or rulers are to be designated may be fixed by a written document, as is the case in our own country, or by immemorial custom, such as obtained long in many parts of Europe. Conquest, violence, and usurpation have laid the foundation of many a State. But here it may

be well to remark that a power unjustly acquired or established may in the course of time come to be legitimate, that is, when to upset it or disturb it would be injurious to the common welfare of all the people which is the reason for the existence of the State's authority: and the norm by which the State is justified or condemned is whether or not it fulfills the duty of promoting the common weal.

But is not authority derived from the people? Yes, if the statement be understood in the true sense. It is from the people inasmuch as without the people it would not exist at all, and because it is the constituent element which inhering in the whole social body organizes it into a State. It is not from the people in the sense that it depends on the will of the community whether political authority shall exist or not; because, if when a sufficient number of individuals and families living together under certain conditions, whether they are pleased or not, the law of nature demands that they combine in a civil society, and furnishes the authority requisite for organization and direction. That authority is derived from the people is not true if we interpret the proposition in Rousseau's sense, which is that when the State is constituted the ruler receives his authority from the people who nevertheless remain sovereign or supreme, and can, therefore, at any time, at their own good pleasure depose their rulers, disregard a constitution, and even institute a new form of government. Here we may recall the words of Washington: "The basis of our political system is that the people can make and alter their constitution of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists till changed by an authentic act of the whole people is sacredly obligatory on all."

Now we can satisfactorily solve the problem which has proved insoluble to all the theories of contract: How can the acts and conventions of one generation bind subsequent ones who were not parties to the original agreement, by which the State was founded? The answer is simple. Contract is not the sole source of our obligations. Some arise entirely independent of any consent of ours. The obligations of parents,

for example, do not depend on their accepting or consenting to them. Children are, by the law of nature, born subject to parental authority without any consent of their own. In like manner we are born subject to the State to which we belong. For, to borrow the words of Burke, "The author of our being is the author of our place in the order of existence, having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will but to His. He has, in and by that disposition virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned to us." "If the social ties and ligaments spun out of these physical relations, which are the elements of the commonwealth, in most cases begin, and always continue independently of our own will, so, without any stipulation on our part, we are bound by that relation called our country which comprehends, (as has been well said) 'all the charities of all.'"

It is, I know, difficult for many persons, who observe the unworthy principles and practices that play a large part in contemporary political life, to give their unreserved assent to the claim that the State is of God. They retort by pointing scornfully to the unlovely figure of the "boss"; to the annual spectacle of the "pork barrel;" and the unsavory heaps of facts that have been accumulated by the muck-raker. They dwell on the unscrupulous methods of intrigue and chicanery which are resorted to by seekers after political place; the bargaining and "log-rolling" by which legislative measures are carried or defeated. They see personal greed or the interest of certain classes prevail over the interests of the people; and observe that some who exercise powerful influence over State affairs, remember only that they have a party and forget that they have a country. But what do these ugly facts prove one way or another, concerning the origin of authority? Nothing whatever. They simply attest that, however exalted its origin may be, authority can be abused and perverted from its true end. But what gift of God may not be, and has not been, abused by men? And, as the old adage has it, the corruption of the highest is the worst.

To set forth with any amplitude the practical consequences flowing from the Catholic doctrine of political power would be matter for another hour's dissertation. Leo XIII has done the work admirably in one of his great Encyclicals, from which we may borrow a pregnant thought or two. Since all authority is from God, he premises, it ought to be used strictly in accordance with divine justice and for the end for which it has been given. Then he says: "In order that justice may be safeguarded in the State let those who administer the affairs of the commonwealth remember that political authority does not exist for the private gain of those who exercise it; that the government of the commonwealth is to be carried on by those to whom it has been entrusted, but for the welfare of the people for which end alone it exists. While the responsibilities of the governing body are placed in its true light, by our doctrine the dignity of those who obey is admirably safe-guarded, because they are taught that in submitting to a just authority they are not bowing their wills merely to the dictation of men like themselves, but to the supreme will of divine majesty itself; and in rendering to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's they are really rendering to God the things that are God's. The conscientious citizen recognizing that the laws have a divine sanction behind them obeys, as St. Paul counsels, not from fear but for conscience sake, and sees the institution of his country clothed with a sacred character which demands from him reverential loyalty and attachment.

There never has been a time in the history of the country when there was more need than there is today of inculcating the truth about the nature of political authority both upon those who exercise it and those who are bound to obey it. If we believe even only the half of the allegations that are daily published in the press and repeated from mouth to mouth, then the people are rapidly losing respect for the laws and the lawmakers; and the lawmakers have, in too many instances lost sight of the reason why this sacred power has been confided to them. The evil is intensified by the fact

that a widespread decay of religious faith, and a vicious way of training the young, in which parental authority is not sufficiently insisted upon, are co-operating to destroy respect for every form of authority. In the present situation no greater service can be rendered to the Republic than can be done by the Catholic Church, if her members are but true to her teaching on the nature of the State, and proclaim it to their fellow-countrymen, both governed and governors, not merely by word but also and especially by example.

JAMES J. FOX.

ARISTOTLE IN RELATION TO MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY.

In order to understand the attitude of the medieval Church towards the philosophy of Aristotle, it is necessary to know how that philosophy was modified and transformed in various ways before it came into contact with Christianity. From Athens at the end of the fourth century before Christ, to Paris at the beginning of the thirteenth century of the Christian era there is a long journey both through space and through time. From the days when the Stagyrite himself discoursed on philosophy in the shaded paths where he met his disciples, to the days when Thomas of Aquin expounded him in the convent of St. James, or Siger,

Reading lectures in the Streets of Straw
Did syllogize invidious verities,

the world underwent so many changes, that the old Aristotle would hardly recognize himself in the new. And among these changes I do not reckon now the greatest of them all, which was due to the advent of Christianity; for, as yet, Christianity had modified Aristotle very little, if at all. The changes I refer to are intellectual, political, social, linguistic, literary as well as religious, through which, as through a series of successive transmigrations, the soul of Aristotelianism passed before it appeared on the stormy scenes at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century. During the progress of these transformations Aristotle had acquired various kinds of reputation; he was "a heretic" and "the father of heresies," he was a "pagan atheist," a "pantheist," a "sorcerer," an "uncanny Arabian magician," and in one quaint old woodcut he is represented with a swarthy complexion, a thick black beard, fierce flashing eyes, bushy eyebrows and elaborate folded turban of the typical Moorish teacher. In Rome he was known as a

logician, in Edessa he was understood to be almost a Nestorian, in far off Bagdad he was the great physician, in Cordova he was a philosopher hostile to the Korân, and in Paris in the twelfth century, before the University attained its corporate existence, he was regarded as an advocate of pantheism, materialism and fatalism. No wonder then, that he was at first misunderstood, suspected, proscribed, and not admitted without a struggle to the title of preëminence which he held in Dante's time as "the master of those who know."

The point of departure in this curious succession of changes is, as has been said, Athens at the end of the fourth century B. C. There Aristotle expounded his philosophy until the year before his death, when he retired to his country house at Chalcis and handed over the government of the school to Theophrastus. Theophrastus, was then, the first scholarch, or ruler of the school. He appointed his successor, and so there was a series of scholarchs, whose descent is as well authenticated almost as the pedigrees of kings or emperors, down to the third century of the Christian Era. All this time, the school was at Athens; how long, however, it continued to meet in the shaded walks made sacred by the footsteps of the Founder, it is impossible to determine. One thing is certain, the tradition of Aristotelianism in the school was vigorous at first; the earliest of the scholarchs were men of science, botanists, moralists, historians; but, little by little, the tradition became weaker, the pure stream of doctrine became tainted by the accession of elements and tendencies foreign to its spirit. There was, as we said before, no mysticism in Aristotle. In fact he was a positivist, or if you will, a practicalist, in the large sense of the word. The characteristic note of all his teaching was scientific accuracy and healthy, wholesome naturalness. His philosophy was the last great product of the classic spirit. With the downfall of Greece's freedom and the arrival of the Macedonian and the Roman, came a tendency towards cosmopolitanism, followed by a tendency towards mysticism. It was no longer an honor to be a citizen

of Hellas; therefore, the philosopher sought refuge either in the doctrine of the Stoics that all men belong to the common nationality of human nature or in the doctrine of the mystic that the sentiment of nationality belongs to worldliness and that piety is better than patriotism. Even before Christianity came, philosophy, feeling the inadequacy of its own efforts, turned to Oriental religions for inspiration and assistance: natural phenomena came to be explained, not by the forces of nature, but by the power of demons or spirits, and the practice of magic and divination took the place of the cultivation of virtue and the pursuit of the beautiful. Matter came to be considered the source of all suffering and of all moral evil, and consequently the science of nature took a place subordinate to speculations about the One, the Ineffable, the pantheistic God. This is the movement known as Neo-Platonism, and it influenced, from the beginning of its career the school of Aristotle, so that those who wrote commentaries on his works strove with might and main to read these doctrines and tendencies into his writings. That was the condition of the school of Aristotle at Athens when, in the year A. D. 529, it, together with the other schools of philosophy, was closed by order of the Emperor Justinian. This edict sent the Aristotelian tradition into exile in two directions. At Constantinople a more or less unsteady succession of commentators began, which reached its greatest importance in the ninth century, but exerted, generally speaking, very little influence on the Latin world at any time. The more important line of development leads us from Athens to Asia Minor, whither most of the Athenian teachers went after the edict of banishment. There, especially in Syria and Armenia, important schools were established in the sixth century, which translated the works of Aristotle into Syriac, and explained them in the Neo-Platonic sense. In Persia, too, the philosophers found refuge for a while, and underwent the influence of the mysticism native to that country. There, at Bagdad, in the ninth century, the philosophy of Aristotle first came

into contact with the Arabians. In that century, while Europe was experiencing that wonderful awakening to education and culture which we call the Carolingian revival, the world of Central Asia was being governed by an enlightened line of Caliphs known as the Abassides. Under their protection, learning flourished throughout the Saracen empire of the East; later, it travelled into Northern Africa and Spain, and finally, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, reached the world of Western Europe in the great center of intellectual life, the University of Paris. Thus, as you see, the journey from Athens to Paris was not direct; it was by way of Syria, Persia, Afghanistan, Morocco, and Cordova. And even this is not all. In Spain, the Caliphs, less enlightened or less liberal than their predecessors at Bagdad, persecuted the philosophers, seized their libraries, drove them into exile or put them to death. The Jews, however, were a privileged class, probably because they held the purse strings, and could claim a greater freedom because they controlled the finances of the Caliph's court. Whatever the cause, the fact is that Arabian learning found refuge in the synagogue, and it was through the synagogue, in many cases, that it reached the Christian Church. Consider, then, the succession of linguistic changes through which Aristotle passed. In Syria he was translated into Syriac, in Persia into Persian, thence, (from either Syriac or Persian) into Arabic, from Arabic into Hebrew, from Hebrew into Latin. So that Renan is not in the least exaggerating when he says that the works of Aristotle made their entry into the University of Paris, in a Latin version of a Hebrew version of an Arabic version of a Syriac version of the original Greek!

These linguistic changes are, however, but an index of changes far more profound which the interpretation of Aristotle underwent. Thoughts always take on the color of the mind through which they pass. Even facts have a different shade of meaning according as they are narrated by one kind of historian or by another. The battle of Sedan means one thing to a German, and quite a different thing to a Frenchman.

This is especially true of a system of philosophy, like Aristotle's, which needs elucidation. The Syrians gave it one shade of meaning, the Arabians another, and the Jews did not allow it to pass through the synagogue without the addition of elements distinctly Hebrew. The Syrian was a Christian, but a heretic of the sect of Nestorius; the Arabian was a fatalist, a pantheist, and often a materialist; the Jew was a monotheist, but of the Oriental type, and if he found anything in Aristotle that could be used against the Christian theologian, he was not likely to gloss it over, but rather to emphasize it and accentuate its importance. How profoundly, then, had the meaning and import of Aristotle's words and thoughts been transformed when, about the end of the twelfth century he appeared in this disguise, before the learned world of Christendom at the University of Paris.

Meantime, what had been taking place in the Latin world? There, Aristotle was known only as a logician. Translations of his logical works were current in Latin, some of which, most of which in fact, had been done in the sixth century by Boethius, statesman and scholar, philosopher and martyr for the faith. All the other works, on physics, on psychology, on ethics, metaphysics and politics, were lost to the Latin world. They had not been translated, and, if there were any copies of the Greek text, very few, if any, could read them. The Latin world was Platonist in philosophy. Some, like the stern Tertullian, condemned philosophy of every kind. "What has the Church to do with Aristotle? What is there in common between Christ and Athens, between the Academy and the Church of God?" But, such rigorous narrowness was exceptional. Christian philosophers welcomed Plato as an ally in the contest against paganism. From Justin Martyr in the second century down to St. Augustine in the fifth, they fought the fight for Christian truth with weapons forged in the Academy. There was much in Platonism that appealed to these first Christians: there was its highly spiritual outlook on life, its idealism, its constant effort to uplift, its sweet

persuasive presentation of the reality of the world above us, and its noble disdain for all that is sordid, material, and of the earth earthy. Moreover, the warfare of Christianity was against Platonists or Neo-Platonists, who fought the last fight of Paganism, as did the learned lady Hypatia, of whom we have all read in Kingsley's famous novel. And it was good tactics then, as now, to meet the enemy on his own ground, capture his heaviest guns and use them against him. But, most convincing justification of all, in the mind of the first Christian thinkers was the belief which they openly proclaimed that God had inspired Plato in the natural order as He had inspired Moses in the supernatural order, so that, in the design of Providence, Plato was sent to prepare the world for Christianity. In intellectual matters Plato was the precursor of Christ, as John the Baptist was in matters spiritual. Therefore, while the Christian philosophers esteemed Plato for the truth that he taught, they did less than justice to Aristotle. In the East they suspected him, because he was the favorite author of the Nestorians; in the West they held him in contempt, because, knowing only his logical treatises, they could pay him no higher tribute than to say that he was a sharp-witted dialectician, a framer of subtle arguments, a word juggler and a logic-chopper.

We are all this time preparing for the story of what happened to Aristotle at the University of Paris. And I promise you that the event will be exciting enough, dramatic, indeed tragic. One more digression is necessary in order that the historic setting of the picture be complete. I have said that only the logical works of Aristotle were known to the Latin world, that they alone had been translated, and that the other works in the Greek original were as good as lost during all the long period of predominant Platonism. The Greek schism of the ninth century was accountable for this. There was little communication between the two great divisions of Christian Europe, the Latin with its capital in Rome, and the Greek Church with its center in Constantinople.

And whatever communication there was was not of the friendly kind. The crusades changed all that. Especially the events of the year 1204, when Constantinople was stormed by the Latin crusaders, the city sacked, its treasures of a literary and artistic, as well of a more material kind divided among the conquerors, and carried off to France and Italy. Among these treasures was the text of Aristotle in Greek, which within a decade or two was known at the University of Paris, and translated into Latin. This version however—I would like to call your attention to this point—this version made directly from the Greek did not become known, in fact, was not made, until after the translations from the Arabic or Hebrew had already become a subject of controversy. For convenience sake, the one shall be referred to in future as the *Greek Aristotle*, and the other as the *Arabic Aristotle*.

We have now the historic setting of the introduction of Aristotle to the Latin world of the Middle Ages. It remains to describe the scene in which the event took place. The scene, as was said before, was the University of Paris, the center, then, for some fifteen or twenty years, of the intellectual life of Europe. Paris had been for half a century the city of schools; at the time of which we are speaking, the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was becoming the city of books. It was the chief center of the bookmaking industry: thither every new manuscript found its way to be copied and studied and explained. Thither scholars flocked from every country in Europe; and a picturesque, boisterous, irresponsible crowd they were, lawless in point of fact, and to a certain extent beyond the law, even in theory. Among them were Jews from Spain with curious manuscripts to sell, jostling the returned crusader who offered for a bargain the literary spoils of some Greek palace or monastery. In the throng too were members of the newly founded mendicant orders, Franciscans and Dominicans, as well as clerics from the various dioceses and monks of the older monastic institutions. And, what strikes us as most curious of all, there

are no university buildings. The Sorbonne has not yet been erected as a hospice for poor students. The students live here, there and everywhere; they assemble in the halls of the monastic buildings, or in the squares or in the streets, wherever a teacher sets up his chair. They bring with them bundles of straw on which they sit, a restless, curious, ill-behaved crowd, if we are to judge by some old woodcuts representing such scenes. The organization of the university is not yet fixed. The relations of the Rector to the Chancellor are still a matter of dispute, and the masters, or professors, who have secured their license to teach, have not yet found out the full extent either of their obligations or their privileges. There are, I am sorry to say, constant riots in the streets, in the lecture halls and even in the churches. The authority of the Pope is invoked, the authority of the king is also invoked, and both are in turn set at naught by passion and prejudice and mob violence. In those days, you can well imagine, the life of a student, or even of a professor, was by no means dull. But the turmoil and the contentiousness and the lack of harmony which marked the external life of the student or master was soon to be paralleled by a conflict of ideas, in which both scholar and teacher took part.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, we may say, Aristotle was held in no higher esteem at Paris than elsewhere in the Latin world. He was known as an acute logician and nothing more. In far-off Toledo, a school of translators were busy with the Arabic text, in Palermo a former student of Paris, the wizard Michel Scot, was engaged in his translations of the Arabic commentaries, so was Gerard of Cremona; and it is said that Robert Greathead, Bishop of Lincoln, was studying the *Ethics* of Aristotle in Greek. But, none of these translations were to reach Paris before 1215 or 1220. The teachers at the University still hold to St. Augustine in theology and to Plato in philosophy. There is William of Auvergne, who is soon to be bishop of Paris; there is the severe and dignified teacher who has come over from England to be first

a pupil and then a master in the Parisian schools, Alexander of Hales, who will surprise the turbulent world of the University when, in 1232, he will lay down his titles and his dignities to become a humble friar of the order of St. Francis. These are Platonists, though Alexander begins to show a tendency to compromise on some points. The general spirit of their teaching is Platonist, and they are by training distrustful of Aristotle. These teachers were in possession when the Arabian Aristotle was introduced. Naturally, therefore, their attitude towards the new thought, if we may so call it, was one of suspicion and hostility. They had no difficulty in pointing out the errors of Aristotelianism. It was plain that the Aristotle who had come in so incongruous a company, surrounded, so to speak, by unbelieving Jews, paynim Saracens and Nestorian Syrians, was out of place in a Christian center of learning. They would have none of him or his fatalism, his pantheism, his denial of individual immortality. But, no student, least of all the medieval student of that period, ever hesitated to make trouble for his teacher. The thirteenth century student did not hesitate; he made up his mind very quickly. He, or a certain number of him, became at once very much interested in the Arabian Aristotle. There were Jews and Saracens at Paris from whom copies of translations could be got, and perhaps a start made in the direction of interpreting the text. At any rate, there appeared among the student body outspoken and ardent, if not intelligent, advocates of Averroism, that is of the kind of Aristotelianism taught by the great Arabian commentator, Averroes. Then, there was trouble in the schools. Discipline being lax, (indeed, I might say, discipline there was none) the question of the schools soon became the question of the streets and the taverns; and fisticuffs and sword-thrusts, rather than arguments, were used in this strange struggle between Platonism and Aristotelianism.

So,—to pursue the Academic phase of the contest—so the affair progressed until Albert the Great appeared on the scene.

To him and to his still more illustrious disciple, St. Thomas, both members of the order of St. Dominic, is due the ultimate triumph of Aristotelian philosophy at the University of Paris, and its subsequent establishment in all the schools of Christendom. They were strong personalities, both of them, the one possessing the thoroughness, the patience, the perseverance of the Teuton, the other eminently endowed with the clearness, the preciseness, the spirit of system characteristic of the Latin mind. And they must have been courageous. Not only in the turbulent quarrelsome multitude of the University, but within the quiet of the cloisters of their own order, they met with opposition. We have a statute of the General Chapter of the order in 1228 which forbids the friars to read the books of the Arabians, and in more than one passage in his works Albert complains of the obstinacy with which some of his confreres refused to sanction the study of Aristotle. We can well understand the strength of the opposition. Platonism seemed to suit piety better than Aristotelianism. It satisfied the demands of the mystic soul. Besides, Platonism came with the sanction of St. Augustine, while Aristotle had none to stand sponsor for him but the Saracen and the Jew. The opposition, if we are to believe Albert, was more zealous than enlightened. But the courage and the patience of these two great men were such that their final success was assured. They took the works of Aristotle as they found them in translations made from the Arabic, separated Moorish comment and interpretation from what they believed to be the original teaching of the Philosopher, and, when the time came, secured through a fellow member of the order of St. Dominic a translation made directly from the Greek text. Thus, they not only robbed the study of Aristotle of whatever danger formerly attended it, but, by bringing out the genuine meaning of the Stagyrte, showed that he was far from being hostile to Christianity. Thus, too, a catastrophe in the intellectual world was averted. For, there can be no doubt that the crisis through which Christian thought then passed was one of the

most momentous in its whole history. I have said, somewhat flippantly, perhaps, that the body of students took sides with the Arabian Aristotle because they liked to make trouble for their masters, who were Platonists. There was, however, a deeper reason. They took to Aristotle because Aristotle suited the spirit of the age; and it was largely for this same reason that the Greek Aristotle finally triumphed. Plato, the heavenly minded, with his firm belief in the reality and eternity of the spiritual, and his noble depreciation of all things physical as unstable and evanescent, Plato the dreamer and idealist, suited admirably well the centuries which witnessed the decay and downfall of the Roman Empire. He suited too the spirit of the centuries that followed, when, amidst the chaos of invasion, devastation and internal strife, there was no refuge for the philosophic mind except within the peaceful walls of the cloister in a life of meditation and prayer. But now a new Europe had sprung up, and a new civilization had arisen from the ashes of what had been Greece and Rome. A race of mingled Teuton, Celtic, and Latin stock had begun a period of constructive activity. Curious, restless, insatiably inquisitive about everything in nature, ready to believe anything, but wanting to know everything, confident of itself and of its future, this new race was more likely to be satisfied with Aristotle than with Plato. It had already learned something of medicine, geography, astronomy and physics from the Arabians, and now it demanded a philosophy that would have less to say about the spiritual essences above us and more about the nature of physical things around us. The age that chose Plato chose well; the age that demanded Aristotle chose wisely, for the needs of the decadent Latin world of the fifth century were very different from the needs of the rejuvenated Latin world of the thirteenth. That is why the Aristotelian party triumphed, though the opposition was as obstinate as it was at first violent, and, indeed, did not entirely disappear throughout the whole Middle Ages.

What, during all this time, was the attitude of the official

Church? She was, it goes without saying, no longer the Church of the catacombs in her relation to public affairs. She was no longer persecuted, no longer barely tolerated, no longer hampered in her public career by the devastation of the barbarian, or the rapacity of the local tyrant. She was entering into a period of great public activity, of unquestioned authority and of unparalleled prestige. When she acted now, it was with all the solemnity of her ritual and all the dread forms of official condemnation. She could not afford to ignore or pass by the scandal at the University of Paris. When avowed advocates of Averroism began publicly to teach in the name and with the authority of the University, she considered it high time to intervene. The first condemnation is that issued by the Provincial Council held in Paris in 1210, which forbids that the works of Aristotle on Natural Philosophy and the commentaries thereon be *read* (that is taught—we still speak of “reading” law) either publicly or privately at Paris. In 1215 Robert of Courçon, papal legate to the University, renewed the prohibition in regard to the books on Natural Philosophy, added also the books on Metaphysics and prescribed all the writings of two well-known pantheists of that day, David of Dinant and Amaury of Benes. To this extent, then, was Aristotle condemned in the first decades of the thirteenth century. Remark that the condemnation bore directly and exclusively on the use of his works as texts in the schools of Paris. We know that at the very time this enactment was in force, the works of Aristotle were being read elsewhere without protest or interference. Where such conditions existed as existed in Paris, the measure was one of elementary prudence. And, the times were troublesome enough elsewhere to warrant stringent regulations at the great seat of learning. In the south of France the Albigensian heresy was still rife; the war of suppression was still being waged, the taking of Carcassonne and the battle of Muret were recent events in 1220. And we have reason to believe that the doctrinal differences at Paris were not without influence

on the popular mind of Languedoc. In the Middle Ages heresy was a crime against the State as well as against the Church, and the civil as well as the ecclesiastical authority took cognizance of it.

The events I have been describing happened at Paris in the first two decades of the thirteenth century. In 1229 an extraordinary event occurred. The University of Paris went on a strike. The immunity of the student body had been infringed on; some students had been punished by the city authorities, whereas the right to punish was vested in the authorities of the University. When the city refused redress, the whole teaching staff of the University suspended their classes, and quit the city. This is known as the Great Dispersion. In 1231 a compromise was reached; the professors returned to Paris and resumed their work. Somehow, this disturbance seems to have benefited the Aristotelians. At any rate, in 1231 a commission was appointed by Pope Gregory IX to revise the works of Aristotle, in which, says the decree, there are many things useful mingled with what is dangerous and harmful. This is the first sign that the Greek Aristotle was beginning to be known and distinguished from the Arabian Aristotle. Whether the three professors assigned to this task ever attained any tangible results we do not know. But, we do know that by 1255 the works of Aristotle appear on the official programme of the University of Paris among the texts prescribed for study. From that time onward Aristotle was in full authority, so to speak, in the Christian Schools. There are, it is true, later condemnations, one, for example, that dates from 1263; but they are directed explicitly against a powerful party of Averroists who, even at the end of the thirteenth century, had considerable influence at the University. Aristotle as distinct from Averroes, indeed, as opposed to Averroes, is henceforth held in honor; he is, in Dante's grand phrase, "the master of those who know;" his books are studied in all the schools, and the fault found with the Church from this time forward, is that her teachers

are too subservient to the authority of Aristotle. Dating from the middle of the thirteenth century, Aristotle is for the Medieval Church what Plato had been for the Church of the first five centuries "the precursor of Christ in things intellectual."

If I have at all succeeded in laying before you the actual conditions that prevailed at Paris in the thirteenth century, if I have made clear to you the difference between the Arabian and the Greek Aristotle, you will, I think, agree with me that the successive phases of the attitude of the official Church were perfectly consistent. Aristotle condemned, Aristotle corrected, Aristotle approved and prescribed—there would, indeed, be inconsistency here if it were question of the same Aristotle. It was not question of the same, but of the two entirely different systems of philosophy. The Aristotle in the Arabian presentation might well wear the turban. He was a pantheist of the materialistic type; he denied the origin of the world by creation; he taught that the individual soul is not immortal; he lent favor to the prevalent heresy which was disturbing State as well as Church. The Aristotle who came to be known through the interpretations of Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and who could speak for himself as soon as the text was freed from its Saracen coloring, was not, indeed, a Christian. He never wore the halo of the saint nor the official cap of a master in a Christian school. But he was recognized as not anti-Christian; and the vast synthetic system which he had built up by unaided reason was found to fit the needs of the time when Plato's mystic idealism was no longer satisfying. The logic of events, the genius of the great Dominican teachers, and what I think I may call the enlightened patience of ecclesiastical authority brought about this change.

But, the triumph of Aristotle, though definite, was not immediate. I have said that the university world at Paris was an unruly one. It was a race of lusty, contentious, fun-loving, fight-loving youths, who treated king and pope with

less respect than they should have shown, since they believed in both. The forbidden always had attractions for them. And so, even after the Christian interpretation of Aristotle had been officially recognized, there were those who still favored the Arabian interpretation. These were now called the Averroists, from Averroes the great Arabian interpreter,

Che il gran commento fè.

Among the teachers of Averroism in Paris at the end of the thirteenth century was Siger of Brabant, who from the vividness of Dante's description of him, is supposed to have been his teacher in philosophy. There was also a certain Boethius the Dacian. Both of these, probably while St. Thomas was still teaching, professed their belief in the Averroistic philosophy: they were, or should now be considered, skeptics; they held that by reason alone we cannot prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, and, worst of all, they set up the double standard of truth, maintaining that a principle may be true in theology and false in philosophy, in other words, that one may believe by faith what his reason tells him to be false. They were, or claimed to be, Aristotelians. It was they, and not the theologians of the Church, who made a demigod of Aristotle and took the word of the master in place of arguments from reason. We shall hear more of them later when we come to the period of the renaissance.

What was then, the attitude of the Christian Church towards Aristotle triumphant? It is hardly necessary to say that the doctrines of Aristotle were never made dogmas of the Church. Neither was Aristotle's philosophy made the official philosophy of the Church to the exclusion of all others. Nor was the natural science of Aristotle made a matter, at any time, of Catholic belief. At the same time, the charge of undue subservience to the authority of Aristotle has been made against the great philosophers and theologians of medieval times. Let us look into the matter somewhat closely, and, instead of

relying on prejudiced witnesses, like Francis Bacon or the other writers of the humanistic period—we shall deal with them in the next article—let us go to the medieval masters themselves and judge them by their own professions. We shall admit at once that they held Aristotle in the highest esteem: they referred to him as *the* philosopher; they placed him above Plato and all the other Greeks; they considered his teaching to be the highest expression of human wisdom. Dante reflects their sentiment when he calls him “the master of those who know,” “the master of human reason,” “most worthy of confidence and obedience,” a teacher whose opinions are “divine.” They gave credit where they thought credit was due: where less scrupulous teachers would have claimed originality, they acknowledged freely their indebtedness to the Stagyrite. Nevertheless they set limits to his authority. It was not they, but their Averroistic opponents who gloried in the title “Aristotle’s Ape,” quoted his *ipse dixit* as a clinching argument, and swore, as the saying is, by the words of the master. William of Auvergne at the beginning of the thirteenth century writes “It is right and just to contradict Aristotle wherever he says anything contrary to the truth, and to sustain him in everything in which he seems to be right.”¹ Durandus, at the end of the thirteenth century declares “The science of nature does not consist in knowing what Aristotle and other philosophers believed, but in knowing the truth itself; and when Aristotle wanders from the truth, a knowledge of Aristotle is not science but error.”² The greatest of the scholastics, Albert and Thomas, are clearest in the expression of their relation to Aristotle. Albert writes “Natural science does not consist in narrating the opinions of others but in finding the causes of phenomena;” when he is commenting the works of Aristotle he warns us in words which are an echo of Avicenna: “I am explaining the physics of the Peripatetics more according to their intent and belief than according to what I myself have

¹ *De Anima*, I, i.

² *In I Sent.*, Dist. IV, Q. 5.

gleaned from the study of nature,"³ and "If we believe Aristotle to be human, then we must acknowledge that he could be mistaken just as we ourselves can." And St. Thomas sums up the whole attitude of his school when he says "Truth itself is our authority, and without that no other authority can avail."⁴ "Human authority," he adds, "is the weakest of all arguments."⁵ What is more, these men did not hesitate to contradict Aristotle. They held that he was in error in many points, for instance in his denial of creation, in his denial of providence; they found fault with the obscurity of his doctrine regarding the oneness of the intellect, well aware that the Arabian interpretation had leanings towards pantheism and jeopardized the doctrine of individual immortality; finally they saw in his doctrine of the influence of the heavenly spheres the danger of fatalism, and proclaimed their own belief that the human soul is greater than all the stars and cannot be influenced by them to the exclusion of free will. Thus, on this point, at least, they strove to offset the confirmation which sorcery and magic found in the Aristotelian doctrine. In a word, the great masters of the school were not slavishly subservient to Aristotle: even in the popular estimation they were held to be superior both to Aristotle and to Plato. In a fresco by Francesco Tani, a disciple of Orcagna in the fourteenth century, we see in the centre of a group of philosophers St. Thomas of Aquin, chief of the school, holding open on his breast his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, and on the other side, bowing to him as to a superior, are Aristotle with his *Ethics* and Plato holding open the pages of his *Timaeus*. The picture expresses the popular opinion of the Middle Ages.

There are, no doubt, later representatives of scholasticism who carried their reverence too far. There is the celebrated instance of the monk, who, when the telescope was invented,

³ *In Libros de Physico Auditu*, Lib. VIII, Tract. I, Cap. II.

⁴ Talamo, *L'aristotelismo della Scolastica*, p. 146 n.

⁵ *Sum. Theol. Ia*, I, 8 ad 2um.

would not look through it to see that a certain star was in a certain place, because his Aristotle taught him that it should be somewhere else, and while the telescope might possibly be right, Aristotle could not, by any chance, be wrong. Again, there is the instance of the philosopher who would not study the science of botany by the usual methods of observation and experiment, because, having obtained from Aristotle the definition of a plant, he could deduce the whole science from that definition. I have never seen these instances properly authenticated. But even if they are historical, they represent, not the genuine method of the medieval Aristotelians, but the false notion of method prevalent in the age of degeneration and decay.

I have said that Aristotle met the requirements of medieval civilization better than Plato. I meant, of course, in the purely intellectual, scientific order. There are needs of man's spiritual nature which Aristotle did not, and never could, satisfy. There was in him no element of mysticism. He has his feet firmly planted on the earth beneath him, and his head in an atmosphere free from the clouds of ignorance and superstition, but free also from that golden halo which surrounds the head of the mystic. He will not quit the earth on which he stands so firmly, to venture on a flight into the region of beautiful truths. He loves the clear cold light of the atmosphere of science, and has no hankering after the heavenly aura in which the Platonist sees spiritual essences in a warmtinted light. Therefore, he disappointed the mystics. St. Bonaventure never found in him the inspiration of his *Journey of the Soul of God*, Gerson saw in him the teacher of "those self-dubbed philosophers who, separating religion from their philosophy, ruin both;" and Thomas a Kempis had the Aristotelians in mind when he said, "I had rather feel contrition of heart than know its definition." The mystics did not take kindly to Aristotle. When they did not oppose him, they were, at least, lukewarm towards him. Now, mysticism is an important phase of scholasticism itself.

It certainly played an important part in the life of the medieval Church. When, therefore, the attitude of medieval Christianity towards Aristotle is discussed, that of the mystics should not be overlooked. They were the intellectual descendants of those who opposed the first introduction of Aristotle. They were Platonists by disposition, and preferred the dreamer to the investigator, the poet to the scientist, the spiritually minded founder of the Academy to the too naturalistic head of the peripatetic school.

One more point remains to be discussed. Did the medieval Christians really understand Aristotle? They had much Latin and no Greek; even Albert and Thomas did not know enough Greek to read the original text. How, then, could they reach Aristotle's meaning? The modern philologist, with all his linguistic attainment, with the aid of dictionaries and critical texts and learned footnotes, finds it by no means an easy task to determine the meaning of a passage in Aristotle. How then could schoolmen understand him at all? The fact is that they did; and to my way of thinking, they understood him better than many a modern philologist. In the first place, they had translations made which may be wanting in elegance, which are often defective, owing to the blunders of the translator, but which have the supreme merit of adhering literally to the text. Those translations were made, if I may say so, impartially, with no particular theory of interpretation to uphold. It is sometimes a disadvantage to know too much. This is especially true of those who try to render other people's thoughts. The Greeks used to say that the pedagogue, whose business it was to conduct the children to and from school, should either be a very accomplished slave or a slave who knew nothing at all. Mark the alternative, and the exclusion of the half-learned, the semi-educated, from among the eligible. The same, I think, is true of translators. A translator should know everything, so far as that is possible, about his author, or he should know nothing at all, but merely adhere to the text. The first medieval translators belonged

to the latter class. In the second place, the medieval masters grasped the spirit of Aristotle: they themselves worked in that same spirit of wholesomeness, the spirit of the cathedral builders, the spirit in which the *Divina Commedia* was planned and executed. The modern philologist has lost that spirit. He fishes in the text of Aristotle, like the fisherman of whom Dante speaks

Who fishes for the truth *and has no skill.*⁵

The secret of the art of finding truth or beauty is not a knowledge of words, but a feeling for the truth and a power to appreciate the beautiful. We all know, no doubt, the case of the professor of English literature in some German or French University, who, quoting from memory a celebrated line in *Macbeth* rendered it "Will you not give the physic to the madman."—"Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?" What a difference there is in the two sentences, though word for word the meaning to the philologist is, I suppose, the same. To understand Aristotle, a knowledge of Greek is necessary, but more necessary is the mind capable of appreciating the spirit of Aristotle. Such minds, I think the medieval masters had. They belonged to the great constructive age of medieval Christendom, to the century that organized the universities, founded the guilds, and planned the great cathedrals. There were "giants in those days." With none of the intellectual apparatus which we consider indispensable, they synthesized and uplifted the scattered fragments of their own intellectual world; if they were deficient in historic sense, they were strong in abstract science; if they were incapable of appreciating the value of facts, they were thoroughly well able to appreciate principles; if they were ignorant of the history of the philosophers as we know it, they had an insight into systems of philosophy which we do not always possess. They were in many respects like Aristotle himself. That, I think, is

⁵ *Par. XIII*, 123.

why they understood him. Not that they always caught his meaning in matters of detail. Nevertheless, they always, it seems to me, rang true to the voice of his spirit, a spirit calling to them across the abyss of centuries comparatively empty of great constructive effort. If we had more of that spirit we might, with profit, bring to bear on Aristotle's philosophy our more scientific knowledge of the language in which he wrote. We are more critical than the medieval schoolmen, more introspective; but I doubt whether the greatest among us are as profound as they were. Our scientists are heirs to Aristotle's spirit of investigation and systematisation, but our philosophers do not seem to be able to cultivate profundity except at the cost of sacrificing intelligibility. Those of them who have caught the attention of the present generation either soar into metaphysical heights where they are admired without being understood, or skim along the surface of the greatest problems, and cater to the taste of an age that seems weary of prolonged philosophical effort. The medieval Aristotelians were not deterred by the difficulties that lie in the path of every metaphysician: they were convinced, too that the sources of philosophy are in nature around us and beneath us; for

Wisdom is oftentimes nearer when we stoop
Than when we soar.

WILLIAM TURNER.

WOMEN WRITERS OF ENGLISH IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.

II

Our attention is next engaged by the very remarkable series of fifteenth century documents known as the *Paston Letters*. Preserved by the family with a care that has laid succeeding generations under the deepest obligation, these letters give us glimpses, that are now satisfying and now tantalizing, into the thoughts and actions of three generations of a fairly prosperous Norfolk house. Their acquaintances, friends, and enemies, their patrons and dependents, and many of the great historical characters of the time live over again for us in these pages and strut their little hour upon the stage for our benefit and, so to say, under our very eyes.

The *Paston Letters* cover the extensive period of 87 years, from 1422 to 1509. First published by John Fenn in 1787, they attracted immediate attention, as they deserved to do, for they shed a vivid light on the manners and customs of the times, occasionally bring us in contact with the larger events which give so dramatic an interest to the contentions between the houses of York and Lancaster, show us the beginning and development of more than one love story, and are everywhere replete with human interest.

The Paston family was settled in the village of Paston, in the county of Norfolk, some twenty miles to the north of the city of Norwich. Like the Bernerses, they claimed to be noble by long descent through "worshipful blood" from the Norman Conquest, alleging that one Wolstand Paston came out of Normandy into England in 1069; but this is a doubtful ancestry, and there are many other points about their family tree also in doubt. However the antiquity and the gentility of the family may stand, we find its representative, one

Clement Paston, living as a plain husbandman towards the close of the fourteenth century. He appears either to have thriven in the world or to have been helped by relatives, for he gave his son William a good education, which enabled him to hold successive offices of dignity and emolument, until he eventually rose to the position of Justice of the Common Pleas.

Judge Paston (1378-1444) married Agnes Berry (d. 1479), daughter and heiress of Sir Edmund Berry of Horlingbury or Horwelbury Hall in Hertfordshire. She brought him estates in Hertfordshire and Suffolk, and he himself made extensive purchases of land in Paston and other parts of Norfolk, including the manor of Gresham bought from Thomas Chaucer a son of the poet. Knowing well the turbulent spirit of the times, the Judge used to say that "whosoever should dwell at Paston should have need to know how to defend himself," and accordingly he placed his sons at the Inns of Court in London to study law, since in a knowledge of the subtelties of the law lay one of the principal helps against violence and spoliation.

William's son, John (d. 1466), was a hard man, and had unceasing quarrels, which were added to when, in 1459, he was greatly enriched by being made executor and heir to his wife's kinsman, Sir John Fastolf, whose reputation as a brave soldier and a patron of literature was equalled by his notorious character for grasping and grinding in matters of money and property. John Paston's enemies, who were numerous and powerful, sought at one time to affix to him the stigma and legal disabilities which attached to a servile ancestry, and were temporarily successful, but, an investigation having been duly made, the king's council declared the family fully cleared of the imputation. The troubles and quarrels in which this great legacy involved the Paston family were not allayed until 1480. Many letters in the collection deal with the lawsuits and disputes engendered by the Fastolf bequest.

John Paston the first was married to Margaret Mauteby

(d. 1484), daughter and heiress of John Mauteby of Mauteby, near Caister, and by her he had five sons and two daughters. On his death in 1466 he was succeeded by his eldest son John, who had been knighted in 1463. Dying unmarried in 1479, this John was in turn succeeded by his next brother, who, strange to say, was also named John (d. 1503).

From John the third, through his marriage with Margery Brews, of Sturton Hall in Norfolk, were descended Clement Paston (1515?-1597), a distinguished naval officer in the time of Henry VIII., and Sir Robert Paston (d. 1683), who was made Earl of Yarmouth by Charles II. His son, William Paston, second Earl of Yarmouth, dissipated the property so dearly won and with such difficulty held, and the family as well as the title became extinct on his death, without surviving issue, in 1732. It was this nobleman that sold the family papers to Le Neve, the antiquary and collector, who had been Rouge-croix pursuivant and Richmond herald and was then Norroy king-of-arms. After Le Neve's death in 1729 they passed into the possession of Thomas Martin, of Palgrave in Suffolk, who married Le Neve's widow. When Martin died in 1771 the papers were purchased by one Worth, an apothecary and chemist, of Diss in Norfolk, from whose executors they were in 1774 bought by Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Fenn, who, as already stated, began their publication in 1787. Other letters and documents have since been discovered, and are incorporated in the edition brought out by James Gairdner in 1904.

The principal correspondents in the beginning are Agnes Paston, John Paston the first, and his wife Margaret; and afterwards their sons, John the second and John the third; but there are also letters from all sorts and conditions of men and women, from King Edward IV. and King Henry VII. down through duke and earl, archbishop and chaplain, to the land steward and the unknown persons who signed their initials or did not sign at all. The main feature under discussion is the worldly welfare of the Pastons, how it may

best be promoted, how dangers thereto may be averted, how interest and influence may be secured. At every turn we meet references to the law, with the processes and details of which every one, gentle and simple, young and old, rich and poor, male and female, shows a surprising familiarity. The letters bristle with technical phrases concerning suits and indentures and mortgages, writs of replevin and distresses for rent, amercements and estreats, and it is quite common to be confronted with a *supersedeas*, or a *certiorari*, or a *scire facias*. Through it all we can clearly trace the endeavours of the family to form a combination of royal favour, local intrigue, and judicious bribery, so as to secure effective protection from the law against those who sought to take away their manor-houses and their lands by scheming or who had actually seized them by armed force.

The correspondence incidentally reveals a state of anarchy in which "great riots, extortions, horrible wrongs, and hurts" are prevalent, in which electors are intimidated, juries are packed and bribed, and gentlemen returning from church or market are set on and beaten by hired desperadoes or dragged from their own fireside to be despatched out of doors. We read of one gang, armed with bows and arrows, spears and bills, jacks and sallets, making a murderous attack on two servants of the bishop of Norwich as they knelt at Mass in the church at Burlingham, and later attempting to break into White Friars at Norwich during evensong to get hold of certain citizens alive or dead. The same band came near killing John Paston at the door of Norwich Cathedral, and on the same day his wife's uncle, Philip Berney, was so badly beaten that he died in a little over a year. It is not therefore surprising to learn that, during a time of excitement, Cardinal Kemp, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of England, felt constrained to charge and command all his servants to be ready with bows and arrows, swords and bucklers, crossbows, and all other habiliments of war such as they could procure and handle, to wait on the safeguard of his person. The

condition of the times is further forcibly illustrated by the account of two sieges which the Pastons, in defence of their property, sustained, not without loss of life, at Gresham (1450) and at Caister (1469), respectively. In the first of these Lord Molyne's men, 1,000 strong, clad in cuirasses and brigandines, attacked Dame Margaret and twelve others with guns, bows and arrows, pans of fire, and scaling ladders, and, after storming the strongly fortified mansion, carried out the stout-hearted defender in ruffled raiment to watch the demolition of her home. In the second case 3,000 of the Duke of Norfolk's men sat down before Caister Castle and took it after a five weeks' siege.

On the wider arena of the nation's battles also the Pastons took their own part. At first they appear to have been in high favour with the house of York, but Edward IV. turned against them and alienated their allegiance, and accordingly we find Sir John Paston and one of his brothers fighting on the side of Henry VI. at the battle of Barnet on Easter Sunday, 1471. They had in consequence considerable trouble to secure from the victorious Edward a pardon under the great seal when, after the fatal field of Tewkesbury, the Lancastrian cause had sunk in apparently irretrievable disaster. John Paston the third rose into great favour with Henry VII., and, true to his Lancastrian leanings, helped the King, at Stoke (1487), to smash Martin Swartz and his German auxiliaries in their vain attempt to set Lambert Simnel on the English throne. Henry was so pleased with the valour displayed by Paston in that stubbornly contested fight that he knighted him on the field.

During all the excitement business is not neglected. The steward lets farms, collects rents, attends markets, sells barley, malt, and timber, and lays in his stock of hay for the winter and of herrings for Lent. The principals are now in Norwich trying to influence elections, now at Framlingham courting favour with the Duke of Norfolk and for that end paying compliments to the Duchess and bribing her waiting-woman

with gifts of jewels, and again in London tapping court influence for the protection of their manorial rights or for the appointment of a friendly sheriff.

Domestic details, too, we have in abundance: requests for girdles and gowns, for kerchiefs and dress materials, for hose and hats, for treacle "of Genoa," for cinnamon and sugar, for dates and raisins "of Coruns" [Corinth], for basins and ewers, for candlesticks and spoons, for trenchers and quince preserves and plasters, for hawks that can fly at game, and for horses that can trot. The diversity of the subjects treated of is what lends interest to the whole correspondence and constitutes one of its principal charms.

Our immediate concern with the *Paston Letters* is with those of them which were written by women. Not counting Amye Bowet, who writes in very passable French, I have found at least twenty-four women correspondents: Agnes Paston; Margaret Paston; Elizabeth Poynings (née Paston), afterwards Dame Elizabeth Browne; Elizabeth Mundeford; Elizabeth Clere; Alice Crane; Eleanor Chamber; Constance Reynforth; Cecily Dawne; Dame Alice Ogard; Dame Elizabeth Brews; Margery Brews, afterwards Lady Paston; Lady Elizabeth Rothenhale; Alice, Lady Fitzhugh; Elizabeth, Countess of Surrey; Margaret, Countess of Richmond, mother of Henry VII.; two Countesses of Oxford; one Duchess of Suffolk; three Duchesses of Norfolk; one Queen of England; and an unknown lady who furnishes a copy of rather dainty verses in rime-royal. Fortunately, we need occupy ourselves with only two or three of these writers.

First in point of time comes Agnes, wife of Judge William Paston. She was a very determined character, obstinate in having her own way, and grimly tenacious of her rights; but in the first extract which I propose to give she appears in a rather amiable light. She and her husband had contracted their eldest son John to Margaret Mauteby, and the young people never saw each other until their marriage had been all arranged. This is how Agnes Paston tells her husband

of the first meeting of the betrothed pair: observe the various feminine touches in the letter:—

AGNES PASTON TO WILLIAM PASTON.

To my worshepefull housbond, W. Paston, be this letter takyn.

Dere housbond, I recomaunde me to yow, &c. Blessyd be God I sende you gode tydynggs of the comyng, and the brynggyn hoom, of the gentylwomman thet ye wetyn of fro Redham, this same nyght, acordyng to poyntmen [*appointment*] that ye made ther for yowr self.

And as for the furste aqweyntaunce be twhen John Paston and the seyde gentylwomman, she made him gentil cher in gentyl wise, and seyde, he was verrayly your son. And so I hope ther shall nede no gret trete be twyxe hym.

The parson of Stocton toold me, yif ye wolde byin her a goune, here moder wolde yeve ther to a godely furre. The goune nedyth for to be had; and of colour it wolde be a godely blew, or erlys a bryghte sangueyn.

I prey yow do byen for me ij pypys of gold [*gold thread on pipes or rolls*]. Your stewes [*fishponds*] do weel.

The Holy Trinite have you in governaunce.

Wretyn at Paston, in hast, the Wednesday next after *Deus qui errantibus* [*the third Sunday after Easter*], for defaute of a good secreтарыe. Yowres,

AGN. PASTON.

The next extract shows us the same Agnes Paston some eighteen years later as the stern parent, with a keen eye to domestic economy and a desire to discharge her financial obligations promptly when the services stipulated for had been done. Remember that the young man who was to receive corporal punishment had been through Cambridge University and was now a law student at the Inns of Court in London:—

AGNES PASTON.

Errands to London of Agnes Paston, the xxviiij day of Jenure, the yer of Kyng Henry the Sext, xxxvj.

To prey Grenefeld to send me feythfully word, by wrytyn, who [*how*] Clement Paston hath do his dever [*duty*] in lernyng. And if he hathe nought do well, nor wyll nought amend, prey hym that he wyll trewly belasch hym, tyl he wyll amend; and so ded the last mayster, and the best that ever he had, att Caumbrege. And sey Grenefeld that if he wyll take up on him to brynge hym in to good rewyll and lernyng, that I may verily know he doth hys dever, I wyll geve hym X marcs [*a mark* = 13 s. 4d.] for hys labor, for I had lever he wer fayr beryed than lost for defaute.

Item, to se who many gownys Clement hathe; and the that be bar, late hem be reysyd [*that is, have a new nap or pile raised on the bare cloth*]. He hath achort [*a short*] grene gowne and achort musterdevelers gowne [*musterdevelus, a kind of mixed grey woollen cloth*] wer never reysyd; and achort blew gowne that was reysyd, and mad of a syde gowne, whan I was last at London; and a syde russet gowne, furryd with bevyr, was mad this tyme ij yer; and a syde murry [*dark red*] gowne was mad this tyme twelmonth.

Item, to do make me vj sponys of viij ounce of troy wyght, well facyond, and dubbyl gylt.

And sey Elizabet Paston that she must use hyr selfe to werke redyly, as other jentylwomen done, and sumwhat to help hyr selfe ther with.

Item, to pay the Lady Pole xxvj s. viij d. for hyr bord.

And if Grenefeld heve do wel hys dever to Clement, or wyll do hys dever, geffe him the nobyll [*a noble* = 6 s. 8 d.]

After these injunctions it will not surprise us greatly to learn that Agnes treated her grown-up daughter Elizabeth very harshly, beating her several times a week, sometimes twice the same day, breaking her head in two or three places,

forbidding her to speak to any one, and upbraiding her so vilely that her sister-in-law was fain to implore her husband to find a match for the luckless maid. The desired result was somehow brought about, for we find that before 1459 Elizabeth married Robert Poynings, and by him became the mother of Sir Edward Poynings, who as Lord Deputy of Ireland caused the enactment (1495) at Drogheda of the celebrated act, called by his name, which had such disastrous effects in Ireland for nearly three centuries until its repeal by Grattan's parliament in 1782. Robert Poynings died in 1461, and subsequently his widow married Sir George Browne of Betchworth in Surrey. She figures in the correspondence as the writer of one letter during her widowhood, in which she displays a fair command of English and a full share of motherly solicitude for the worldly interests of her baby boy.

The case of Elizabeth Paston, with other cases that come under our notice as the documents are unrolled before us, goes to prove that the position of unmarried daughters in those days was no enviable one. They were regarded as sources of worry and trouble, expensive to train up in the proper way by placing them to board with a family of gentle breeding, and a drug on the marriage market unless provided with a goodly dowry. To keep them among their own was scarcely giving them a fair chance to acquire the necessary accomplishments, although the *res angusta domi* sometimes rendered this an inevitable, if unpleasant, method of avoiding outlay, and the problem of finding them husbands became under such conditions more and more complicated.

Parental authority over girls was great and unquestioned. It was so even with regard to grown-up sons. Years after William Paston's death his sons, now of full man's estate, and one of them married, lived with their mother, who treated them like children.

The marriage of John Paston and Margaret Mauteby turned out better than might be expected from the way in which it was arranged. Margaret proved herself a devoted and loyal,

even a heroic, wife, and an anxious, if not exactly a tender, mother. For a long series of years she figures either as the writer or the recipient of letters. Here is a letter which she wrote to her husband, September 28, 1443, some two or three years after their wedlock:—

MARGARET PASTON TO JOHN PASTON.

*To my ryght worchepful husbond, John Paston, dwellyng in the
Inner Temple at London, in hast.*

Ryth worchipful hosbon, I recomande me to yow, desyryng hertely to her of yowr wilfar, thankyng God of yowr a mendyng of the grete dysese that ye have hade; and I thanke yow for the letter that ye sent me, for be my trowthe my moder and I wer nowth in hertys es [*not in heart's ease*] fro the tyme that we woste [*knew*] of yowr sekenesse, tyl we woste verely of your a mendyng. My moder be hestyd [*vowed*] a nodyr [*another*] ymmage of wax of the weythe of yow to oyer Lady of Walsyngham, and sche sent iiij nobelys [*a noble = 6s. 8d.*] to the iiij Orderys of Frerys at Norweche to prey for yow, and I have be hestyd to gon on pylgreymmays to Walsingham, and to Sent Levenardys [*St. Leonard's shrine at Norwich*] for yow; be my trowth I had never so hevy a sesyn [*season*] as I had from the tyme that I woste of yowr sekenesse tyl I woste of yowr a mendyng, and zyth [*since*] myn hert is in no gret esse [*ease*], ne nowth xal [*shall*] be, tyl I wott that ze [*ye*] ben very hal [*really whole, or well*]. Your fader and myn was dysday sevenyth [*this day se'nnight or week*] at Bekelys for a matyr of the Pryor of Bromholme, and he lay at Gerlyston that nyth [*night*], and was ther tyl it was ix of the cloke [*clock*], and the toder day. And I sentte thedyr for a goune, and my moder seyde that I xulde have dan [*then*], tyl I had be ther a non, and so thei cowde non gete.

My fader [*godfather*] Garneyss sentee me worde that he xulde ben her [*here*] the nexch weke, and my emme [*uncle*]

also, and pleyn hem [*amuse themselves*] her with herr [*their*] hawkys, and thei xulde have me hom with hem; and so God help me, I xal excusse me of myn goyng dedyr [*thither*] yf I may, for I sopose that I xal redelyer have tydyngys from yow herr dan I xulde have ther. I xal sende my modyr a tokyn that sche toke [*gave*] me, for I sopose the time is cum that I xulde sendeth her, yf I keep the þe hest [*promise*] that I have made; I sopose I have tolde yow wat it was. I pray yow hertely that ze [*ye*] will wochesaf [*will vouchsafe*] to sende me a letter as hastely as ze may, yf wryhyn [*writing*] be non dysesse [*trouble*] to yow, and that ye wollen wochesaf to sende me word quowe your sor doth [*how your sore does*]. Yf I mythe have had my wylle, I xulde a seyne yow er dystyme [*have seen you before this*]; I wolde ye wern at hom, yf it wer your ese, and your sor myth ben as wyl lokyth to [*looked after*] her as it tys ther ze ben [*where you are*], now lever dan a goune zow [*I would rather have this than a gown though*] it were of scarlette. I pray yow yf your sor be hol, and so that ze may indur [*endure*] to ryde, wan my fader com to London, that ze wol askyn leve, and com hom wan the hors xul þe senthe hom a zeyn [*again*], for I hope ze xulde be kepte as tenderly herr as ze ben at London. I may non leyser have to do wrytyn half a quarter so meche as I xulde sey to yow yf I myth speak with yow. I xall sende yow a nothyr letter as hastely as I may. I thanke yow that ze wolde wochesaffe to remember my gyrdyl, and that ze wolde wryte to me at the tyme, for I sopose that wrytyng was non esse for yow. All myth [*Almighty*] God have yow in his kepyn, and sende yow helth—Wretyn at Oxenede, in ryth grete hast, on Sent Mikyllys Evyn. Yorys,

M. PASTON.

Then follows this postscript:—

My modyr grette yow wel, and sendyth yow Goddys blyssyng and hers; and sche prayeth yow, and I pray yow also, that ye be wel dyetyd of mete and drynke, for that is the grettest helpe that ye may have now to your helthe ward. Your sone faryth wel, blyssyd be God.

The reference to Our Lady of Walsingham in the foregoing letter is only one of many made throughout the correspondence to this shrine, the most famous perhaps in all England, and one of the most ancient, dating, as it did, back to 1061. We find Sir William Yelverton, one of the judges of the King's Bench, ascribing all the good fortune he had met with in the world, and all his escapes from danger and from the malice of his enemies, to Our Lady of Walsingham. Our Lady of Walsingham was particularly resorted to by women in anticipation of the perils of child-bed (Gairdner, Vol. v., letter 804, and Fenn, II., 96, and IV., 444). Erasmus, who visited Walsingham in the reign of Henry VIII., has left in one of his letters a vivid description of the shrine and its surroundings. When King Henry VII., in his efforts to make headway against Lambert Simnel and the Earl of Lincoln, took a leisurely progress through the eastern counties in the spring of 1487 to beat up recruits for his army, he went from Bury St. Edmund's to Norwich and thence made a pilgrimage to Our Lady of Walsingham. After the battle of Stoke, where victory had perched on his banners and his rival was utterly defeated and degraded from being an aspirant to the crown to be a turnspit in the royal kitchen, Henry again repaired to Walsingham to return a solemn thanksgiving, and he hung his colours as an *ex-voto* offering in front of the image. It is traditional in England that when his son, Henry VIII., was a child he walked barefoot to Walsingham from the neighboring town of Basham, and made an offering of a necklace of great value to the virgin. This fact did not prevent him at a later period from stripping the magnificent shrine of all its treasures at the same time as he dissolved the religious house of which it was the pride and the principal support. In September, 1538, by order of the Lord Cromwell, Henry's confidential adviser, the image of Walsingham with those of Ipswich, Worcester, Welsdon, and many others were all taken away. Those of Walsingham and Ipswich were brought to London "with all the jewels that hung about them," and by Cromwell's order were committed to the flames.

Returning to Margaret Paston, we find her in the following letter, written November 29, 1471, expressing her fears and regrets, her displeasure with the extravagance of her eldest son, her dread of shame, and her mortified pride. Her cry has found an echo in many an anxious mother's heart:—

MARGARET PASTON TO JOHN PASTON.

*To John Paston, Esquier [the second son], be this delyverd
in hast.*

I grete zow welle, and zend yow Goddes blyssyng and myn, letyng zow wete [*know*] that I have a letter from zour brother, wherby I undyrstand that he cannot, ner may, make no porveyans for the C. mark; the wyche causythe me to be rythgh hevvy, and for other thynges that he wrytth to me of that he is in dawnger. For remembering wat we have had befor thys and ho sympplly yt hath be spent and to lytyl profythe to any of us, and now arn in soche casse that non of us may welle helpe other with owte that we schuld do that wer to gret a dysworschip for us to do, owther [*either*] to selle wood or lond or soche stufte that were necessary for us to have in owr howsys; so mot I answer a for God, I wot not how to do for the seyde money, and for other thyngges that I have to do of scharge, and my worshup saved. Yt is a deth to me to thynk up on yt. Me thynkyth be zour brother's wrythtyng, that he thynkyth that I am informed be sume that be a bowthe me to do and to sey as I have be for thys, but be my trowthe he demyth a mysse; yt nedyth me not to be informed of no sech thengges. I construe in my owyn mend, and conseyye i now [*enow, enough*] and to myche, and whan I have broken my conseyte to sume that in happe he deniythe yt too, they have put me in cownforth more that I kowde have be by any imajynasyon in my owyn conseythe. He wrythetyth to me also, that he hath spent thys terme xl. li. [*forty pounds*]. Yt is a gret thyng; me thynkyth be good dyscreyson ther mythe myche ther of aben sparyd. Zour fadyr, God blysse hys sowle, hathe had as gret maters to do

as I trowe he hathe had thys terme, and hath not spende halfe the money up on them in so lytyl tyme, and hath do ryth well. At the reverens of God, avyse him zet to be war of hys expences and gydyng that yt be no schame to us alle. Yt is a schame and a thyng that is myche spokyn of in thys contre that zour faders graveston is not mad. For Goddes love, late yt be remembyrd and porveyde for in hast. Ther hathe be mych mor spend in waste than schuld have mad that. Me thynkyth be zour brother that he is wery to wrythe to me and there fore I wyl not akumbyr hym with wrythtyng to hym. Ze may telle hym as I wryth to zow . . .

As for my rowndlet of wyne, I schuld send zow mony there fore, but I dar not put yt in joperte, ther be so many theves stereng. John Lovedayes man was robbyd in to his schyrte as he cam home ward. . . .

God kepe zow and send zow good speede, &c. Wretyn the Fryday, Sen Andrue Ev.

Be zour modyr.

So through the whole gamut of human emotions runs this interesting correspondence. Many a pathetic figure peeps at us out of these fifteenth century pages—Cecily Dawne and Jane Boys and Elizabeth Paston and Constance Reynforth and Margaret of Anjou, and the “goodly young woman,” Margery, daughter of John Paston the first. In particular the narrative of the sorely tried patience and constancy and the final triumph of Margery Paston can scarcely fail to strike a responsive chord in any sympathetic heart.

From the instance of John Paston himself and Margaret Mauteby it may be inferred that marriages by arrangement of the elders and without reference to the feelings of the contracting parties were the rule, and so they were; but we are given an occasional glimpse of the genuine unbidden feeling of a man for a maid and of a maid for a man. Here, for example, is an extract from a letter of Margaret Paston to her eldest son, Sir John Paston, from which we see that hearts could glow, and that love could be made, in what our age and country

at least regard as the orthodox style. There is something captivating about Jane Walsham's frank avowal of her feelings:—

“Item, I wold ye shuld speke with Wekis, and knowe hys dysposysion to Jane Walsham. She hathe seyde, syn he departyd hens, but [*unless*] she myght have hym, she wold never maryd, hyr hert ys sor set on hym; she told me that he seyde to hyr that ther was no woman in the world he lovyd so welle. I wold not he shuld jape hyr, for she menythe good feythe; and yf he wolde not have hyr, late me wete in hast, and I shall purvey for hyr in other wysse.”

After that it comes on us rather in the nature of a shock to learn that Margaret Paston was not so concerned that her own daughter, Margery, should marry the man of her choice. Two days earlier (November 13, 1463) she had written a letter to her husband from which the extract below is taken; observe how the feelings of the prospective bride and bridegroom are utterly left out of account: one husband would do as well as another:—

“I was at my modder, and wille I was ther, ther cam in on Wrothe, a kynnysman of Elysabet Clers, and he sey your dowter [*saw your daughter*], and preysyd hyr to my moder, and seyde that she was a goodly yong woman; and my moder prayd hym for to gett for hyr on good mariage yf he knewe any; and he seyde he knewe on shuld be of a CCC. mark be yer, the wyche is Sir John Cley son, that is Chamberleyn with my Lady of York, and he ys of age of xvij yer old. Zyf ye thynk it be for to be spok of, my moder thynkyth that it shuld be get for lesse mony now in thys world than it should be her after, owthyr that j. [*one*], or sum other good mariage.”

The suggested union did not take place, and Margery remained on her mother's hands until they bored each other

unutterably. The brothers felt it, too. John Paston the third thus writes to his mother in London, September 14, 1465:—

“I pray yow voysyt the Rood of Northedor and Seynt Savour, at Barmonsey, amonge whyll ye abyd in London, and lat my sustyr Margery goo with yow to pray to them that sche may have a good hosbond or [*ere*] she com hom ayen.”

Margery's marriage to another suitor is mooted in a letter from J. Strange to Sir John Paston two or three years later:—

“Ryth worchupful ser, after dewe recomendacion, plesyt zow to understond the cause of my wrytyng ys for a maryage for my Masters Margery, zowr suster. For my nevyewe, John Straunge, wold make her sure of xl. li. [*forty pounds*] joynture and CC. marke [£133. 6. 8] be zer [*year*] of inherytaunce; and yf zee and zour frendes wole agreve [*will agree*] herto, I trost to God that xall take a conclusion to the plesur of God and worchup to both partyes.”

These overtures also came to nothing, and, thus tossed from pillar to post, Margery finally took the matter into her own hands and betrothed herself to their steward, Richard Calle. Thereupon there were fearful wrath and dismay in the Paston family circle. Calle was a good steward and a loyal and faithful servant: he had run the risk of being murdered in the streets of Norwich and of being hanged by process of law for devotion to the cause of the Pastons: but when it came to the question of his wedding a daughter of the house the pride and prejudices of class and caste and of the alleged Norman blood were aroused, and frantic efforts were made to prevent their union from taking place. But Richard and Margery were staunch and true. They stood upon the rights conferred on them by their betrothal, then a most sacred and solemn engagement. There is one letter from Calle to Margery, which is too long to quote, but which proves him to have been a loyal lover and a manly man, well worthy to be mated with the grand-daughter of an English judge, even

if, in addition to that distinction, she could boast of the claims of long descent. When the family found that their efforts were unavailing to thwart the designs of the determined pair, appeal was taken to the bishop of Norwich to show whether or not there had been a betrothal. The bishop, good man, went as far as he conscientiously could in reasoning with Margery, but reasoning was of no avail, and there was of course a point where his authority ceased. It would appear that the contract was proved and confirmed, whereupon the angry mother turned her daughter out of doors and left her to the cold and unwilling charity of a stranger. All obstacles, however, were finally overcome, and the marriage eventually took place in 1469; let us hope that Richard and Margery lived happily ever after. Their union was blessed with at least three sons, and blood proved thicker than water in the long run, for Margaret Paston in her will made on February 4, 1482, handsomely remembered her three grandsons of the name of Calle.

There is one joyous personage who breaks into the correspondence as it nears its close. I refer to Margery Brews, who eventually married John Paston the third and, when he was knighted at Stoke, became Lady Paston. She is an artist in the composition of valentines and knows how to say a coy thing coyly and an arch thing archly. She rises up amid a most serious set of people to appeal to our sense of humour and of fun. She invites us across the ages to laugh with her at her jokes and with a twinkle in our eye to sigh gently with her in her mock sorrows. Her wooing by John Paston begins in a letter which he wrote to her apparently before he had seen her, or at least before he could be said to be acquainted with her. The girl was flattered and interested, and her mother, Dame Elizabeth Brews, was evidently very anxious for the match. She writes to her prospective son-in-law several encouraging letters, meant to give him heart and hope when the usual difficulties about settlements had supervened. She reminds him, oracularly and metaphorically, that

It is but a sympill oke,
That is cut down at the first stroke.

Margery herself is frankly outspoken. She writes to Paston that she is not in good health of body nor of heart and will not be until she hears from him; assures him that, even if he had not half the means he has, she would not forsake him; and declares that, if he will be content with the dowry offered him, she will be the merriest maid on earth. She carries on the campaign vigorously in her family circle, and gives her mother rest neither by day nor by night, crying and clamouring to have the matter brought to an issue. Paston on his side was also very energetic, and the marriage finally took place about the month of August, 1477. After marriage Margery's letters show many traces of her old sprightliness, but they gradually become records of business transacted, wrongs done to property, and public events. She bore several children, and died in 1495, eight years before the husband she loved so well.

From the nature of my subject I have been able to do no more than touch on the fringe of the *Paston Letters*: full justice could not be done to them in the course of one short article. It is not too much to affirm that any one who wishes to be thoroughly conversant with the real history of fifteenth century England must not be content until he has mastered the correspondence and the accompanying documents in all their details. They are history at first hand and in the making, source books for the after time.

On the literary side no extravagant claim can be made for them, although some of the letters are very well written indeed. From the linguistic point of view they are extremely interesting. And those who have been patient enough to read this article through will, I think, agree with me that, if the *Paston Letters* are not themselves literature, they at least provide much of the raw material of which literature is made.

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AN IRISH HOMILY ON THE PASSION: TEXT AND TRANSLATION.

II.

TEXT.

Adeir grigoir an¹-tan fiarfócair² dim a-tigerna cad-he an-résún nó-an-cúntus do-bér a-fuil an fíreoin do-doirtidh a-talman tar-mo-chenn na² testaigat grasa uaimsi ac-freagra na-n-aithisi fuair Christ co³-humal and fein. an-tan do-doirtad³ fuil an-rechta-núaid⁴ ar-an-talmain so. 7⁵-gur-brúidheadar an-cined iúbulta mac dé⁶ fa-cosaib tar⁷ éis a-adlaicti co-mí-trocaireach.⁷ 7-a Adeir grigoir is-truad 7-is-ro-truad dona-doeinib imcras⁸ croch Christ 7-nach leanann hí .i. a⁹-coroin coiserca 7-nach⁹ congmann a-riagail mar¹⁰ atat iés grada cacha ceime in-molta 7¹⁰ adeir grigoir ca-fuil in¹¹-att tethmhe na-daingen ac-an-cined dænna acht a-creachtaib Christ.¹¹ 7 Adeir ambrocus is¹²-teind leat a-christ ar-creachta-ne¹² 7-ni hiatt do-creachta fein is¹³-teind let¹³ 7¹⁴-ní-he¹⁴ do-bás fein¹⁵ acht ar-n-eslainti¹⁶-ni is¹⁷-teind let¹⁷ oir do-gallraigte tú ar-son ar-peccad-ne. Adeir Augustin ca-fuil ní-is-mó re-congmaíl¹⁸ ar-cuimne na-is-troma¹⁸ re-cairiugad na-mac dé¹⁹ do-faicsin tarrnocht am-bochtacht²⁰ indarbert o-c[u]raid crochti mí-trocairigh²⁰ 7-nach-smuainenn duine a-trocaire (fo 33a) do-techt ar-bochtaib dia²¹ a-comæin na-pían-so.²¹ Adeir ambrosius is-truadh damh-sa troma 7 serui mo-pectaig indus corab-eicen do-Christ páis²² do-fulang ar-mo-shon²³ 7²⁴-hé-fein can-peacad and²⁴ 7 Adeir ambrocus curab ar-ar-son-ne do-bo-teind²⁵ le Christ cach²⁶ ní da-fuair²⁶ oir-nír-fætadh²⁷ teindes do-tabairt do and fein do²⁸-reir adhbair²⁸ 7 Adeir Bernard do-cim Christ cengailti fa-n-coroin-

¹ fos in tan.

² iar fader orum-sa euntus na fola firenta so do-doirtedh tar mo-cenn a talm-hain na-teastaidhi.

³ tar mo cenn ac-denum umla ann fen dar-doirteth.

⁴ nua.

⁶ dia fona cosaibh.

⁷ Omitted in Eg.

⁸ imurcus.

⁹ imurcus coroin crist 7 nach.

¹⁰ 7-is-d-æs graidh gach ceim in-molta tucter in radha-so.

¹¹ innillus na-daingin a-teitheth in-cined doenna acht a-creachta isa crist.

¹² is-iat ar-creachta-ne is-teinn let a-crist.

TRANSLATION.

Gregory says, "What reason or explanation shall I give, O Lord, when I am asked why the blood of the righteous was shed on the ground for my sake, for me who lack the power (to bear without) answering the insults which Christ Himself bore humbly for me, the time the blood of the New Law was shed on this earth; and that the Jewish people trampled the Son of God under their feet without mercy after his burial?" And Gregory says, "It is indeed a great pity that men should venerate the Cross of Christ, and not follow it, which is, to consecrate his Crown and not to keep his Rule; for the true lover practises what he praises." And Gregory asks what place of refuge, what stronghold is there for the human race, save in the Wounds of Christ? And Ambrose says, "O Christ, our sufferings are near to Thee, and it is not thy sufferings that concern Thee, nor is it thine own death, but our infirmity which Thou considerest; for Thou wast sickened by reason of our sins." Augustine says, "Where is there anything more to be kept in mind, or more to be blamed than to see the Son of God stark naked, in distress after the merciless torment of the Crucifixion, and to see that man does not think to show pity to God's poor in return for those sufferings?" Ambrose says, "Grievous to me is the weight and bitterness of my sin that made it necessary for Christ to undergo the Passion for my sake, although He Himself was sinless." Again Ambrose says, "It was for our sakes Christ found suffering in everything, for He could find no cause to suffer in Himself according to his own nature." And Bernard says, "I see Christ bound under

¹³ Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁵ *fein* is dith *let acht*.¹⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*²⁰ *am-bochtaine o-curaidh mi-trocaire croichte* (?)²¹ *dia isin-saighal-so in-agid na-pene do-fulaing a-corp co-humal mor galurach daibh 7 adeir.*²² *pian paiss.*²⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*^{26, 26} Omitted in *Eg.*^{28, 28} *acht inn-a-inne.*¹⁴ 7 a tiagerna ní he.¹⁶ *galar-ne.*¹⁸ *fiadnaisi na-ni is truma.* ¹⁹ *dia.*²³ *a-shon.*²⁵ *budh-teinn.*²⁷ *nir feteih.*

spíne¹ 7-fa-dæirsi na-sciursad² ar na-crochad 7-ní-fergach ata 7-cret³ adeir-sa an-a-brethemnus fein ris in-tan nach tiucfaidh dim æn-briathar do-congmaill dó⁴ tar cenn mo-pectaig don⁵ ló-deigeanach 7-adeir⁵ Adeir Bernard da-tinoilti⁶ cach bairdi⁷ dar doirtad⁸ do-fuil Christ an-aimsir a-césta is-maith do-coimetfa hí.⁹ Masead cret fa-nach coimétaid⁹ t-anam fein óir is mó lúach an-ní¹⁰ do cennaigh se ac-diá na-an-ní¹¹ tuc-sé¹² ar-a-son .i. a-fuil¹³ fein óir ní-mesann an ridere fírindech a-sæthar an-tan coimlí'nus toil a-tigerna 7-is-mar-sin nar-mothaigh mac dé¹⁴ a-cesadh-fein ac-coimet¹⁵ toile an-athar¹⁶ ac-ar¹⁶ cennach¹⁷ ne maille-re sæthar mór.¹⁷ Adeir Augustin da-cuim-nidi an-cruaidhi páis an-tigerna ac-ar¹⁸ cennach-ne ní-fuil ní¹⁹ da-cruaidhi doimeocha air-fein nach-fuileongad hé co-foighidech. Adeir²⁰ Bernard cíá nach²¹ goidfidhi docum²² foghanta díera do-denam²³ do-día da-cuimnigidh sé césad Christ 7-an faici²⁴ an-cenn arna-cromad sa-croich²⁵ do-chur failti riut²⁵ 7-a-bél dúinti²⁶ do-tabairt póici duit mar comarta sída 7²⁶ a-tæb arna-oslucad do²⁷ leigen a-ruin²⁷ riut 7-a-lamha arna-lethad²⁸ do-t-gabail²⁸ cuigi 7-iat arna-cengailti sa-croich²⁹ do-fulang do-toile fein duit 7-a-cosa cengailti sa croich cétna dobeth maille riut 7-a-corp uile arna-righed sa-crund césta docum³⁰ do-sínti ris isin gradh mar³¹ do-ghradhaigh sé tú ar-tosach.³¹ 7 Adeir Augustin tainic an-líaid nemda-so do-gabail asanora do-fein 7-do tabairt³² anora³³ 7-do gabail³³ galar 7-do-tabairt³² tslainti³⁴ 7-do-dul (fo 33b) docum³⁵ báis 7-do-tabairt³² betha 7-do fechain na-notar 7-do-fagbail báis tar-ar-cend co documlach.³⁶ 7-a³⁷ Adeir Augustin do-curid líaidh chucaib³⁸ a-eslana .i. Ísa 7-nir³⁸ aithnebar hé 7³⁹ is-aire sin do-marbabar hé 7-do slanaigthe⁴⁰ na-heslana o-fuil in-leaga-so do-ól. 7 Adeir⁴¹ fós an-tan is-gruamda an⁴² deoch leighis 7-is-do-óla-con-ibenn an-liaidh hí artús indus comad-lughaiti grain an-otair roimpi-sin cor⁴³ amlaid sin do⁴³ cúaid crist tar-ar-cenn-ne

¹ sbine.³ cad.^{5,5} Omitted in *Eg.*⁷ æn braen.⁹ hí 7-a-duine masead cad-um-nach comifa.¹⁰ an-eth.¹² tuc ; se omitted in *Eg.*¹⁴ dia.¹⁶ in aithar gar.¹⁸ gar.²⁰ 7-adeir.²² cum.²⁴ faicidh.⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*⁶ tinoltea.⁸ doirteth.¹¹ an n-eth.¹³ fhola.¹⁵ ac comlinadh.¹⁷⁻¹⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁹ æn ni.²¹ ce-nach.²³ Omitted in *Eg.*²⁵ isin crann-cesta aigi cum failti docur rit.

the crown of thorns and oppressed by the scourging after his Crucifixion, and yet He is not angry. And what shall I say to Him, at the judgment, when no word will come from me to excuse my sin and keep me by Him on the last day?" Again Bernard says, "If every drop of the blood of Christ that was shed at the time of his Passion was saved, it is well thou wouldst guard it. Why then dost thou not guard thine own soul? For more precious is the thing that was ransomed by God than the thing He gave for its ransom, even his own Blood. As the true knight does not reckon his toil when fulfilling the will of his master, even so the Son of God did not consider his own suffering when, fulfilling the will of his Father, He redeemed us with great anguish." Augustine says, "If we consider the severity of the Passion of the Lord when redeeming us, we see there is nothing however harsh or painful that He did not endure with patience." Bernard says, "Who would not ask to render earnest service to God, if he remembered the torments of Christ, and saw the Head bowed on the cross to give thee welcome, and his mouth closed to give thee a kiss as a sign of peace, and his side opened to disclose his inmost love for thee, and his hands spread out to take thee to Him, those hands fastened to the cross to expiate thine own will, and his feet bound to the same cross that He might be with thee, and his whole body stretched out on the tree of torture to draw thee to Him in love, as He loved thee first." And Augustine says, "This heavenly Physician came to take to Himself insults and to give honor, to assume sickness and to bestow health, to accept death and to give life, to visit the sick and to die in pain for our sakes." Again Augustine says, "A

²⁶ *dunta cum poigi do-thobairt dut .i. cum-sidhigad rit 7.*

²⁷ *cum a-ruin do-leigin.*

²⁸ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁹ *in a comain fen.*

³⁰ *onora duine 7-do-chach 7-do-gabail.*

³¹ *slainti.*

³² Omitted in *Eg.*

³³ *cugaibh eslani 7-nir.*

³⁴ *do-slanaihi na-heslani.*

³⁵ *do 6l ain deoch leigis con-ibinn in-liaigh ar-dus innus nach grannaidhinn (sic) int-othar roime gurob.*

³⁶ *do-ibh crist serbus choiligh na paisi duinne ga-eisimlarudh duinn serbus caintech docur an-atrighi ar-pecaidh 7 adeir.*

³⁷ *lethnugad isin croith do-d-gabail.*

³⁸ *cum.*

³⁹ *tobairt.*

⁴⁰ *cum.*

⁴¹ *Sic in ms.*

⁴² *gurob.*

⁴³ *Adeir Agustin in tan.*

indus nach gabaid grain sinne roim an-aitrigi doleigeas ar-peacaig do-gnáth. 7-a Adeir¹ Bernard an-cend do-eist re ceól² na-n-angel cur-eist³ re-briatraib na³-n-iúbul ac-cur-a-coroine fa⁴ cend 7-na-súile dob-áille na-an-grian ar-na-ndorchugad⁵ isin-páis⁵ cétna 7⁶-briatra dubalta nan iúbul ac-boghrad na-cluas do-ested ceól na-n-angel .i. ac-a-radh⁶ crochaidh crochaidh hé 7-an-bél do-tecaise ceol na-haingil⁷ ac-ól domblais éi 7 aigéte⁸ 7-an-aged dob-áille na-cach-aged do⁹-dorchaide hí¹⁰ an-tan-sin¹¹ o-seilegar 7-o-salchar nan-iúbul 7-na lamha do-cruthaig neam 7-talam cur-cenglad iatt o-na-clodhaib isin-crann¹² césta 7-na-cosa dar-cóir an¹³-doman do-cheimniugad cur¹³-cenglad¹⁴ isin crann cétna¹⁵ óir ní-raibi¹⁶ aen-ball sær ann¹⁷ acht a-teanga ar-na-coimét do-aithne a-mathair do-Eoin bruindi ana-mathair 7-do-aithne Eoin disi ana mac dileas¹⁸ dingmala dia eisi-fein.¹⁸ 7 Adeir Bernard do-fétus¹⁹ an-talam 7-an-fairgi do-cheimniugad²⁰ 7-ní-fuarus tú ac-rann²¹ acht ann-sa-croich césta 7 Adeir an-suibisceluidhe nar-feth neach grad bud mó do-tabairt²² na²³-anam do-chur²³ tar-cend a-escarat bunaid²⁴ 7-adeir Adeir²⁵ Bernard a-Isa ro-milis is-mó tucais amach na-fuara is oir tucais ant-anam dob-uaisli na-cach uile²⁶ anam tar cenn anma na pectach 7 Adeir²⁷ Bernard²⁸ crett²⁹ fa-ndernais procision isin eclais .i. an solás ro-shocraidh roim aimsir do³⁰-césta 7-cur-aithnigis³¹ fein clucatt hé³¹ 7-is-é a-adbar sin do-derbatar na-fáidhed³² .i. curab -é an-dobron is-dered do cach solás oir dobo³³ troma serui do-chur césta (fo 33c) Christ³⁴ na-solás an-procision dorindi³⁵ domnach na-pailme an-ierusalem³⁶ gé adubrad ris-an-la-sin is-bennaighiti an mac³⁷ tainic an-ainm día .i. rí clanni hisrael 7-na-beil cétna ac-a-rádh aóine³⁸ an-cesta na-díaidh-so-nach-roibi rí acu acht sésair 7-ís éc-cosmail na-neithi so doronad³⁹ ris oir do-chuiredar na-tigernaighi⁴⁰ 7-na-dæine saidbri an-étaighi úaisle fa⁴¹-chosaib domnach na-pailme 7-do-churedar na-doeine daidbri géga éxamla barra na-crand 7-tucc an⁴²-croch 7-an-coroin spíne torad⁴² barr na-crann so co-ha-bonnaib .i. an-lictauire⁴³ lér-slanaighi

¹ do-ibh crist serbus choiligh na paisi duinne ga-eisimlarudh duinn serbus caintech docur an-atrighi ar-peacaidh 7 adeir.

² gloir.

³ eist re duinne briatra serba na.

⁴ ma.

⁵ dorchudh duinne sa pais.

⁶ 7-na-cluasa do-cluinedh in cheol sirainglidi ga-mbodhrugad o-briatraibh diabulta nan-iubul ga-rad ris.

⁷ aingli.

⁸ aigedi ann sa croith 7-in-aighi bud-socraidhi na-gach uile aighi dæna do.

⁹ trit-ne.

¹⁰ sin i.

¹¹ croich.

¹² na huili talman do-ceimniugad dar do-pogad ina onoir gur.

¹³ cengladh iat.

¹⁴ cesta.

¹⁵ roibh.

¹⁶ ann-gan-cesadh acht.

physician was sent to you in your illness, even Jesus. They knew Him not, and therefore they put Him to death, and the sick were healed by drinking the Blood of that Physician." And he says further, "When most disagreeable and hard to drink was this healing draught, the Physician drank it Himself first, to lessen the dislike of the sick for it. And thus Christ came for our sakes, in order that we might not have aversion for penance which is to be the cure for our sins." And Bernard says, "The Head that heard the music of the angels listened to the words of the Jews, as they put the crown of thorns on his head; and the eyes that were more beautiful than the sun were darkened at the Crucifixion; and the ears that were used to listen to the music of the angels, were deafened by the lying words of the Jews, as they cried, 'Crucify, crucify Him'; and the mouth that taught the angels' music was made to drink gall and vinegar; and the face that was more beautiful than any other face was darkened at that time by the spittle and filth of the Jews; and the hands that created heaven and earth were fastened by nails to the tree of torture; and the feet that should have walked the earth were bound to the same tree; for no member was left free, but his tongue to confide his Mother to John of the Breast as his own mother, and to entrust John to her, as her own son, next worthy after Himself." Again Bernard says, "Thou wast able to walk upon the earth and the sea, and Thou foundest no check but on the cross of suffering." And the Evangelist says, "No one could show greater love than to give up his life for the sake of his enemies." And Bernard says, "O most sweet Jesus, more didst Thou give than

¹⁷⁻¹⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*

¹⁸ do-timcellad.

¹⁹ do-thobairt.

²⁰ Interlinear addition in R. na a-anum fen do-cur, *Eg.*

²¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

²² Omitted in *Eg.*

²³ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁴ a.

²⁵ faidhi.

²⁶ crist co-dethinach.

²⁷ iaruslem.

²⁸ aine cesta.

²⁹ tiagernaide.

³⁰ in coroin sbine 7-in-croch cesta torad.

³¹ lictubair.

³² dfedus.

³³ acrann an-æn-inadh acht.

³⁴ Sic, ms.

³⁵ adeir fos.

³⁶ a-isa ro-milis cad.

³⁷ aithnis cugud-he.

³⁸ budh truma serbhe.

³⁹ dorinne se.

⁴⁰ nech.

⁴¹ dorinneth ris co-clæchelodac oir.

⁴² fa na chosaibh.

⁴³ pobuil pecaich do-creid.

anmanna an-popuil¹ do-creitt indtu 7-an-ri-so do² fuair do-anoir la-na-pailme iter na-tigernaigib³ adubramar an-étaigi úaisle fein do cur fa-na-cosaib do-benad a-étach díles fein-de lá-na-páisi 7-do-cuiretar⁴ crandechur air. 7 Adeir Bernard curab díles⁵ prosision do-cengal ris-an⁶ cesad da-eisimplarugad⁷ duinne⁸ cæined 7 toirrsi do-beth acaind in-dereth tsolais⁹ int-sægail.⁹ Adeir Bernard cor-sciúrsad hé o na-sciúrsedaib 7-cur-coronad on-spín 7-cur ruaimred a-chosa 7-a-lama o-tairgedaib¹⁰ maille-re¹¹ móran peine¹² 7-cenel ndocráid an-báis 7-ataim-si mí-chuimnech ar cach-cinel peine da-fuair¹⁴ sé 7-do-athain co-fogidech da-athar na-lean a-tigerna ar-na-hiubaltaib an-ní-so¹⁵ doniat. Adeir¹⁵ Bernard re-persain an-fíreoin¹⁶ na-bí tarcaisnech art¹⁷ anam ar-son curab-é luach¹⁷ fola 7-feola mic an-athar neamda hé. Adeir¹⁸ in-sealmus a-Ísa óic umail ro-grodach cid tusa¹⁹ fuilngis an-croch is-misi adbar do-galar. Adeir Bernard con²⁰-dligenn cach-uile cristaidhi cuimne césta²¹ crist dobeth aici²¹ ana-craidhi²² 7-con²³ dligend an-sacart 7-ant-escop co-ro-mor oir is iad imcras²⁴ an-coroin coisrica Adeir an-faid²⁶ a-fidair geinemna christ curab mar-do-ferad ant-uisce (fo 33d) do-feradh mé 7-do-scaélad mo²⁶-chnamha 7-ní can adbar²⁷ aderar²⁸ fertain an-uisqui a-compraitt paisi christ óir is-glan ant-ær o-fertain an-uisqui 7²⁹-do-ní an-talam-úr ar-ar-doirter²⁹ hé 7-sgrisaidh³¹ cach³⁰-salchar³¹ 7-ar³⁰-fertain crist as-a-cathar nemda am-broind muire³² o-techtairecht an-aingil docum³³ a-césta tar-ar-cend-ne³⁴ do-glan-sé an brú an-a-tainic-se 7-do-coiserc³⁵ an-eclais an-ar-crochad hé 7-do-glan³⁶-sé ar-pechaig-ne³⁷ gurab-aire³⁸-sin adeir³⁹ an-fáid⁴⁰ do-ruaimretar mo lamha 7-mo-chosa 7-do-airmetar⁴¹ mo-

¹ Omitted in *Eg.*² tiagernaibh.³⁴ docureth.⁵ dilus.⁶ cengal don cesad.⁷ da-eisimlarudh.⁸ duin.⁹ tsolais aingidhi tuitimdhí ant sèghail 7 adeir.¹⁰ ona tairngedaibh.¹¹ Omitted in *Eg.*¹² pian.¹⁴ dar-uair.¹⁵ in ní-so nach fedadar cade re-denam adeir.¹⁶ na-ferinne.¹⁷ ar hanum.¹⁸ luach cesta crist e 7 adeir.¹⁹ cetusa.²⁰ Bernard gach uile cristaidhi condligenn cuime cesta.²¹ Omitted in *Eg.*²² craidhethaibh.²³ co.²⁴ imurcus sgailad.²⁶ faidh da-feradh me mar-ferthar int-usqui 7-do-sgailad mo.²⁷ cus.²⁸ aderthar.²⁹ 7-nuaguigid in talam ar an doirter. ³⁰ sgrisaidh se gach³¹ salchar 7-a-comlinad na fighrach so ar.

receive, for Thou didst give the Life that was nobler than all other lives for the sake of the life of sinners." Again Bernard says, "Why didst Thou make triumphal entry into the Temple, by which is meant, the joy and the splendor which preceded the time of thy suffering? And why didst Thou allow it for Thyself? For this reason, the prophets declared that sorrow is the end of every joy. For heavier and bitterer was the infliction of the torment of Christ than the joy of the procession which He made on Palm Sunday into Jerusalem; although they cried out to Him on that day, 'Blessed is the Son that cometh in the name of God,' that is, King of the people of Israel, yet the very same mouths said to him, after that, on Friday of the Passion, that they had no king but Cæsar. And unlike each other were the things that were done to Him; for, on Palm Sunday, the princes and the rich folk put their noble garments under his feet, and the poor people spread various branches, the tops of trees. And He bore the cross and the crown of thorns, which were the fruit of those trees from leaf to root, namely, the electuary that saves the souls of the people who believe in them. And this same king was honored on the day of Palms by the princes who, as we have said, doffed their noble garments and put them under his feet, and then, on the day of the Passion, tore off his garments and cast lots on them." And Bernard says, that it was fitting to unite the triumphal entry with the Passion, to make manifest to us that sorrow and weariness shall be ours after the joys of this world. Bernard says, "He was scourged with scourges, and crowned with thorns, and his feet were pierced and his hands by the nails, accompanied by great pain and grievous forms of death, and I myself am unmindful of all the kinds of pain which He experienced. And He patiently called upon his Father; 'Do not pursue the Jews, O Lord, for what they do.'" Bernard says, "Be not scornful of thy soul, O righteous man, because its price was the Blood and Flesh of the Son of the heavenly Father." He says too, *in Psalmis*, "O Jesus, young, humble, most loving, why didst Thou endure the cross, since I am the cause of thy suffering?" Bernard says that every Christian

⁸³ mure oighi.

⁸⁴ dar cinn-ne.

⁸⁶ do-agris-se.

⁸⁸ uime-sin.

⁴⁰ in-faidh cetna.

⁸³ cum.

⁸⁵ do-choisric se.

⁸⁷ peceth-ne.

⁸⁹ adubairt.

⁴¹ do-tairmbetar.

chnamha Adeir ant-udarras aca-tuicsin-so an-talam trebtar co-domin is-é-is-mó-torad curab amlaid sin is moaidi tslánaigter¹ lucht creidemna crist doimne² a-crecht tar-a-cenn ann sa-croich Adeir an-fáidh tucadar olc dam do-chind maithesa⁴ óir⁵ adubairt crist an-trath tucus-a-torad tucadar-sin aimritecht 7-an-trath tucus-a-betha tucadar sin bás 7⁶-an⁶-trath tucus-a-anoir tucadar sin aithis 7-an-trath tucus-a-leges tucadar sin crechta 7-do-malle ant-athar co-hobann aimridecht an-popuil gentlidi oir an-tan do iar se a-torad⁷ ní-fuair uatha acht a-duillebar .i. am-briatra dimæine in-a-sinagógaib .i. a-tighi⁸ gentlidi uarbarta ant-sean rechta 7-teach diles² uarbarta de¹⁰ 7-na-croiche césta ac-a-facbail folam¹¹ in¹² a-fásach.¹² FINIT. [do sin uile a-manu scolaris].¹³

¹ slanaigther.² doimne cr.⁴ maithusa ar-perssin crist nach adubairt.^{5,6} Omitted in *Eg.*⁶ in tan.⁷ torad .i. anmanna ní fuair.⁸ tigibh.⁹ Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁰ dia 7 na-trocaire 7 na.¹¹ Omitted in *Eg.*¹² folam finit amen.¹³ *Eg.*^a Translating from *Eg.*^b Translating from *Eg.*

should be mindful in his heart of the Passion of Christ, and the priest and the bishop especially, for it is they that bear the consecrated crown. The prophet says, prefiguring the birth of Christ, "As water was poured, I was poured, and my bones were scattered." And not without reason is it said in this comparison of the Passion of Christ that water is poured, for the air is purified when the rain falls, and the rain freshens the earth whereon it falls, and all filth is banished. Now, when at the message of the Angel, Christ was shed from the heavenly city into the womb of Mary, He purified the womb into which He came, and, at the time of his suffering for our sakes, He consecrated the Church by his Crucifixion, and washed away our sins. Hence it is that the Prophet said, "My hands and my feet were pierced and my bones numbered." Authority says, to make this clear, that, as the ground most deeply ploughed is the one that giveth most fruit, so are they most healed who believe in the depth of Christ's sufferings for our sakes on the cross. The Prophet says, "Evil was given to me in return for good." For Christ said, "When I gave fruit, they gave barrenness; and when I gave life, they gave death; and when I gave honor, they gave insult; and when I gave healing, they gave wounds." And straightway the Father cursed the barrenness of the Gentiles, for, when He asked for fruit, He got nothing but leaves, that is, He got nothing but empty words in the synagogues, namely, in the houses of the heathen, the abode of the Old Law, and God's own house, the tabernacle of God and (of mercy and)^a of the cross of suffering was abandoned and deserted. Finit. (Amen. Here all this endeth, *a manu scholaris.*)^b

GEORGE W. HOEY.

SAINT THOMAS AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

The civilization of the middle ages differed fundamentally from that which preceded and that which followed it. The root of the difference was in the fact that religion was the source of action in the middle ages, that it dominated all spheres of effort and that it gave to life and society a character of homogeneousness which they possessed neither before nor since. The transformation from a pagan to a Christian form of society was slowly accomplished: the transition filled the centuries between the invasion and destruction of the Roman Empire by the German peoples and the restoration of political unity in Western Europe under Charlemagne. This long period of disorder and change was conducive neither to intellectual activity nor to social experiments, but it was a time of profound upheaval in all departments of life, and when Charlemagne assumed the imperial crown the Empire was Roman merely in name. Paganism was totally extinct. Pagan learning and pagan ideals had vanished, and in the ninth century the new order found its guides and the exponents of its purposes in the schools which arose under imperial and ecclesiastical patronage. These schools were preëminently Christian, and hence it is not surprising that civilization and learning took such a decidedly religious tone in the succeeding centuries. The theology and philosophy of these schools were a faithful reflection of the times. Theology was the Queen of Sciences, philosophy its handmaid. In a truly Catholic and eclectic spirit all streams of tradition were laid under contribution and all systems of thought thoroughly examined, until Scholasticism in its greatest exponent, St. Thomas Aquinas, without repudiating the idealism of Plato, pursued its ends under the realistic influence and with the objective methods of Aristotle.

In regard to social and economic questions, the change in method and environment produced no change in doctrine, and

the writings of St. Augustine remained throughout the middle ages the classical expression of the Christian concept of society and the State. A decided step in advance was made, however, through the dialectic methods of the scholastics. Because of the thoroughness with which all matters bearing on conduct and social relations were discussed, the obligations of different classes in society were set forth more fully and a much more complete and systematic presentation made of Christian duties and responsibilities than in the writings of the early Christian fathers. St. Thomas is not only the great leader of mediæval thought, but the recognized exponent of the Catholic idea of social relations.¹ Though the social question did not present itself to the mind of St. Thomas in the form in which it is understood to-day, it is possible to find in his works explicit statements and well-defined teachings which cover every phase of modern social and economic problems.² The doctrines of St. Thomas are not, it is true, expressed in a manner which corresponds precisely to the form in which these problems now present themselves, but because he did not deal *ex professo* with social and economic matters, and only discussed them incidentally in connection with his exposition of the general scheme of Christian morals, his words have all the greater weight as associating social duties and questions of wealth and property with the philosophy and practice of the Christian life.

What St. Thomas' philosophy of life and conduct was it is not necessary here to discuss. God for him was the Creator and end of all things: man was superior to all the rest of creation, by reason of the possession of an immortal soul. "There is one first of beings, possessing the full perfection of all beings whom we call God. Out of the abundance of His perfection He bestows being on all things that exist; and thus

¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*.

² See especially Schaub, *Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus*, Freiburg, 1898, and Walter, *Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Sozialismus*, Freiburg, 1895.

He proves to be not only the first of beings, but also the first principle of all. He bestows being on other things, not out of any necessity of His nature, but by the free choice of His will. His dominion over the things He has brought into being is a perfect dominion, since in producing them He needs the aid of no exterior agent, nor any subject matter to work upon, seeing that He is the universal efficient cause of all being.”³ “The final end of the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself, by knowing Him and loving Him. Intelligent nature therefore alone in the universe is in request for its own sake, while all other creatures are in request for the sake of it.”⁴ The end and purpose of human life being the attainment of happiness with God, the merit and value of all human action and effort was measured in accordance with the manner in which it promoted that end. “The proper act of everything is its end, as being its second perfection: hence what is well disposed to its own proper act is said to be virtuous and good. . . . To understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, will be the most perfect instance of the activity of understanding. To know God then by understanding is the final act of every subsistent intelligence.”⁵

Those few statements contain in substance the views of St. Thomas on the world and on man. His teaching in regard to property and wealth flowed directly from the same principles. Because God is the Creator of all things and because the world and all it contains are directly dependent on Him, it follows that He alone is the Lord of creation.⁶ He alone possesses absolute and unrestricted rights of possession. These rights extend even to men, because, being the source of all existence, His dominion knows no bounds.⁷ God created all

³ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 1.

⁴ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 112.

⁵ *Contra Gentiles*, II, 25.

⁶ *Summa Theologica*, I, XIII, 7, ad 5.

⁷ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 119.

things not for any gain that might accrue to Himself, but because it was fitting that He, the fountain of goodness should communicate Himself to others.⁸ Though creation could add nothing to the perfection of God, some created things were more perfect than others, in order that the more imperfect might serve the purposes of the more perfect. As plants use the earth for their nutriment, and animals plants, so do men make use of both plants and animals.⁹ It was because of his rational nature that man held the highest place among created things. "Since the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine Providence, and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due proportion from highest to lowest, divine Providence must reach by a certain rule of proportion to the lowest things. The rule of proportion is this, that as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so lower creatures should be under the higher and be governed by them. But of all creatures intelligent creatures are the highest. Therefore the plan of divine Providence requires that other creatures should be governed by rational creatures."¹⁰ The rights, however, which men possessed over the rest of creation did not impair the *principale dominium* of God, nor were they in themselves absolute. The distinction between divine and human rights was clearly drawn by St. Thomas, who pointed out that everything created can be considered either in regard to its nature, or being, and its use. As to its nature it is not subject to human but solely to divine power; but the use of external things has been granted by God to men for their benefit in accordance with the right exercise of reason and will.¹¹ The general rule therefore in regard to property is that it is to be looked on as coming from God the source and origin of all things and must be referred to Him as the end and aim of all things.¹²

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 93.

⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, I, xcvi, l. c.

¹⁰ *Con. Gen.*, III, 78.

¹¹ *Sum. Theol.*, II, II, lxvi, ad 1.

¹² *Ibid.* I II. cii. 3. ad 1.

In everything therefore that constitutes true ownership men may be justly regarded as the masters of creation. They are such through the dispensation of the Creator, as shown in the order of the universe and in the divinely implanted needs of their own nature. This conception of the relation of man to the visible universe, namely that God is the source and real Lord of all things created, while men are merely administrators or trustees, formed the basis of the teaching of St. Thomas on property. In this connection two questions very naturally presented themselves. In the first place was the world given to the human race at large, in the sense that each man possessed an equal right to its fruits, so that men in a state of communism might be left to work out their destiny? Or if, on the other hand, private property was recognized, was its possession absolute and without restrictions? On each of those points St. Thomas expressed himself very decidedly. In regard to the first he maintained that private property was not only allowable but necessary.¹³ Its necessity was not founded in the absolute concept of human personality, or in the nature of the thing possessed, but in the actual needs of the individual, and the welfare of society.¹⁴ The basis of property rights was to be looked for in human nature as it is with all its failings and with its many wants. Private property, as St. Thomas understood it did not mean exclusively individual property. The State, the Church, the family as moral persons were also entitled to property rights.¹⁵ To the common objection against the institution of private property,—that it is opposed to the natural law according to which all things belong to men in common and that consequently private property is untenable,—St. Thomas answers that far from

¹³ *Sum. Theol.*, II. LXVI. ad 2 c.

¹⁴ *Sum. Theol.*, IIa IIæ. LVII, ad 3. Si enim consideretur iste ager absolute, non habet, unde magis sit hujus quam illius; sed si consideretur per respectum ad opportunitatem colendi, et ad pacificum usum agri, secundum hoc habet quamdam commensurationem ad hoc quod sit unius, et non alterius.

¹⁵ Walter, *op. cit.*, p. 13 seq.

justifying the claims of communism, the natural law lays down no rule or principle for the division of property. The manner in which property is divided is regulated neither by the laws of nature nor by the Creator but is entirely dependent on human industry and human effort guided by the laws of Justice and Charity.¹⁶ God endowed humanity with the earth and its fruits. Every man therefore was entitled to gain for himself from this common store what his needs demanded. This right of gaining and owning constituted the principle of private property.

While the rights of private property were thus unassailable, the laws in regard to the extent and the use of these rights were equally clear. In this matter, St. Thomas, while avoiding the errors of Communism and Socialism, was equally adverse to the teachings of the extreme Individualists and Liberals who attach neither limits nor responsibility to the possession of earthly goods. In the first place, since the earth and its riches belong not to men but to God, and since men must give a severe reckoning to the Almighty for the manner in which they use His gifts, they are entitled neither to misuse nor destroy the things they possess, because by doing so, they violate their trust, and injure the abstract rights of their fellow men to a share in the benefits intended for all.¹⁷

In defining the duties and responsibilities attaching to private property St. Thomas brings out in the clearest light the Christian doctrine of ownership, and gives an outline of the Christian social theories which prevailed in the middle ages which stands out in sharp contrast to the individualistic views which have gained ground in modern times. The fundamental idea which underlies this teaching in regard to the use of private property is that material things as such and for their own sake must

¹⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. 2. ad 1. Ad primum dicendum, quod communitas rerum attribuitur juri naturali, non quia jus naturale dicitur omnia esse possidenda communiter, et nihil esse quasi proprium; sed quia secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessionum, sed magis secundum humanum conditum, quod pertinet ad jus positivum.

¹⁷ *Catena in Matt.* 5. 42. See Schaub, *loc. cit.*, 257.

never be an object of effort. In comparison with heavenly things they are valueless, and are desirable only in as far as they are conducive to salvation. In addition to this the possession of earthly goods offers a real source of danger, because through solicitude for them a man may be withdrawn from the attainment of the real purpose of his existence. Nevertheless earthly goods are or can be for their possessor *bona utilia*, not in the sense that *utile* is synonymous with the "end" but merely with the "way" or "means." The real test of their value is to be found in love for God, in Charity. This is the norm and standard by which the worth of everything earthly is to be estimated. Together with this he lays down another general rule which is essential to a clear understanding of property relations, namely that man strives to attain his last end, not as an individual, but as a member of society, and hence the use of property is inseparable from obligations to one's fellows.¹⁸ This doctrine of the solidarity of mankind led to the formulation of another canon in regard to property in which St. Thomas, following the teaching of Aristotle that "it is best to have property private but to make the use of it common," lays down the principle that, "while it is right that men should have the ownership of property, the use of it should be common, so that the owner may the more readily minister therefrom to the needs of others."¹⁹

This doctrine that the use of property should be common was not intended to convey the idea that the owner was bound to share his goods with everyone, nor that everyone had the right to enjoy the possessions of his neighbor. If such was the case, there could be no such thing as private ownership. The common use of property and the right to demand a portion of another's goods was restricted to cases of extreme need. This was the principle according to which St. Thomas regulated

¹⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. a. 5 ad 2. *Bona temporalia, quae homini divinitus conferuntur, ejus quidem sunt quantum ad proprietatem: sed, quantum ad usum non solum debent esse ejus, sed etiam aliorum, qui ex eis sustentari possunt ex eo quod ei superfluit.*

¹⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 2 c.

his doctrine regarding community of use, and having stated the principle he was careful to define the basis on which it rested and the occasions when it might be exercised. By extreme need he meant simply those cases in which life itself was at stake. The importance of the issues involved in this teaching required still further elucidation, and, in common with all Catholic moralists, St. Thomas made a distinction between different kinds of need, which he classed as extreme, grave, or ordinary. Extreme need exists when a person is so situated, that he cannot morally speaking and by his own efforts, avoid death or some other evil almost its equivalent such as a loss of health or being seriously maimed. A need is considered to be grave when heavy perils are not actually impending but are merely probable, or when there is great difficulty in acquiring things that are necessary. An ordinary need is one in which a person is so placed that he can by his own efforts escape grave or extreme evils, or when minor inconveniences cannot be removed without assistance from elsewhere. In order to still further safeguard the rights of property, and prevent the crime of theft, St. Thomas requires that before the principle of community of use in time of necessity can be invoked there must be evident signs that such need actually exists.²⁰ There can be no doubt but that such a principle could easily be misunderstood, and that it might lead to confusion and abuse, but St. Thomas had in mind rather the guidance of conscience than the formation of canons of social expediency. His teaching in the matter was a manifest conclusion from the doctrine that the earth is the common heritage of all men and that the right to existence is superior to any law of property. To supply one's necessities from the goods of another in case of extreme need was not theft.²¹ Nor was it strictly speaking a violation of the right of property, the primary function of which is the maintenance of human life.

In brief then the doctrine of St. Thomas on property is

²⁰ *Quodl.* 8. 12.

²¹ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 7.

that God alone possesses absolute and unrestricted rights over all things created. Men, however, are proprietors in a true and real sense, but their rights are those of trustees or administrators, and because of this they are bound to exercise their stewardship in accordance with the laws laid down by the Creator. The rights of property are fixed and unassailable, but these rights have limits, and in cases of extreme necessity they have to yield before the higher right to life and existence.

The right to existence which makes the use of property common in cases of extreme need constitutes a strict obligation of Justice. There are other obligations no less binding which flow from the Christian law of Charity. These laws of Charity are inseparable from the social character which St. Thomas associated with property. It was on this point perhaps that the mediaeval view of property differed most broadly from the pagan idea of absolute ownership, and the extreme individualism of the present. It offered a bar to selfishness and egoism and, insisting on the mutual obligations of men towards one another and their duties towards society at large, brought out in the clearest light the Christian view of the solidarity of mankind. To promote and quicken this solidarity may be considered the principal object of property viewed in its social character. The manner in which St. Thomas expounds this doctrine of the social character of property offers a striking argument against the claims of socialists, and provides a remedy for the evils on which they base their claims. He lays it down as a general law of charity that the rich man and all who possess property, are bound to relieve the wants of the poor and other unfortunates out of their superfluous possessions.²² His doctrine in this matter has been the teaching of the Christian church at all times. "When what necessity demands has been supplied," says Leo XIII,²³ "and one's standing fairly taken thought for, it becomes a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains over. It is a duty, not of justice (save in

²² *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. 7. c.

²³ *Encyclical, Rerum Novarum.*

extreme cases) but of Christian charity—a duty not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must yield place to the laws and judgments of Christ, the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving.” It is clear that the doctrine of almsgiving and the practice of the virtues of charity and beneficence are subjects which require considerable explanation. In view of differences of time, place and persons it is not possible to lay down general rules regarding the manner in which superfluous goods should be dispensed. As long as men are permitted to administer their property no external authority could, without violating the right of private ownership, dictate how these rules should be enforced. The only sure basis for their enforcement is that offered by the rigid adherence to the Christian law of fraternal charity. To the mind of St. Thomas beneficence founded in love constituted the true idea of almsgiving. There might be almsgiving of a merely material kind without love, but formal almsgiving when, for the sake of God, the distress of others is freely and gladly relieved, must have love as its source and principle.²⁴ The obligation of relieving the distress of those in need or the duty of almsgiving in its wide sense extends to spiritual as well as to material necessities. In regard to the latter point the obligation of almsgiving was defined by considering in the first place its character and in the second place its scope or extent. The duty of the rich or the property owner to his needy neighbors was measured by the extent of his superfluous goods, and the right of the recipient by the character or extent of his necessities. In order to make clear what is meant by superfluous goods, St. Thomas divides all property into three classes. First, that which is necessary for the preservation of the life of the owner or of those directly dependent on him; second, that which is necessary, not for the preservation of life, but for the maintenance of social position; third, that which remains after the necessities

²⁴ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. 1 ad I.

of life and the demands of social position have been satisfied.²⁵ The main difficulty in regard to this classification is in laying down definite and positive rules by which the goods of the third class, the superfluous goods, may be distinguished from those of the second class. As regards the duty of almsgiving, St. Thomas teaches that no one is bound to use the goods of the first class in assisting his neighbors even when these are in extreme necessity, because his action would be prejudicial to his own life and to the lives of those dependent on him, and before attending to the needs of others a man is bound to provide for himself and for those towards whom he has obligations. In regard to goods of the second class, the possessor is not *bound* to expend them in almsgiving except in cases where others are in *extreme* need. If, however, without grave prejudice to his condition in life, a man should devote some of the goods of this class to almsgiving, provided he does not go too far, he is free to follow his charitable instincts and his conduct in so doing is meritorious. In regard to the third class, the "superfluous goods," St. Thomas teaches that these are held in trust for the poor and that they must be expended in relieving the sufferings of those who are in want. This doctrine of St. Thomas has been the teaching of the Church at all times, but it is hardly necessary to say it is not a doctrine which is easily defined nor one which can readily be enforced. Fr. Garriguet holds that St. Thomas taught that a man is obliged to devote the whole of his superfluous goods to the support of the poor.²⁶ In practice, however, it is not easy to convince men that they are possessed of "superfluous" goods, nor to point out the extent of their superfluities. They can easily convince themselves that they require certain things to maintain a style of living to which they believe they are entitled, and because the economic basis of life is so thoroughly different from what it was in the time of St. Thomas, it is not hard to find reasons to excuse men who,

²⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. a. 6.

²⁶ *La propriété privée*, Vol. II, p. 42.

because of uncertainty in business affairs and the necessity of providing for their children, accumulate a reserve fund which may serve at the same time to preserve them from need, and afford security against possible failure in the future. Consequently, even though it is not possible to lay down certain and definite rules in regard to the use of "superfluous goods," the doctrine of St. Thomas on the matter is clear, and the rich, in his view, cannot consistently with their duty as Christians, escape their obligations towards their less fortunate brethren.

The fact, however, that the rich are under this obligation does not give the poor the right to appropriate their possessions, except of course in case of extreme necessity. Their claim is merely one of charity. The rich, furthermore, if they fail to dispense what is over and above the demands of life and social station, may be considered to have kept something committed to them for the relief of others, and to have acted against the designs of divine Providence, but they are not guilty of injustice to any needy person in particular. No one, therefore is justified in considering that he has a special title to the superfluous possessions of the rich, for, conformably to the rules of charity, the rich man is free to select whomsoever he wishes as the object of his beneficence.²⁷

In dealing with the rights and obligations of property, St. Thomas was naturally most interested in the moral and religious aspect of the question. It would be an injustice to him, however, to consider him as a mere exponent of Christian morality and a social theorist. His whole line of reasoning shows that he was not concerned with the abstract question as to whether communism absolutely speaking was feasible or not, or whether it was more or less desirable than a condition of society in which the institution of private property was observed. He was eminently practical, and dealing solely with facts, and taking human nature as it is, he has offered economic reasons intended to show as well the impossibility of a socialist organisation as the absolute necessity for mankind of main-

²⁷ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 7.

taining private property. Discussing the question as to whether private property is legitimate, he sums up his reasons under three heads, and concludes that it is not only legitimate but necessary: In the first place, because private property alone gives men a sufficient incentive to work; for everybody is more solicitous about what belongs to him alone, than about things which he holds in common with all or with many, and everyone avoids labor and leaves to others the care and trouble of things held in common, as happens in cases where there are many servants.

In the second place, the social organization itself is much better regulated, where each one has some special duties and obligations, for nothing but confusion can be looked for, if everyone is expected to interest himself in everything.

In the third place, peace and contentment will be more surely attained if everyone has his own property. Experience shows that in cases where several men hold the same thing in common quarrels constantly arise.²⁸

These three reasons show how thoroughly the views of St. Thomas are at variance with the theoretical socialism of the present. His belief in original sin and the necessity of individual effort under divine grace made it clear to him that no change in social environment could so affect the nature of men as to provide an adequate stimulus for effort, nor offer a sure foundation for permanent social relations. The modern socialist argues that, if property were abolished, zeal for the common good and the sense of solidarity would result in corresponding efforts for the common good and would eliminate passion, avarice and self-seeking from human nature.

On this point St. Thomas, by taking human nature as it is, as history has shown it to be from all time, and if the present and past are any indication of what the future will bring, as it will always be, offers a more reasonable solution of social ills than Socialists do, for he makes his theory of human society fit the facts of human nature. The Socialist, on the contrary,

²⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 2. c.

attempts to make human nature fit his theory, and, imagining human nature to be what it is not, promises to regenerate society economically by removing the most potent incentive to economic activity. Hence, in order to meet the first argument of St. Thomas the Socialist must be able to guarantee that if private property is eliminated, every man will put forth his best efforts, that production will be efficiently managed in the sense that every one will aim at producing the highest results with the least waste of effort and material, and in addition some reasonable and acceptable scheme of distribution must be devised. If the stimulus to reward in the shape of private property is removed, what manner of division can be resorted to by which the needs of the individual and society can be provided for? Shall there be an equal division of all the fruits of collective effort, or shall the reward be in proportion to the need of the individual, or according to the amount or the character of the work, or in accordance with the energy or industry shown in its accomplishment.

The second argument of St. Thomas that good order in society requires that private property should be maintained, goes directly counter to the fundamental tenet of socialism that ownership must be transferred to the community. This contradiction suggests a second category of difficulties with which the advocates of socialism have to deal and which their opponents constantly urge them to answer. It is not necessary to attempt to describe what a complete transformation of society the abolition of private property would bring about. With perhaps the exception of some novelists, the socialists themselves do not attempt such a description. They profess, however, that property is the basis of the present social organism, and St. Thomas' plea for the retention of private property in the interests of social order suggests the thought that it would be a dangerous expedient to transfer to the community rights for the exercise of which even the advocates of collectivism can offer no practicable scheme. If private property were abolished the socialist community would have no capitalist class, and

business in all its phases would be regulated by the community. Everything bearing on production and distribution would be the work of the whole body. This could be accomplished only through a highly centralized system of organisation, in which each man would be required to perform some work for the general good, to which he would be assigned by some official or board having authority from the community, and as equality should prevail some method must be elaborated by which this method of collectivist activity could be most efficiently exercised. The difficulties in the way of such a scheme, and the fact that no solution has hitherto been offered by which these difficulties might be met, can be taken as a justification for the argument of St. Thomas that public order is best conserved by respecting the rights of private property.

One of the stock arguments offered by socialists in favor of a change from a capitalistic to a socialistic regime is that most of the quarrels which arise among men are occasioned by property, and that consequently if property (the cause) were abolished, these disputes (the effect) would cease. St. Thomas did not deny that property is a fruitful source of dispute among men but he contends that private property is more conducive to social peace and order (*magis pacificus status conservatur*). The difference between the two views arises from a different estimate of human psychology. It would doubtless be admitted by both sides that the success or failure of any social scheme can be judged by the extent to which it contributes to the peace and contentment of those who compose it, but while the advocates of community control place the cause of disputes in something external to man, St. Thomas bases it on the ambition and lust for power innate in human nature which is supported by greater or less capacity for acquisition and aggrandizement. By transferring control over the instrument of power from the individual to the state, these differences in natural capacity would not be eliminated and, consequently, because the avenues of power would be open to a larger number, the reasons for dispute and disagreement would be more nu-

merous. Besides, if every man considered himself entitled to an equal share in the products of communistic effort, without regard to his contribution either of brains or muscle, nothing could be looked for except constant turmoil. Hence, because of the difficulties attending a change from one form of social organisation to another, and through the discontent arising therefrom, and because of the hardships inseparable from common control, it seems reasonable to conclude that the peace of society would be less likely to be disturbed if property rights were not interfered with.

Another prerogative of private ownership, the right of transmitting and inheriting property was based, according to St. Thomas, on the same reasons which justified the right to own private property. Social progress and the permanence and stability of social institutions demand, he says, that men, in addition to being permitted to possess private property, should have the right to transmit this to their heirs.²⁹ The same economic reasons sustain the rights of transmission and of possession, and if at the death of the owner control should pass from his heirs to the community, the stimulus and incentive to industry and effort would be removed and the same social confusion would ensue.³⁰ The right to inheritance is expressly stated by St. Thomas to be a secondary right of the natural law, because parents are obliged not only to provide for their children during the period of adolescence but for their whole lives.³¹ The right of inheritance is sedulously attacked by socialists and the incompatibility of their views with those of St. Thomas arises from the greater dignity attached by the latter to the human personality and the family in opposition to the socialist claim of the omnipotence of the state.

The reciprocal obligations of the individual as a member of

²⁹ IV. *Sent.*, XXXIII. II. II. 1 ad 1.

³⁰ II. *Pol.* 3.

³¹ IV. *Sen.*, XXXIII. II. a. 1 c. Matrimonium ex intentione naturae ordinatur ad educationem prolis non solum per aliquod tempus sed per totam vitam prolis.

a society called the state, and of the state consisting of a number of individuals bound together for a definite purpose were searchingly analysed by St. Thomas. The fundamental postulate in his teaching regarding the state is that man is a social being and not only a social but a political being.³² While nature has provided other animals with the means of preserving life, it has endowed man with reason, by which, inasmuch as he cannot realize the full capabilities of his nature in solitary exclusiveness, he is led to seek union and fellowship with others. This necessity of nature towards organisation finds its expression in love or an inclination to the social life. Christian charity ennobles and consecrates this natural tendency and under its influence society can reach the highest perfection.

The fact, however, that men are led by nature to form political and social organizations does not mean that the individual is entirely absorbed in the community. Even as a social being he has rights which lie beyond the competence of the state. When, as may happen, the rights of the individual come into conflict with those of the state, and when the general welfare is at stake, St. Thomas asserts that the rights of the community are superior to any individual rights. "Private good," he says "is subordinate to the end of the common good: for the being of a part is for the sake of a being of the whole: hence the good of the race is more godlike than the good of the individual man."³³

Over and above the bonds of friendship and interest that exist among the members of the same state, arising from common customs and a common mode of life, St. Thomas insists that all men are brothers in the sense that all share the same nature and have the same end and destiny. The state must aid men to attain this destiny, and the means at its disposal are the exercise of its governmental powers. Such powers are necessary to the well being of men, and being ordained by God, no one is justified in opposing them.

³² *Con. Gen.*, III, 117. 128. 129, etc. *Sum. Theol.*, IIa. IIæ. CIX. 3 ad 1.

³³ *Con. Gen.*, III, 17.

Among the many functions of the State are the maintenance of peace and the preservation of Justice. But for all its functions and activities the prime source of unity and justice is Love, which alone begets peace and softens the rigors of justice. The state itself is incapable of promoting love among men. It may aid and produce conditions for its manifestation; but love and fraternity can be secured by only one power, that which works on the souls and minds of men, Religion.

Though the opinions of St. Thomas on society and the state were derived from the principles of religion, which elevates all men to equality by insisting on their common origin and common end, he did not consider that this equality extended to the possession of material things or riches. He assumed that there would be differences of class and that there would be rich and poor. The ownership of material things and the possession of riches was not in his mind incompatible with the Christian idea of society. In themselves and as creatures of God, material possessions were good: if evil was associated with them it was because of the manner in which they were abused. They might be made to minister to virtue, they were necessary for the various needs of life, and the effort to attain them was not sinful. But while they might be used as aids in promoting the salvation of the soul, they were frequently sources of danger and sin. This latter was especially true of riches in the narrow sense of the word, but St. Thomas does not find in the possession of riches anything that was contrary to the Christian religion or the Christian view of life. "To have riches and be their master," he says, "is one thing; to have them and be their slave is another. He is their master, who uses them well and derives fruit from them. He is their slave, whom they profit not."

This incomplete and summary statement of the views of St. Thomas gives no idea of the wealth of information contained in his works on all matters connected with the modern social movement. Production, distribution, equity between employers and workmen are all dealt with by him directly or indirectly.

His attitude represents the general teaching of the mediæval church, and his doctrines express fully what the early Christians aimed at without being able to impress their contemporaries, what the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries not only taught, but in the more favorable conditions in which they lived, endeavored to make the general practice of their time. The coherence and unanimity which run through Christian teaching and Christian practice down to the end of the mediæval period show that Christianity is a real and potent social factor, that it has a social programme, and that much of the unrest of the present might be stilled by returning to the ideals of state and society and the conceptions of property and wealth which prevailed before the great social and religious upheaval of the sixteenth century.

The divergence between the opinions of St. Thomas and those expressed by the representatives of the more extreme form of socialism, arises from the fact that he viewed the world and human life teleologically, that in his mind they had meaning and purpose only in so far as they aided men to attain another and higher life in a world to come. He was equally opposed to the expression of unrestrained individualism either personally or economically, and to socialism with its depreciation of the value of personality. His system was neither individualistic nor socialistic, but was a combination of both. The individual is by nature social, but he is also dominated by self interest, and both instincts must be taken into account in attempting to formulate a scheme of social relations that will best contribute to the highest manifestation of human capabilities and best serve the ends of human existence.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

AN ACCOUNT¹ OF A RECENT PUBLICATION ON
THE GOLDEN PURPLE CODEX OF THE
PIERPONT MORGAN COLLECTION.

THE GOLDEN-LATIN-GOSPELS **P** In The Library of J. PIERPONT MORGAN (Formerly Known As The "HAMILTON GOSPELS" And Some times as KING HENRY THE VIIITH'S GOSPELS), Now Edited For The First Time With CRITICAL INTRODUCTION And Notes And Accompanied by Four Full-Page Fac-Similes, By H. C. HOSKIER, New York, Privately Printed, MCMX, Fol., pp. cxvi, 365.

I.

THE PLACE OF THE J. PIERPONT MORGAN MANUSCRIPT
AMONG THE PURPLE CODICES.

It may not be amiss to preface the description of this sumptuously gotten up volume with some general information on the magnificent Morgan Codex and the class of manuscripts to which it belongs.

The art of Chrysography is very ancient. As early as the beginning of the second century B. C. we read in the Pseudo-Aristeas that the copy of the Sacred Scriptures which the high priest Eleazar sent to the King of Egypt was written in gold letters.² But it is not until the middle of the third

¹An *account*, not a *criticism*, our object being simply to call the attention of the public to Mr. Hoskier's work, and, especially to the P. Morgan Codex itself. We leave it for specialists in Latin Versions of the New Testament to criticise the author's methods and conclusions. *Ne sutor supra crepidam*.

²For the date of Aristeas' letter see Swete, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 16, for the passage itself, p. 549, cf. Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* XII, 10, Georg. Syncellus, *Chronographia*, edit. Dindorff, I, p. 517.

century of the Christian era that we find a mention of purple-dyed parchment or vellum being used further to enhance the beauty of chrysographic codices. Maximin the Younger had been presented by one of his aunts with a copy of the complete works of Homer written entirely in gold on purple vellum:³ From the time of Constantine this expensive style of Calligraphy was reserved, it seems, to the Sacred Scriptures and in particular, if we judge from the specimens that have come down to us, to such books of them as were of liturgical use, as the Psalter and above all the Four Gospels. This custom originated very likely with a desire of impressing the due reverence for the word of God upon the still spiritually untrained minds of the thousands who at that time were coming over to the Church from all ranks of society, within the Roman Empire and outside as well. St. Bonifacius, the Apostle of Germany, writing to the Abbess Eadburga (725) says: "I beg you also to write for me, in gold, the epistles of my Lord Peter the Apostle for the honor and reverence of the Sacred Scriptures before the eyes of my carnal auditors."⁴ The faithful also not unfrequently had such costly copies of the Gospels executed for their own private use, though not always for as commendable reasons. And this gave St. John Chrysostom the occasion of remarking in one of his homilies that fewer were those who cared to show that they knew the contents of the Gospels than those who boasted having them written in gold.⁵ The manuscripts were generally exceedingly large and heavy, and not always as remarkable for their correctness as for their price. "Let those who want them," says St. Jerome, "have ancient books, or books written in gold or silver on purple parchment, or in so-called uncial letters, written burdens rather than codices, *Onera magis exarata quam codices.*"⁶

³ Historia Augusta, Jul. Capitolinus, *De Maxim. Jun.* iv, 4.

⁴ Epist. xix (Serrarius, xxviii), Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 89, col. 712.

⁵ Hom. 32 in Joann. Migne, *P. G.* 59, col. 187.

⁶ *Praefat. in Job*, Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 22, col. 418. Cf. *Epist. ad Eustochium, de custod. Virginit.*, *ibid.*, vol. 28, col. 1083.

None of these very early manuscripts written entirely in gold letters on purple are now extant. But we have several ones in silver letters, with, in some cases, portions in gold writing. The chief ones among the Greek manuscripts are first, the *Codex Beratinus* at Berat, Albania (Φ); it is entirely in silver letters and dates probably from the fifth century.⁷ Second, the *Codex Rossanensis* (Σ) in the Archbishop's library at Rossano, Southern Italy. It is written in silver letters, the first three lines of each Gospel being in gold, and dates probably from the sixth century if not a little earlier.⁸ Third, *Codex Purpureus* (N) the only known Greek purple manuscript until the discovery of (Σ); hence its name. Its probable date is the sixth century. The writing is in silver letters with the exception of the titles in the upper margins and the sacred names, God, Jesus, etc., which are in gold.⁹

The earliest purple Latin manuscripts are about of the same age and style as the Greek ones. The three best known are the *Codex Veronensis* (b) in silver letters of the fifth

⁷ It was described at length and illustrated with a plain photographic fac-simile by Abbé P. Batiffol who visited Berat in 1882, for that express purpose. His description is found in its ultimate form in *Archives des Missions Scientifiques*, Série III, vol. XIII, pp. 437 ff.

⁸ Gebhardt and Harnack who discovered it in 1879, published an account of it the following year, *Codex Rossanensis*, Lipsiae, 1880. "In a sumptuous form, far more satisfactory to the artist than to the Biblical critic" (Scrivener, *Plain Introduction to the N. T. Criticism*, 4th edit., 1894, I, p. 164). It is the earliest known copy of the Scripture with miniatures in water colors.

⁹ Forty-five folios only of this manuscript are known so far to be extant. Of these thirty-three are in the Library of the Convent of Patmos.—For an account and the text of these see L. Duchesne, *Mission au Mont Athos* in *Archives des Missions Scientifiques*, Série III, vol. III, Paris, 1876, pp. 386-419,—four at the British Museum (Cotton. Titus C. xv), two at Vienna (Lambee, 2) and six at the Vatican (Vatic. 3785). These last six were published with an excellent fac-simile in colors by Cozza-Luzzi, *Pergamene purpuree Vaticane di Evangeliario a caratteri di oro e di argento*, Roma, 1887. It is very likely that the manuscript once was extant in its entirety at Patmos.

century.¹⁰ The *Codex Palatinus* (e) in gold and silver of the same date,¹¹ and the *Codex Saretianus* (j) in silver writing also of the same age,¹² the *Codex Brixianus* (f),¹³ and the Psalter of St. Germain, bishop of Paris († 576),¹⁴ both in silver and gold letters, and of the sixth century. To the sixth century also belongs the *Upsala Codex Argenteus* of the Gothic Version.¹⁵

For some reason or other manuscripts on purple vellum seem to have been much less common during the following two centuries. None at any rate are now extant that we could safely ascribe to the seventh century or to the first six or seven decades of the eighth, with the possible exception of a copy of the Vulgate of the Gospels in the golden capital letters which L. Delisle thinks might date from the eighth century. It contains now only St. Matthew and part of St. Mark.¹⁶

¹⁰ Published by Blanchinus (Bianchini) in *Evangelium Quadruplex*, etc. Rome, 1749. Cf. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, p. 954. The ms. is preserved in the Library of the Chapter of Verona (Italy).

¹¹ Vienna (Imper. Libr. Lat. 1185) and Dublin (Trinity College, N. 4, 18); cf. Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 955.

¹² Published by Amelli, *Dissertazione Critico-Storica*, 2d edit. Milan, 1885, "with a fac-simile whose characters much resemble the round and flowing shape of those in a b f." Scrivener, *Plain Introduction*, etc., II, p. 48. Cf. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, p. 964, and Cozza-Luzzi, *op. cit.*, p. 5 f.

¹³ Published by Blanchinus, *op. cit.* Cf. Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 957*. It is preserved in the Library of the Chapter of Brescia (Italy).

¹⁴ Paris, Bibl. Nation. Lat. 11947. Described in Sylvestre, *Universal Palaeography* I, p. 296 ff. *Album*, pl. cx (in colors).

¹⁵ An excellent fac-simile in colors of this beautiful manuscript (University Library, Upsala) will be found in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. IX, p. 616, and a brief notice, chiefly historical, in Scrivener, *Plain Introduction*, etc., 4th edit., II, p. 146.

¹⁶ Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 11955. For particulars on this manuscript and information as to the literature concerning it, see Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate pendant les premiers siècles du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1893. This is probably the *Codex Evangelii S. Matthaei* mentioned by Blanchinus, *Evangelium Quadruplex*, II, fol. dxcvii recto, col. 2, on the authority of Montfaucon, *Bibl. Biblioth.* II, p. 1041 and ascribed there to the seventh century. A few more Greek and Latin manuscripts of the Scriptures supposedly of the seventh century, are given by Blanchinus in his list of *Codices aurei, argentei et purpurei* (*op. cit.*, II fol. dxciii ff.), but we

Toward the end of the eighth century and during the early decades of the ninth century we meet again with quite a number of beautiful purple codices of the Vulgate. The appearance coincides with the revival of Chrysography, under Charlemagne. Several of them are probably due more or less directly to the Scriptorium that he had established in his own palace under the direction of Alcuin, the so-called Palatine School.¹⁷ Such are for instance the *Evangeliaire de Godescalc* of 781-783, entirely in gold on purple,¹⁸ as are also the *Gospels of Abbeville* which belong to the end of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century.¹⁹ The *Evangelies du Sacre*, found as the tradition goes, on the knees of Charlemagne when Otho III opened his tomb, are also in gold on purple, with the exception of the titles, in silver.²⁰ Let us mention also the *Bible de Théodulfe* one of the finest codices in existence. Some portions are in gold, others, in particular the Psalms and the Gospels, in silver letters on purple.²¹ Nevertheless the art of staining purple vellum was on the decline and soon after Charlemagne's death (814) it gradually went out of practice.

From the above remarks it really seems as if the seventh and eighth centuries marked the ebb in the production of manuscripts during the early medieval times. An exception, however, must be made in favor of Rome, where the pious industry of multiplying the Sacred Books for the local churches and the missions was, even then, flourishing as attested by history. St. Augustine and his companions whom St. Gregory the Great sent to preach the Gospel in England (597) were

have failed to identify them with now known manuscripts. Among them is a Greek copy of the Gospels all in gold on purple vellum which Montfaucon saw at St. John de Carbonara (Naples) and pronounces a manuscript of quite exceptional beauty, *nihil porro concinnius vidimus* (Montfaucon, *Palaeographia Graeca*, p. 4).

¹⁷ Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁸ Paris. B. N. Nouv. acq. Lat. 1933. See Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁹ Abbeville, Library of the city, No. 1; see Berger, *op. cit.* pp. 267, 374.

²⁰ Vienna. Imperial Treasury; see Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 275, 421.

²¹ Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 9380. For a full account of this Bible see Berger, *op. cit.* p. 149 ff., 405.

certainly well stocked with books from the Roman copying-rooms when they left the Eternal City. We know also from the *Ecclesiastical History* of Bede that St. Benedict Biscop, abbot of the two Northumbrian monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow, made five pilgrimages to Rome, and in at least three of them, collected a large number of books for the use of the Anglo-Saxon churches.²² Soon, however, scriptoria were established in the various monasteries of Northumbria which, in course of time rivalled—and if we judge from the specimens that have come down to us—outstripped those of the Mother-Church. It is enough to mention the famous *Codex Amiatinus*²³ which Ceolfrid († 716) companion and successor of St. Benedict sent as a present to the Holy See; the Lindisfarne Gospels (Br. Mus. Nero, D. 4) copied by Eadfrid († 721) in the “holy island” of Lindisfarne “in honor of St. Cuthbert” († 687) about 700, the Stonyhurst Gospel of St. John found in St. Cuthbert’s coffin in 1104.

It would be surprising that monks who could execute manuscripts of such exquisite taste as those should have never thought of trying their hands at chrysographic codices on purple vellum. That they did so in at least one instance is a fact that cannot be called in question. In St. Wilfrid’s life written soon after his death by Eddius Stephanus, we read that the saintly Archbishop of York who was also abbot of Ripon had presented the Church of this monastery with just

²² Cf. the letter of St. Martin I (640-655) to Amandus, bishop of Trajectum (Maestricht): Reliquias vero Sanctorum de quibus praesentium lator nos admonuit dari praecepimus. Nam codices jam exinaniti sunt a nostra bibliotheca et unde ei dare nullatenus habuimus; transcribere autem non potuit quoniam festinanter de hac civitate regredi properavit (Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 87, col. 138).

²³ Thus called from the Abbey of Monte Amiato, near Siena where it was preserved for many years. It is now in the Laurentian Library of Florence. On this beautiful ms. see De Rossi, *La Bibbia offerta de Ceolfrido Abbate al Sepolcro di S. Pietro*, etc. Rome, 1887, (with fac-simile of folio bearing the dedicatory inscription, also Vigouroux, *Dictionn. de la Bibl.* I, 480 ff. (Art. *Amiatinus*, by P. Batiffol, with a good fac-simile of the upper half of a page).

such a copy of the Gospels on the day of its consecration: “. . . addens quoque Sanctus Pontifex noster inter alia bona dona ad decorem domus Dei inauditum ante saeculis nostris quoddam miraculum. Nam quattuor Evangelia de auro purissimo in membranis depurpuratis²⁴ coloratis pro animae suae remedio scribere jussit, necnon et bibliothecam librorum eorum omnem de auro purissimo et gemmis pretiosissimis fabrefactam compaginare inclusores gemmarum jussit.” (Gale, *Historiae Britannicae*, etc. *Scriptores XV*, Oxford, 1694, p. 60, cf. Hoskier, p. xii f.)

This interesting passage of St. Wilfrid's life leads us naturally to speak now of the Morgan manuscript, for no less an authority in paleography than Wattenbach suggested that it might be the very manuscript mentioned by Eddius Stephanus.²⁵

The verso of the first folio which is of purple color like the others and serves as guard-leaf, shows the coat of arms of the Kings of England, with the following inscription in a beautiful hand of the sixteenth century and in gold letters:

FATO SERVATUS TIBI SUM, TER MAXIME PRINCEPS
TE QUOQUE SERVAVUNT AUREA FATA MICHI
INSTAURATA NITENT PER TE SACRA DOGMATA PER TE
AUREUS EST AUTHOR CHRISTUS UBIQUE MEUS

and, on an inserted leaf, a note states that this manuscript was sent to Henry VIII, as a present by Leo X.²⁶ How old this note is, we are not told by any of the few who have written about our manuscript. At any rate Wattenbach²⁷ is of the

²⁴ Sic! read *de purpura* (?) as in Blanchinus, *op. cit.*, fol. dxcii recto a, who quotes from Mabillon's *Acta Sanct. Ord. Benedicti*, Saec. iv, part II, p. 552. Yet Hoskier, who seems to quote from Mabillon, has also *depurpuratis*.

²⁵ See below in our description of Mr. Hoskier's *Introduction*.

²⁶ Wattenbach, *Sitzungsberichte d. Kön. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin*, 1889, p. 152.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

opinion that the latinity of the inscription, the last verse in particular, is not quite good enough for the Chancery of Leo X. He would rather attribute it to Cardinal Wolsey, Archbishop of York, in whose diocese the monastery of Ripon was. Mr. Hoskier hesitates to accept this view because the supporters of the coat of arms do not tally with those of Henry VIII. For the same reason he rejects also the suggestion by the author of the Hamilton sale Catalogue—who sees in the words *in-staurata . . . dogmata* an allusion to the Reformation—that the dedication might refer to Edward VI.²⁸ Samuel Berger, on the other hand offers quite a different theory. He remarks that the guard-leaf on which the dedication now is, has lost its companion. This, he supposes, once bore the dedicatory distichs addressed to Charlemagne by one of his familiars who had this masterpiece of Chrysography executed. Later, when the manuscript was presented to the King of England, the donor cut off this folio and had the inscription copied again on the companion blank folio and accompanied with the royal English coat of arms. Mr. Hoskier for reasons which will become apparent in our description of his book rejects also this hypothesis, denying in addition, that any folio was cut off, (p. 1.) So all we can say is that some time during the sixteenth century our manuscript was in the possession of one of the Kings of England or of some member of the royal family, granted that the coat of arms could have belonged to some other person than the King himself. Later it came into the possession of the Marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale²⁹ and passed afterwards into the Library of the Duke of Hamilton, where it was known as Codex Hamilton 251. In 1882 the whole Hamilton collection was bought by the royal Chalcography of Berlin with the understanding that the British Museum should have the privilege of purchasing back a certain number of

²⁸ P. 1; cf. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

²⁹ Wattenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 152. According to S. Berger, *Hist. de la Vulgate*, p. 397, the fly-leaf bears the following note: Douglas et Lyderdale, 1300, Londini, 1747.

valuable manuscripts of special interest to England. Among these were our Gospels. But the direction of the British Museum having failed to raise the money necessary for the purchase in proper time, the royal Chalcography of Berlin directed Mr. Truebner, the book-dealer of Strassburg, to resell those manuscripts at auction. The sale took place at Sotheby's, London, in 1889, when the Hamilton purple Gospels fell to Mr. Quaritch, the well-known English antiquarian, who sold them the following year to Mr. Thomas Irwin of Oswego (N. Y.). They now belong to Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan the American Maecenas. To him from its folds of purple the golden voice of this truly royal manuscript justly repeats the first distich of the dedicatory inscription:

FATO SERVATUS TIBI SUM, TER MAXIME PRINCEPS
TE QUOQUE SERVAVUNT AUREA FATA MICHI.

The literature on our manuscript is scanty. In 1887, W. Wattenbach published a first notice in the eighth volume of the *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für altere Deutsche Geschichtskunde*, pp. 343-346, and a second one: *Ueber die mit Gold auf Purpur geschriebene Evangelienhandschrift der Hamilton'schen Bibliothek* (in *Sitzungsberichte d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1889, pp. 143-156). A description with a facsimile in gold and colors appeared in *Catalogue of manuscripts chiefly from the Hamilton collection*, 1889, No. 1, gotten up in view of the auction sale, we suppose, and another one in *B. Quaritch's rough list*, No. 99. Finally, Samuel Berger who examined the manuscript while it was in the hands of Mr. Quaritch, and obtained additional information on its text, through the Rev. B. W. Bacon, when it had become the property of Mr. Irwin, devoted to it several pages of his excellent book, *Histoire de la Vulgate dans les premiers siècle du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1893, pp. 37, 259-262, 277, 397 f. The descriptions of W. Wattenbach and S. Berger, though not as complete as one might wish, are well worth reading; from them chiefly

we have gleaned most of the information, just imparted to our readers, on the history of the Morgan Codex.

II.

DESCRIPTION OF MR. HOSKIER'S PUBLICATION.

The title³⁰ adopted by Mr. Hoskier does not convey quite an accurate idea of the various elements of the publication to which it is prefixed. In fact the book consists mainly of an *Introduction*, *Preliminary Remarks*, four full page *Fac-similes* and a collation of the text (not an edition) with full critical apparatus, written in Latin, under the title of *Lectiones Variae*, etc. Of special importance among the accessories (Preface, Indexes, Colophon of the printer, etc.) is the *Appendix*, a collation, in Latin equally, of a fragment of the Gospels also in Mr. Morgan's collection.

We shall now proceed to describe each of the five chief portions of the book.³¹

INTRODUCTION, (pp. xi-cxvi).—In the first fifteen pages the writer tries to establish that the Morgan Codex was written on the British soil, in the last decades of the seventh century, as against Samuel Berger,³² who considers it a product of the Palatine school inaugurated by Charlemagne, or of the north of France. He disagrees also with Wattenbach, who while ascribing the manuscript to the same date as Hoskier (since he identifies, or at least grants the possibility of identifying it with the famous manuscript executed by order of Wilfrid, Archbishop of York, and presented by him to the monastery of Ripon) still doubts whether it was written in Rome or in

³⁰ See above.

³¹ In this description square brackets indicate our insertions where we quote Mr. Hoskier, whether verbatim or not.

³² *Histoire de la Vulgate*, etc., pp. 259 ff.

England.³³ To prove his position, Mr. Hoskier establishes a comparison of the Morgan Codex with a number of well-known Codices of undoubted British origin and generally ascribed to the same age as he claims for the former. After this Mr. Hoskier goes into a detailed study of the text of the old Latin manuscripts and of some of the most famous Greek Codices and investigates the relation of the Latin texts to the Coptic, all this with a view to show the ancestry and affinities of the Morgan text, which he, afterwards traces through the *Saxon Versions*. "When we find," says Mr. Hoskier in his preface, "that our manuscript is sometimes alone, or nearly alone with *a* [*Cod. Vercellensis*], or *b* [*Cod. Veronensis*] or *d* [*Cod. Bezae*], or with *ff*² [*Cod. Corbeiensis* 2], or *h* [*Cod. Claromontanus*], or *k* [*Cod. Bobbiensis*],—or *r* [*Cod. Usserianus* 2], or *g*¹ [*Sangermanensis*],—as to forms; and when we find ourselves alone with *ⲁ* [*Sinaiticus*] or *A* [*Cod. Alexandrinus*], or *D* [*Cod. Bezae*], or 59, 73 (Syr. S. Goth.) or *CΣ* [*Cod. Ephraemi* and *Cod. Rossanensis*] of the Greeks, or with *a d δ* together in Greek order; or alone with Irenaeus' translator, or Lucifer, or with Coptic, we realize that we are face to face with a problem of deepest interest. For this does not mean that the text is a mixed text, but that the *Ur-text* or *base* goes very, very far back and contains some of the elements of the other texts, which have come down to us by branches, yet originally was another recension, lost to us otherwise, which we recognize by a few unique readings which have weathered the storm of revision and transmission and still linger amid the older surroundings." A few lines further, the author states his method as follows:—"From Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, the Curetonian, Syriac and the Coptic versions, we carry the history of our text through the *Codex Vercellensis* (*a*) to St. Patrick, then, with the *Codex Bezae* (*d*) and Columbanus' less pure *r* on Irish soil through the VI and VII centuries with the

³³ *Ueber die mit Gold auf Purpur etc., Sitzungsab. d. Preuss. Akad. z. Berlin, 1889, p. 153.*

Book of Durrow, to the time when the Manuscript itself was written; and thence running concurrently with the other English Texts A (*Amiatinus*) and Y (*Lindisfarne*) with L (*Chad*) through D [*Liber Armachanus*] Q [*Book of Kells*] R [*Cod. Rushworth*] to E [*Cod. Marmoutier*—British Museum Egerton 609], and beyond.”

PRELIMINARY REMARKS (pp. 1-71).—In the preliminary remarks Mr. Hoskier treats of the external appearance of the Codex (size and color of parchment, arrangement of folios into quires, signatures, disposition of text on the page, etc.) and especially, of the script (shape of letters, ligatures, abbreviations) and of various peculiarities or defects of spelling and accentuation. He insists more than on any thing, on the script and spelling in this manuscript. While Wattenbach distinguishes but two hands, Mr. Hoskier sees forty-five different ones.³⁴ Some extend over one or more quires, most of them over but a few folios, or even a dozen lines or so. This number seems formidable. It is “unheard of so far in a manuscript,” says Mr. Hoskier, “but, if we have erred we cannot possibly have erred fifty per cent, and therefore over twenty different hands would remain” (p. 3). Occasionally also he calls attention to some special or rather characteristic readings of the several scribes. Mr. Hoskier finds it difficult to account for so many hands writing such a very varying amount of copy. At first he supposed that the execution of the manuscript was on the nature of a rush order. Why so, he explains on page 3. This manuscript he *hesitatingly* suggests was perhaps written by order of St. Wilfrid like the one which he presented to the Church of Ripon (see above, page 592). “It might be that he wished to offer something to the Roman authority before

³⁴ He describes every one of them in the greatest detail, with an amazing perspicacity. Here he sees that the scribe is a man of versatile character, or over-confident, there, that he was tiring, or sick, in another case although the writing of a scribe is large “and writing becomes smaller as we advance in age” Mr. Hoskier judges that he was an old man, for his style favors the ancient division of lines.

whom he was twice cited to appear (and twice acquitted of the charges preferred against him) and that he deliberately had the members of his monastery at Ripon (or elsewhere) enter the Scriptorium and assist in executing the present he designed, also deliberately copying Italian rather than English or Irish forms, though enough of them linger to show the local origin of the ms. . . . Haste in execution might also be accounted for by his order to appear at Rome within a certain time. Or again, upon his return, he might have wished to show his gratitude to Pope Agatho, or the later Pope John. At any rate a voyage of such a ms. to Italy might well account for the inscription later on its return as a present in the XVI century." This way, however, of accounting for a rush order was abandoned by Mr. Hoskier. "The above," he says in a foot note to the preceding words, "written long since we allow to stand; but it is our conviction that the ms. never left England at all, as the continuity of its text runs straight on through R to W in the XIII century³⁵ as shown elsewhere." Still on page 57 Mr. Hoskier seems to cling to the theory of the rush-order—though for what other reason he does not state—and he tries to explain how time could be gained by multiplying the copyists "it being evident that each scribe must have completed his task before the other could begin at the proper place where the former left off, and there is only one place in the whole book where the scribes do not meet exactly and only two letters are missing there." We confess that we fail to grasp the solution he offers. But this does not matter, as probably Mr. Hoskier having abandoned the only reason he mentions anywhere for a rush order abandoned also this explanation.³⁶ And this is very likely why on this very page 57 he

³⁵ R = Rushworth Gospels, IXth century, Oxford, Bodl. Auct. D. 2, 19, also called Gospels of Mac Regol. W = Brit. Mus. Reg. 1 B. XII.

³⁶ We give it here however, for the benefit of our readers and in justice to Mr. Hoskier . . . "if we suppose that the exemplar serving as a model was recopied line for line, we establish two things, 1st, the probability of the "rush-order" and the possibility of its being carried out

proposes another theory to explain the large number of hands, viz., that all the brothers of the monastery were given an opportunity of writing a part—large or small according to their ability and handwriting—for an important *patron*, or purpose or occasion." A question of sentiment, therefore, not one of expedition.

FAC-SIMILES.—These are evidently intended for the *Preliminary Remarks* which we have seen are chiefly concerned with the Paleography of the manuscript. However, they have been distributed throughout the book as follows: The first, before the general title, in colors, showing golden letters on purple vellum: (S. Matthew, x, 29-xi, 1); the second, also in colors, showing golden letters on bluish vellum: (S. John, xviii, 6-19); the third, between the INTRODUCTION and the sub-title of the PRELIMINARY REMARKS, plain phototype, letters in white on gray ground: (Luke, xviii, 43-xix, 14). The fourth one, immediately after sub-title of LECTIONES VARIAE, letters and ground as above: (S. Matthew, vi, 13-24).

LECTIONES VARIAE (pp. 175-344).—The collation of the text is based on the Clementine edition of the Vulgate, Rome, 1592. Mr. Hoskier first undertook it at the request of Abbot Gasquet for the use of the Benedictine revisers of the Vulgate. But he soon detected that the text of the Morgan manuscript was of considerable importance for the history of the Old Latin version and incidentally for that of the original Greek, and for the textual history of the Syriac, Northern Coptic and Gothic versions, and could not refrain from extending his collations to all of these, for the Synoptic Gospels. For the Gospel of St. John he went even further, drawing in the Southern Coptic, the Armenian, the Arabic, the Ethiopic and even the Old and later Saxon. The readings, where not appearing for the first time, are generally taken from the latest and most reliable editions and authorities, and to these Mr.

by a large number of scribes; and 2nd, that an exemplar (since perished) of a much earlier date existed with this very text.—Thus we add an indeterminate number of years to our manuscript's age."

Hoskier, in some instances refers us for fuller statement, the evidence in the collation being, as he says, "perforce condensed to the limit." In the case of Wordsworth, when our author differs from him, "the evidence has been checked and should be correct." Nor has Mr. Hoskier neglected the Fathers, such as S. Justin, S. Cyprian, S. Jerome, S. Patrick. This great accumulation of readings, he warns us "is not a rehash but a careful attempt to show action and reaction of the versions one upon the other and to help to untangle the intricacies of the transmission, as such it is hoped that it will be found useful and not too elaborate. Care has been taken, when possible, to bring into juxtaposition readings which may have a bearing upon each other.—The late Saxon has been occasionally introduced to show our [manuscript's] influence and that of others upon it." (p. cxvi). An *Elenchus* of the codices used in this collation is prefixed to it. It shows in every case the edition or authority followed by Mr. Hoskier, together with the presumed age of the Codex. We find there all the best known manuscripts of the Vulgate (32 mss.) and Itala (28 mss.) which Mr. Hoskier cites throughout his collation, and a good many others which are cited occasionally only, as a rule from some good authority, as the Catalogue of Ancient Manuscripts in the British Museum,³⁷ (16 mss.), the "*Ada Handschrift* of Corssen *et al.* Leipzig, 1889 "³⁸ (40 mss. mostly from *Bibliothèque Nationale* of Paris and other French Libraries) and from the "*Schepps edition*, Würzburg, 1887 "³⁹ (13 mss.). Then come the editions of the Vulgate: Stephanus (1546) Henten (1583) the Sixtina (1590) and the Clementina (1592),—the Oriental Versions: Syriac, from the editions of Gwilliam (Peshitto), Burkitt (Curetonian and Sinaitica) and Gibson-Lewis (Hieronymian); Arabic Diatessaron mostly from

³⁷ With autotype Facsimiles, Part I, Greek, 1881, Part II, Latin, 1887.

³⁸ *Die Trierer Ada-Handschrift bearbeitet und herausgegeben*, Leipzig, 1889, (with 38 plates) by several authors; the dissertation by Corssen.

³⁹ Presumably *Die ältesten Evangelien handschriften der Würtzburger Universitätsbibliothek*, Würzburg, 1887.

the edition of Hogg, Coptic (Bohairic) from the edition of Horner; the others from Tischendorf and others.—Finally the Fathers from Galland and other ancient and modern editions. In this formidable array of Codices and authorities we miss entirely the Greek Codices, a good many of which, the Sinaiticus especially, appear quite often in Mr. Hoskier's Critical Apparatus.

APPENDIX (pp. 345-357).—The subject of the Appendix is a fragment of 18 folios of the VII or VIII century. It shows portions of St. John and St. Luke, bound, as it seems, without regard to the order of books and chapters. This fragment comes from the Libri Collection, and originally belonged to the same ms. as a Nuremberg fragment published by Dombart in *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* (Leipzig, 1881, pp. 465-478). The collation was undertaken by Mr. Hoskier at the request of Abbot Gasquet and the sign $\overset{\circ}{M}$ has been adopted to designate this fragment.

H. HYVERNAT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Handbook of the Divine Liturgy. A Brief Study of the Historical Development of the Mass, by Charles Cowley Clarke. St. Louis, 1910. Herder, 90 cents net.

The professed object of this book, which is to provide beginners with the results arrived at by liturgical scholars who have written on the Mass, is surely most praiseworthy. It is not an object, however, which the author has very successfully achieved, for his work leaves much to be desired both as to matter and manner. Parts of the Mass are only slightly commented on, other parts are altogether passed over, and the explanations which are given are wordy and confused. The English translation of the prayers of the ordinary is certainly not rhythmic, is often unidiomatic, and in some places is quite faulty as a rendering of the Latin. This is especially true of the three prayers before the priests' communion. The rubrics, for some reason, have not been translated. In their place the author has substituted a set of rubrics of his own. This will be quite misleading to the reader who is unacquainted with the Latin text. A popular and at the same time a scholarly account of the missal is still a *desideratum* for the English reader who desires to know something of the history of the Latin liturgy.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

On the Priesthood. A Treatise in Six Books by Saint John Chrysostom, translated by the Rev. Patrick Boyle, C. M. New York, 1910. Benziger Bros.

The spiritual works of the Fathers, unlike other books of piety, have an enduring vigor and freshness which make them suitable for every age. This is especially true of St. John Chrysostom's treatise *On the Priesthood*. Written about A. D. 373 its counsels and warnings are just as pertinent today as they were in the fourth century. This translation by Father Boyle is from Migne's

text collated with the edition of Marion, and in its smooth and readable English is an example of what a translation ought to be.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

A Medieval Mystic. A Short Account of the Life and Writings of Blessed John Ruysbroeck, Canon Regular of Groenendael, A. D. 1293-1381, by Dom Vincent Scully, C. R. L., London, 1910. Thomas Baker.

This is an interestingly written biographical sketch of a Flemish priest whom the Supreme Pontiff has recently enrolled among the Beati. John Ruysbroeck was one of the most eminent of the mystics of the Middle Ages, and exerted a profound influence upon his contemporaries. For thirty years he, with a number of others, lived together as secular priests bound by no other rule than their profound spirit for prayer and intense desire for purification. In deference to the wish of the Bishop they were in A. D. 1349 organized into a community under the rule of the Canons Regular of Saint Augustine. Blessed John's reputation for sanctity, and spiritual insight attracted to him many disciples, among whom was the famous Gerard Groote, the Founder of the Brethren of the Common Life. It was from Ruysbroeck that Groote drew his spiritual principles for the guidance of this new community. And it was these principles under which Thomas à Kempis was formed, and which found expression in his immortal work, *De Imitatione Christi*. Tauler was also deeply indebted to Ruysbroeck, or at least to his writings, which he laid under generous contribution. A critical edition of all the works of the Mystic of Groenendael is now in course of preparation in Louvain, and an English rendering is expected to be undertaken before long.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

The Roman Breviary. Its Sources and History, by Dom Jules Baudot. Translated from the French by a Priest of the Diocese of Westminster. St. Louis, 1909. Herder. \$1.00 net.

The Breviary is one of the great storehouses of the Church's

tradition, for in it are gathered the treasures of piety and devotion which faith has produced during the ages. If we would have a right understanding of its contents an acquaintance with the history of its development is of the first importance. We welcome therefore this translation of Dom Baudot's compendious work, providing as it does the English reader with a clear succinct account of the growth of the Divine Office. The book is largely a résumé of Dom Baumer's great work, but Batiffol, Cabrol and others have also been laid under contribution, so that the reader has in this volume a fair epitome of the latest conclusions of scholars in this department of research. Dom Baudot agrees with Baumer, Lévêque, and Morin, as against Batiffol, in attributing to St. Gregory the great credit of having codified the Roman Office. He also takes sides against Batiffol with regard to the influence exerted by Pope Gregory VII on the office. Batiffol maintains that this Pontiff made no sensible modification in the Roman Office. Baudot, on the contrary, sees in him a liturgical reformer laboring to revive Roman usages in opposition to innovations which had shorn the liturgy of much of its dignity and beauty. The work done by Franciscans in popularizing the shortened office of the Roman Curia, the efforts at reform prior to the Pian Breviary, and the manifold French schemes are all tersely yet clearly and interestingly related. The author concludes by expressing the wish that, in case of any further revision of the Beviary, the ferial office may be reinstated, that a new distribution of the psalms be made, and that the length of the office may be reduced on certain ferias and especially on Sundays. A few notes are added at the end by Baudot himself which are not in the French original. The whole volume as a translation is a most creditable piece of work, and is a valuable addition to English liturgical literature.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

Études de critique et d'histoire religieuse. Deuxième Série. Par L'abbé E. Vacandard, Aumonier au Lycée Corneill à Rouen. Paris. Victor Lecoffre. (J. Garabalda et cie), 1910. 12o. Pp. iii + 308.

The essays which compose this volume all deal with subjects of living interest. Most of them have already appeared as articles

in the *Revue du clergé français*, the *Revue des questions historiques*, and the *Revue pratique d'apologétique*. The author, however, has taken advantage of this new edition to enlarge, and in some cases to make more clear the views which he expressed when the studies first appeared. In the essay on the "Formal Institution of the Church by Christ" which opens the series, M. Vacandard replies to the attack made on the origin of the Church and shows the futility of attempting to make a distinction between the "Christ historique" and the "Christ resuscité." The second essay, dealing with the origin of confession, is a short account of the early history of that sacrament. The other studies deal with the question of military service among the Christians of the first centuries. The council of Macon and the question regarding the souls of women, the Albigensian Heresy in the time of Innocent III, and the nature of the Coercive Power of the Church which is an elaboration and defence of some opinions expressed by the author in his work on the Coercive Power of the Church and the Inquisition. A series of appendices still further elaborating some points touched on in the text is found at the end of the volume. They are the work of the Abbé Misset, and were originally written as replies to some of the critics of M. Vacandard. Though the subjects dealt with are for the most part controversial, the author has not failed to draw at times a useful lesson, as for instance in his chapter on the Christian and Military Service, where he has pointed out the impropriety of requiring priests or those destined for the ministry to bear arms. The question regarding the Council of Macon and the souls of women is disposed of in a few pages, but in such a thoroughly convincing manner that it is to be hoped that this old legend will no longer be offered as historical fact.

PATRICK P. HEALY.

The Parallel between the English and American Civil Wars.

The Rede Lecture delivered in the Senate House, Cambridge, on June 14, 1910. By Charles Harding Firth, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1910. Pp. 50.

This lecture offers a good example of a process of education, the purpose of which in former times was said to be *ad torquenda*

ingenia. The author commences his discourse with the assurance that history never repeats itself, and ends with the statement that "an historian needs the fuller evidence which time alone can bring in order to complete the parallel between the results of the two civil wars." Until all the evidence is in it would perhaps be better not to pronounce judgment on the present attempt to point out similarities in these two great events. The drawing of parallels will know no restrictions if authors permit themselves the liberties taken by Mr. Firth, who in his quest has at times ranged very far afield, as for instance in comparing the social and political difficulties in Ireland, which he considers a racial question and a consequence of the policy of Cromwell and the Puritans, and the negro question in the United States which is the result of giving the suffrage to the negro race. The book is well written, The publishers have made a volume that is a credit to them, but, to what purpose?

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Religion in New Netherland. A History of the Development of Religious Conditions in the Province of New Netherland (1623-1664). A dissertation presented to the University of Louvain to obtain the Degree of Docteur ès Sciences Morales et Historiques. By Frederick J. Zwierlein, L. D., Professor of Church History at St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, New York. Rochester, John P. Smith Co. 8vo. Pp. vi + 365.

This work deals with religious conditions in the Province of New Netherland from the time of the establishment of the Dutch Reformed Church down to the English Conquest in 1644. The causes which gave rise to the peculiar development in the religious life of the Dutch settlers in the short period of their occupation of New Netherland are dealt with in several chapters in which the author discusses: The Dutch Background of the Religious History of the Province of New Netherland, Religion in New Sweden before and after the Dutch Conquest and the Religious Factors in the English Immigration. The concurrence of these elements gave rise to a situation which was unique in its kind, it being, not a minature replica of the religious conflicts in Europe from which these dissident interests had arisen, but a new form of

religious antagonism in which racial and of course commercial antipathies intensified sectarian bitterness. An excellent account is given in other chapters of the peculiar organisation of the colony under a chartered company, which, though it made no provision for religion, afterwards extended its control not only to regulation of the affairs of church and school but also to the supervision of general public morals. The manner in which this supervision was exercised under the vigorous Peter Stuyvesant and some of his successors forms not the least interesting part of the work. These chapters are devoted to the Persecution of the Lutherans, the Quakers and the Jews. The anti-semitic policy of the Dutch settlers was based on economic as well as religious grounds, and the fear that if they were tolerated "liberty could not be refused to Lutherans and Papists." The last chapter is devoted to an account of the missionary activity of the Dutch and the Jesuits among the Indians. It is creditable to the Dutch that while they failed themselves in impressing the Indians with the truths of Christianity, and confessed their inability to do so largely because of the bad example given by their own people, they used their influence at times in securing the release of the Catholic missionaries from the Indians and succoring those who had been delivered or who were so fortunate as to escape. The good offices of the Jesuit Fathers were invoked also to bring about better relations with the French in Canada. Two appendices contain respectively a chronicle of the more important events in the history of New Netherland, and a select bibliography. This latter which fills twenty pages contains not only lists of printed materials, but an excellently arranged catalogue of the manuscript materials to be found in the various libraries and archives. In itself it forms an excellent introduction to the history of New Netherland. The work as a whole is a model of correct historical composition. The style is crisp and forceful, the facts are well marshalled and excellently presented, while the thoroughness in exhausting all sources of information and the judicious spirit exhibited in the choice and presentation of evidence, give proof of the scholarly attainments of the author and his thorough familiarity with the requirements of modern historical science.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Saint Léger, Evêque d'Autun. (616-678). Par le R. P. Camerlinck. Paris. Lecoffre. (J. Gabalda et Cie) 1910. 12mo. Pp. xxiii + 176.

It seems strange that the history of St. Léger (Leodegarius) should have hitherto been so completely neglected. Though he was not less famous as a statesman than as a saint during his lifetime, and though his activities profoundly influenced the course of events in Merovingian Gaul, his life remained unwritten. The merit of the present work in addition to filling this want, consists largely in freeing the name and reputation of the saint from the charge of guilt or complicity in the murder of Childeric II. This accusation which is frequently repeated in works of reference (see *Dic. of Christian Biography*), the author shows to have been utterly without foundation. Léger and Ebroin were both compelled to retire to the monastery of St. Columbanus at Luxeuil, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the saint, from his retreat instigated the murder of the king. The author lays stress on the fact that Ebroin, the Mayor of the Palace, found it suited his schemes at a later date to discredit Léger, whose influence he feared, and, as the best means of removing him, trumped up this accusation. The Saint himself denied it with indignation, no evidence was presented against him, and so generally was it believed to be a fabrication that no one could be found to make the accusation when he was brought to trial. A little more attention to the political conditions which prevailed in the time of St. Léger would have added to the attractiveness of the present Life.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Dante's Gastmahl übersetzt und erklärt, mit einer Einführung. Von Dr. Constantin Sauter. Freiburg and St. Louis, Herder, 1911. Pp. ix + 385. Price \$2.00, net.

This is a translation, with Introduction and Notes, of Dante's *Convivio*. All students of Dante now recognize that, for a right understanding of the masterpiece, the *Divina Commedia*, a knowledge of Dante, the Troubadour of the *Vita Nuova*, of Dante the political theorist of the *De Monarchia*, and of Dante the phil-

osopher of the *Convivio* is absolutely necessary. Dr. Sauter has this motive in view. He does not fail to call attention to the intrinsic value of the *Convivio* as a contribution to that Italian tradition in philosophy which, starting with the somewhat mystic speculations of the Pythagoreans of Magna Grecia, descended through Cicero, Seneca, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius and Boethius to medieval Latin Christianity. At the same time, he appreciates the fact that, for us, the *Convivio* and the other minor works are of interest chiefly because of the light which they throw on the purpose and meaning of the *Divina Commedia*. The chapters "Die philosophische Lyrik," "Dantes symbolische Liebesdichtung," and "Die philosophische Quellen des Convivio," are especially valuable. Perhaps the author slightly exaggerates the importance of the Arabian doctrines in the philosophical training of Dante. The question is, however, open to discussion. In any case, the assertion (page 74) that in 1210 the physical and metaphysical works of Aristotle were proscribed by ecclesiastical authority until freed from error should be recast so as to distinguish accurately between the enactment of the year 1210 and that of 1215. On the whole, the work bears evidence of painstaking and accurate research, and deserves to be translated into English, so as to take its place in the library of the English-reading student by the side of Bowden's excellent translation of Hettinger's work.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Protestant Thought Before Kant. By Arthur Cushman M'Giffert. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp. 261. Price 75 cents.

The author is the professor of Church history in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the dedication is "to Adolf Harnack, Teacher and Friend." It is an able account of the ebb and flow of Protestant thought from the Reformation to the beginning of the 18th century. The Reformation, we are told, "was not exclusively nor even chiefly a religious movement." Until Kant's day, Protestant thought was largely dominated by mediaeval ideas, especially by the theory of the total depravity

of human nature. After giving his interpretation of mediaeval Christianity, Dr. M'Giffert describes in four interesting chapters, the theological systems of Luther, Zwingli, Melancthon and Calvin. Luther, he tells us, could not be just to the old system. Branding the mediaeval church as an apostasy from the principles of the ancient church, his own system was neither Pauline nor Patristic. "The mediaeval church was at one with the ancient church, and the difference between Luther and the early Fathers was at bottom as great as between him and the schoolmen." Luther's efforts to harmonize his theory of "justification by faith alone," with the demands of morality, involved him in so many difficulties and contradictions as to amount to a repudiation of the principle itself. Zwingli, whom Luther regarded as "no Christian," was the forerunner of Calvin in his theory of the absolute will of God. He overshadows Luther in his influence upon subsequent Protestant theology. The differences between Melancthon and Luther are marked. In each succeeding edition of his *Loci Communes*, Melancthon departs more and more from Luther, and his doctrine becomes more and more "reactionary and Catholic." Calvin accepted the principle of Zwingli, though, unlike the latter he drew back from its dreary, even terrible conclusions. Credited by posterity with being the promoter of civil liberty and democracy, he was, as a matter of fact, opposed to both. "He had a deep-rooted aversion to democracy." In the chapter on the English reformation, Professor M'Giffert maintains that Henry VIII in his break with Rome, acted in accordance with a widespread popular demand. The Protestant historians Maitland and Gairdner, and Father Gasquet differ with him. They tell us that at the beginning of the 16th century Lollardy was absolutely dead and that the masses of the English people were not only Catholic but Papal. The attempt of Protestantism to systematize and justify itself is told in the chapter on Protestant Scholasticism. Our Protestant friends who are fond of ridiculing the mediaeval schoolmen for their wranglings and useless disputations, will find this chapter very painful reading. "Compared with that of the Middle Ages," says our author, "Protestant scholasticism was much more barren and at the same time narrower and more oppressive." It was barren and dreary to the last degree. The reaction against all this manifested itself in Pietism. Germany was the first

to feel it. In England it was preceded by a period of rationalistic deism. The Evangelical pietism of Wesley, found an echo in New England, in the theology of Edwards. Becoming identified in the minds of many with Christianity, the result of the whole movement in many quarters was disaster. This is brought out in the chapter on Rationalism.

The author is in error when he identifies, as he seems to, the Catholic doctrine of human nature, with the Protestant doctrine of total depravity. According to Catholic teaching, when man fell, he fell to the level of man, not below his manhood. Many of the pessimistic views of man, expressed by the Fathers, refer to man considered historically. Dr. M'Giffert has not caught the meaning of the Tridentine decrees on this point. However, this misconception does not affect his conclusions on Protestantism, which is the subject of this book. This latest production of Dr. M'Giffert, will more than repay the reading.

BART. A. HARTWELL.

Bibelatlas in 20 Haupt- und 28 Nebenkarten. Von Hermann Guthe, Dr. Theol. und Phil., Professor an der Universität Leipzig, mit einem Verzeichniss der alten und neuen Ortsnamen: H. Wagner & E. Debes, Leipzig, 1911. Preis gebunden M. 12.

This Bible Atlas, the work of Dr. Guthe, of Leipzig, a scholar well known for his many important contributions to History and Theology, contains 20 principal and 28 secondary lithographic maps representing Palestine and the countries mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. This Atlas is a decided improvement on works of this kind. The author has availed himself fully of the recent discoveries in History, Geography and Archaeology. For example the latest results of the explorations and surveys of Drs. Brunow and Schumacher in the lands east of the Jordan, and those of Dr. Musil in the Sinaitic peninsula have been judiciously utilized, so that Maps 1, 2, and 4, as regards the delineation of the soil's surface, are entirely new. To facilitate the use of the Atlas for historical studies the maps have been arranged to correspond with the chronological order of the events which caused the geographical

changes. Thus there are 12 maps of Palestine showing at a glance the political vicissitudes of the Holy Land from the time of Saul to the destruction of the Second Temple. This series is completed by a map of modern Palestine and a plan of the City of Jerusalem. Students of Assyriology will be interested especially in Map 5 which shows the extent of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires during the eighth and seventh centuries B. C. They will find on it the names of all the important places mentioned in the cuneiform inscriptions so far deciphered. This beautiful map is accompanied by small plans of the ancient sites of the cities of Niniveh and Babylon as known to us from recent excavations.

The artistic make-up of this Atlas is not inferior to its intrinsic value. Though the pages are large, the book is not unwieldy, being of the same convenient size as the excellent *Handatlas* of Ernst Debes. The maps are very good lithographic prints; the mountain ranges are represented in gray brown, the frontiers of countries are marked in different bright colors, and the proper names in black letters, so that each map presents a neat appearance and every name on it is very distinct and legible. The Index contains 7000 geographical names, and the modern equivalents for ancient names are given whenever possible. We earnestly recommend this Atlas to teachers and students of the Holy Scriptures. It is up to date in every respect.

A. A. VASCHALDE.

Modern History. By Rev. Doctor Peter Fredet, revised and enlarged by Charles H. McCarthy, Ph. D. Professor of American History, Catholic University of America. John Murphy Company, Baltimore and New York, 1910. Pp. ix + 788 + 73.

Fredet's *Modern History* is well known and extensively used in our Catholic schools. According to the Publisher's Preface, hardly any alterations have been introduced in this new edition up to page 600. We may, therefore, confine our review to the latter section of the work. It is pleasing to note that in the revision more attention has been devoted to the social, economic and educational conditions; also that the newer tendencies in government such as the Initiative and the Referendum, have not

been overlooked. In regard to the individual countries, Ireland, too frequently little noticed in non-Catholic text-books, receives due attention. The gradual disappearance in England of the traditional bitterness towards the Catholic Church is recorded and the recent separation of Church and State in France is discussed. In the paragraph on the reconstruction of Germany the political difficulties springing from the national antipathy of the Polish provinces, of Alsace-Lorraine and of Schleswig-Holstein are indicated. Pertinent and impartial citations from non-Catholic periodicals help the student to form a correct judgment of the notorious Ferrer case out of which so much capital has been made to malign the Church. Several maps have been added in this revision and numerous attractive illustrations introduced. The book sells for the very modest price of ninety cents, an exceptionally low figure for a Catholic text-book.

N. A. WEBER, S. M.

Mass of the Immaculate Conception, No. 8 in C: For Men's Voices, in Two Choirs by Abel L. Gabert. Published by G. Schirmer, New York. Pp. 32. Price 50 cents, net.

Dignity and power, depth of religious feeling and intimate skill in its expression, mark this new choral work by Father Gabert. The inexhaustible wealth of suggestion embodied in that glorious liturgy which the One Church has handed down in uncorrupted purity from the early ages of the history of the Faith, has been utilized, musically, with keen appreciation and pious reverence.

The solemn beauty of the ritualistic words, the potency of their traditional appeal, are heightened rather than impinged upon by the clear and simple eloquence of their modern harmonic setting. The movement of the voices has been admirably managed throughout, and their separation into two choirs—one for first and second tenors and basses, the other (unison) for voices of medium range—gives ample opportunity for effective contrast and blending of tone-color. The absence of solos need not be regretted: so strong is the unity of spirit evinced in the choral development that, as the work stands, they would be practically superfluous.

The dramatic moments that occur in the text find an entirely logical working-out in the music, but in no way does this music make concessions in the direction of the theatrical or over-emphatic. A pure naturally expressive style and spiritual sincerity of utterance are common to the entire work, which merits, not only on this account, but because of its practical usefulness as well, the widest appreciation on the part of Catholic church musicians.

FREDERICK MARTENS.

The Chief Ideas of the Baltimore Catechism. By Rev. John E. Mullett. New York, Benziger Bros., 1911. Pp. 96.

Pastors and Catechists will welcome the appearance of this new work, which combines all the essential elements of the Baltimore Catechism with some timely additions, put in the form of simple questions and answers. This catechism has all the advantages of the older ones hitherto in use, and possesses in addition a simplicity and directness of presentation which greatly facilitates the labor of the teacher by enabling the child-mind easily to grasp and retain the matter proposed. The success of the method of catechetical instruction introduced by Father John Furniss, C.S.S.R., has long been recognized and appreciated; and it has been the aim of the author of the present new catechism to arrange his work along the same lines. This little book, therefore, is highly worthy of recommendation.

C. J. C.

The following important publications have been received and will be reviewed later:—

The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Southern Dialect otherwise called Sahidic and Thebaic, with critical apparatus, Literal English Translation, Register of Fragments and Estimate of the Version. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911. 3 vols., 8vo: Vol. I, The Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark, pp. xii, 648; Vol. II, The Gospels of St. Luke, pp. 479; Vol.

III, The Gospel of St. John, Register of Fragments, etc., Fac-similes, pp. 399, plates I-X.

ETUDES BIBLIQUES :—

Les Livres de Samuel, par le P. Paul Dhorme des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1910, 1 vol., 8vo, pp. 10, 448.

Le Livre d'Isaïe, traduction critique avec notes et commentaires par le P. Albert Condamin, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1905, 1 vol. 8°, raisin; pp. xix, 401.

L'Evangile Selon S. Marc, par le P. M.-J. Lagrange, des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1911, 1 vol. 8°, raisin; pp. cli, 456.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Summer School. The registration for the University Summer School for Teaching Sisters and Women Teachers has reached a gratifying figure, and the success of the School in point of numbers seems assured. So far the students come from more than twenty States and represent over fifty teaching communities. The Dean of the School is Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields; the Vice-Dean, V. Rev. Edward A. Pace, D. D.; and the Secretary, Rev. Patrick J. McCormick, S. T. L., all three professors of the University. Many of the Sisters will find accommodation in the vacant buildings that can be conducted as convents; others will reside in various convents of the city. The teaching staff numbers twenty-two and the School will be open from July 3rd to August 7th.

The Engineering Building, that accommodates also the new Heating, Light, and Power Plant of the University, is now in full operation. The professors and students have taken possession of their commodious and elegant quarters, equipped with all the latest devices for the teaching of these sciences. The classrooms, drawing-rooms, library, and professors' offices leave nothing to be desired. These Schools are located on the second floor of the Engineering Building, and they have also considerable space on the mezzanine and basement floors. All visitors admire the spacious and lofty boiler room, the splendid engine room, the hydraulic engineering room, etc. The new building is also an artistic edifice, and, with its 125 foot chimney, is a striking land mark. It is also the first University building to be erected on the new Boulevard Avenue that separates the University grounds from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Already a large number of prospective students from Washington and elsewhere have announced themselves.

Meeting of the Trustees. The Trustees of the University met in Divinity Hall Wednesday, April 26th, 1911. Archbishop Farley was elected Vice-President of the Board in succession to the late Archbishop Ryan. The plans of the new Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall were approved, and the immediate erection of one wing and the basement of the tower was authorized. A new Department of Ascetic and Pastoral Theology was created in the School of Theology, and in the School of Science the Department of Drawing, to include all the drawing common to the various classes of the School of Sciences.

The Teaching Staff of the University now numbers fifty. Of these 19 are full professors, 5 associate professors, 20 instructors, 6 assistants. They are distributed as follows:—10 in the School of Theology, 3 in the School of Law, 11 in the School of Philosophy, 10 in the School of Letters, and 16 in the School of Science.

Gifts. From the estate of Martin J. Kavanagh of Brooklyn, the University has received the sum of \$10,082.59. Mrs. Mary Mahony, of Brooklyn, left by will to the University, the sum of \$5,000. for a theological scholarship, and Miss Ellen Hagerty, of the same city, bequeathed to the University the sum of \$1,000. These donors have the profound gratitude and the constant prayers of the University for their eternal welfare.

Hibernian Scholarships. By the action of the late convention of the Ancient Order of Hibernians at Portland, Oregon, the scholarships established by various States have been raised from two hundred and fifty to four hundred dollars, and it is expected that this generous provision will increase the demand for these scholarships that are now among the best academic prizes within the reach of Catholic youth.

The Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall has been begun, and one wing of it will be ready for the opening of the Uni-

versity in October. This wing will contain rooms for sixty students, and will have in the basement a large and commodious recreation room. The basement of the tower will also be built and will give room for a commodious temporary chapel for the students of Gibbons Hall and Albert Hall. The material used is Port Deposit granite and the trimmings are Bedford limestone. This wing, 105 by 40 feet, will be three stories in height, and will be fire-proof throughout.

Lectures. Reverend Doctor Kerby will deliver an Address on "Catholic Women in Charity Work," at the National Convention of the St. Vincent de Paul Society in Boston June 6. Reverend Dr. Fox will deliver five Lectures on Socialism at Fordham University, New York, in August, at the invitation of the German Catholic Central-Verein.

The Catholic Educational Association will hold its eighth annual meeting in Chicago on June 26-29, 1911. The arrangements for the meeting have been practically completed.

Most Rev. Archbishop Quigley appointed the School Board and the presidents of educational institutions to act as a committee to take charge of the work, and with the energy and enterprise characteristic of Chicago people the work was promptly organized and the success of the convention is now assured. From the present indications it is safe to predict that the Association will hold its most important and successful meeting in Chicago.

The sessions of the conventions will be held at De Paul University, 1010 Webster Ave. The University has a splendid group of buildings, which the Vincentian Fathers have kindly placed at the disposal of the Association for the purposes of the convention.

A reception to the delegates will be held at the headquarters, the Great Northern Hotel, on Monday evening, June 26th, and the sessions of the convention will open with Mass on Tuesday morning, June 27. The usual order will be followed

in the various, meetings, and the Association has the reputation of holding hard working conventions. The interest of the various departments in their special work is shown by the crowded programs which they offer, and it will only be by careful adherence to the schedule that the work outlined can be accomplished. The usual public meeting will mark the close of the convention, and for this meeting the Chicago Auditorium, which is noted for its historic gatherings, has been secured.

Gifts to the Department of Mechanical Engineering. The New York Air Brake Co., Watertown, N. Y.:—One No. 5a Piston Valve Duplex Air Pump, Complete; One 26½ x 34 inch, Main Reservoir; One 12 x 33 inch, Auxiliary Reservoir. This equipment to be used for running volumetric efficiency, and steam consumption tests; and such other tests as are possible.

The Peneberthy Injector Co., Detroit, Mich. One Working Steam Injector; One Model Steam Injector.

The Ohio Injector Co., Wadsworth, Ohio. One Working Steam Injector. These injectors afford, in a practical way, a means of applying some of the most important principles in thermodynamics.

The D. V. Anderson Steam Trap Co., Cleveland, Ohio. One Sectional Model Anderson Steam Trap. This model is very useful in showing the working conditions, by which the steam condensation is drained from the steam mains.
